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INTRODUCTION
A.

AN ANACHRONISTIC AGENCY

Conceived as a nineteenth century outpost of Manifest Destiny' to

1. "Manifest Destiny" was a term that gained popularity in the 1840s to justify the
United States' westward expansion, including the appropriation of Mexican lands. See,
e.g., Richard Griswold del Castillo, Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War and the
Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo,5 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 31, 32 (1998).
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demarcate and guard expanded U.S. borders against erosion by
meandering rivers;' re-engineered in the mid-twentieth century in
order to impound and develop the boundary waters;' its friends and
critics alike say the International Boundary and Water Commission,
U.S. - Mexico (IBWC) has become a dangerous anachronism, left
behind by twenty-first century social, environmental, and political
issues that it is unwilling or unable to address.'
Scholars routinely catalogue the alleged failings of the IBWC's
dominant U.S. Section (USIBWC):' secretive;' beholden to regional
agricultural interests;' indifferent to disappearing water sources;8

2. The IBWC traces its institutional roots to the Convention of 1889. Convention
to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Changes in the Beds of the Rio Grande and
Colorado Rivers, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512 [hereinafter Convention of
1889].
3. The 1944 Water Treaty, which ushered in the modern age of the IBWC,
allocated boundary waters and provided for joint construction of international dams,
canals and other facilities. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219
[hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty].
4. See generally Helen Ingram & David R. White, InternationalBoundary and Water
Commission: An InstitutionalMismatchfor Resolving Transboundary Water Problems, 33 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 153 (1993); Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into
InstitutionalResponsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 397, 399-400 (1993); Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT.
RESOURCEsJ. 973, 974 (2000); D. Rick Van Schoik et al., Water Issues in the U.S.-Mexican
Border Region, 1-4 Dynamics of Human-Environment Interactions, in THE U.S.-MEXICAN
BORDER ENVIRONMENT: DYNAMICS OF HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS 123, 130
(Edward Sandalla ed., 2005) ("the treaty and the commission [...] are thought of by
critics and friends alike as anachronistic and unable to deal with today's problems")
available at http://www.scerp.org/pubs/m 1/chapter 1-4.pdf.
5. See generally Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement
Between Mexico and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands,
19 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 87, 113-14 (1986); Stephen P. Mumme, New Directions in United
States-Mexican Transboundary Environmental Management: A Critique of Current Proposals,
32 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 539, 545 (1992) [hereinafter Mumme, New Directions]; Geoffrey
Land, North American Free Trade and the Environment: Border Environmental Groups and the
available at
108-109
(1993)
NORTE
99,
FRONTERA
NAFTA,
5
http://aplicaciones.colef.mx:8080/fronteranorte/articulos/FN1 0/3fl0 Nafta and-the-future-ofMexicoUS-border.pdf; Stephen P. Mumme, Managing
Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Institutional Issues Raised by the 1990's
Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, 156-57 (1999) [hereinafter Mumme, Managing
Acute Water Scarcity]; Stephen P. Mumme, The US-Mexico International Boundary and
Water Commission in the Sustainable Development Era, 9 IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURrIY
BULLETIN 117, 122 (2001) [hereinafter Mumme, Sustainable Development Era] available
at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb9-2_mumme.pdf; Mark
Spalding, Addressing Border EnvironmentalProblems Now and in the Future: Border XXI and
Related Efforts, in THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER ENVIRONMENT, 105, 118 (Sw. Ctr. for Envtl.
Research & Policy et al eds. 2003) available at http://scerp.org/pubs/m1c6.pdf;
Stephen P. Mumme & DebraJ. Little, Leadership, Politics, and AdministrativeReform at the
United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and
Mexico, 47 Soc. ScI.J. 252, 260 (2010).
6. See generally Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and
Options, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 283, 284, 292 (1993); Robert D. Hayton, The Matter of
Public Participation,33 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 275, 277, 279 (1993).
7. See, e.g., M.H. Jamail & S.J. Ullery, International Water Use Relations Along the
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apathetic about associated ecological crises;' abusive to its employees;'o
lacking essential diplomatic and professional skills;" unresponsive to
the needs of a growing population;' 2 and hamstrung by a too-timid
Proposals for abolition or radical
reading of treaty language.'"
reformation of the USIBWC are legion. 4
The boundary and water treaties are also criticized as archaic and
inequitable, in part because they give the United States a
disproportionate share of boundary waters.'" In addition, the 1944
Sonoran Desert Borderlands, in ARID LANDS RESOURCE INFORMATION PAPERS 1, 17-18 (Ariz.
Univ. Office of Arid Lands Studies ed. 1979); Stephen P. Mumme, State Influence in
Foreign Policy Making: Water Related Environmental Disputes Along the United States-Mexico
Border, 38 W. POL. Q 620, 635 (1985) [hereinafter Mumme, State Influence]; Mary E.
Kelly, Commentary, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 299, 301-02 (1993); Stephen P. Mumme,
Advancing BinationalCooperation in TransboundaryAquifer Management on the U.S.-Mexico
Border, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 77, 89-90 (2005) [hereinafter Mumme,
Advancing Binational Cooperation]; Nicole Ries, Note, The (Almost) All-American Canal:
Conseo De DesarrolloEconomico De Mexicali v. United States and the Pursuit ofEnvironmental
justice in TransboundaryResource Management, 35 Ecology L.Q. 491, 524-26 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Szekely, supra note 4, at 399-400; Stephen Mumme, Minute 242 and
Beyond, Challenges and Opportunities for Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the
Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341, 34142 (2000); Robert E. Hall,
Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportunities Under International Law for
Groundwater Management in the United States-Mexico Border Region, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 873, 907, 910 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Charles R. Johnston, Jr., Comment, Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United
States Water Quality Dilemma, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 152, 164 (1972); Michael Gregory,
Environment, SustainableDevelopment, Public Participationand the NAFTA: A Retrospective, 7
J. ENVTL. L. & LMG. 99, 165 (1992); Spalding, supra note 5, at 120; Jennifer Pitt,
Dredgingfor Diplomacy? Colorado River Management at the United States-Mexico Border, 19
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 47, 53-54 (2006); Developments in the LawInternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1550, 1578 (1991).
10. See, e.g., Mumme & Little, supra note 5, at 262-63.
11. See, e.g., Bennett & Herzog, supra note 4, at 974; Jurgen Schmandt, Bi-National
Water Issues in the Rio Grande/RioBravo Basin, 4 WATER POLICY 137, 150, 152-53 (2002);
MARY KELLY & ALBERTO SZEKELY, CTR. FOR LATIN AM. STUDIES, MODERNIZING THE
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 2-3 (Feb. 2004), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4hj9d7nw.pdf.
12. See e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 113-114; John Altomare, Comment, Stemming
the Flow: The Role of InternationalEnvironmental Law in Seeking a Solution to the Sewage
Treatment Crisis at the Tijuana-San Diego Border Region, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 361, 390
(1990); Sanford E. Gaines, Bridges To A Better Environment: Building Cross-Border
InstitutionsForEnvironmental Improvement In The U.S.-Mexico BorderArea, 12 ARIz.J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 429, 442 (1995).

13. See, e.g., Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A Ground-Water
Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 399 (1975);
Sinclair, supra note 5, at 113-114; Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century "Minute,"
44 NAT. REsoURCESJ. 163, 164 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 114, 116-17; Gregory, supra note 9, at 165;
Mumme, New Directions, supra note 5, at 545; Ingram & White, supra note 4, at 174;
Szekely, supra note 4, at 399; Kelly, supra note 7, at 301-02; Gaines, supra note 12, at
442; Bennett & Herzog, supranote 4, at 974; KELLY & SZEKELY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
15. The 1944 Water Treaty and an earlier agreement entitled the United States to a
disproportionate share of boundary waters. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4
(Lower Rio Grande), art. 10 (Lower Colorado River); Convention Providing for the
Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, U.S.Mex., May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 [hereinafter, Convention of 1906]; see, e.g., Melissa
Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable Principles to
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Water Treaty has been criticized for giving preference to irrigation
while ignoring groundwater and ecological uses,'" and also for its
which privileges
of "Engineer-Commissioners,"'"
designation
construction expertise over essential management skills." Although
some have called for a new treaty to be administered by a new
institution, 9 others, doubting the political viability of such proposals,
suggest that amendments to treaties, combined with a thorough
housecleaning of inept leadership in the U.S. Section, and an infusion
of badly-needed professional and diplomatic talent, can salvage the
IBWC. 20
B.

CAN'T SEE THE STATUTES FOR THE TREATIES

Notwithstanding this crescendo of criticism, the IBWC literature is
strangely devoid of reference to U.S. domestic law, including statutes
that implement the boundary and water treaties, 21 serve as the
enabling legislation of the USIBWC," place the agency under the
supervision and control of the U.S. State Department, 2' and make its
duties subject to reassignment by the President.24 In addition to these
statutes, and even the treaties themselves endowing executive
authority,25 the U.S. Constitution gives the President vast executive
powers over foreign affairS26 and administrative agencies. 27 Indeed,

Determine Water Allocationfrom the Rio Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9 GEO. INT'L.
ENVrL. L. REv. 489, 498-99 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Revising the 1944 Water Treaty: Reflections on the Rio
Grande Drought Crises and Other Matters, 45 J. Sw., 649, 651-52 (2003); Allie Alexis
Umoff, An Analysis of the 1944 US.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 32
ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'YJ. 69, 84-87, 97.(2008).
17. The 1944 Water Treaty designates five officials for each section: an "EngineerCommissioner," two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a secretary. 1944 Water
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
18. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283; Schmandt, supranote 11, at 152-53; Kelly
& Szekely, supranote 11, at 2-3.
19. See, e.g., Burman & Cornish, supra note 13, at 397; Mumme, New Directions,supra
note 5, at 545.
20. See, e.g., Mumme, New Directions,supra note 5, at 545; Stephen P. Mumme, The
Case for Adding an Ecology Minute to the 1944 United States-Mexico Water Treaty, 15 TUL.
ENvTL. L.J. 239, 246, 255 (2002); Kelly & Szekely, supra note 11, at 2-3; Mumme &
Little, supra note 5, at 266-67.
21. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 277-277h (2010).
22. See id. § 277.
23. See, e.g., id. § 277a.
24. See id., §§ 277, 277b(a) (1), 277b(a) (2), 277c(a). See also infra note 32 and
corresponding text.
25. The 1944 Water Treaty itself recognizes the right of each nation to construct
treaty works through any public or private agency in accordance with domestic laws.
See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 24 and Protocol. The Treaty also specifies that
the State Department handle any joint action or agreement on the part of the United
States. Id. art. 2.
26. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authority to -appoint ambassadors); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (authority to "receive ambassadors and other public
ministers"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (authority as "commander in chief,").
27. Article II, section 1, clause 1, commonly referred to as the "Vesting Clause,"
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scholars debate whether the President has nearly exclusive powers in
certain foreign" and domestic matters.'
Eschewing any reference to this body of law, critics and
government agencies alike focus exclusively on intricate treaty
language that supposedly makes the USIBWC an autonomous
agency." This myopia begins with the USIBWC, which "considers
itself an independent federal government agency whose leader is
answerable only to the President."" Even the IBWC website, which
provides the full text of the boundary and water treaties and hundreds
of additional international agreements, somehow avoids any mention
of statutory authority."
Many prominent academic scholars have a different view of the
agency's alleged autonomy, confidently claiming that "the U.S. IBWC
was structured, in effect, as a congressional agency."" The Legal
Adviser's office at the State Department, presumably agnostic as to
whom the USIBWC should report, if anyone, acknowledges
responsibility for giving foreign policy guidance, as specified in the
treaties but believes "there is sufficient independence provided for in

states that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Section 2 establishes the executive departments, stating
that "[the President] may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in
each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices." Id. § 2, cl. 1. Section 2, clause 2, commonly referred to as the
"Appointments Clause", states the President may "nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by law." Id. § 2, cl. 2. Finally, the "Take Care Clause," at Article II, section
3, states that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Id. §
3.
28. It has been argued that the president has "unilateral authority" to interpret or
reinterpret treaties, notwithstanding their domestic law effect. SeeJohn Yoo, Politics as
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation,89
CALIF. L. REv. 851, 868-870, 878 (2001); but see, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, TheJudicial
Power and Treaty Delegation,90 CALIF. L. REv. 1263 (2002).
29. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549-50 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2247 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 697 (2007);
Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload,
and the UnitaryExecutive, 12 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 357, 359 (2010).
30. The 1944 Water Treaty appears to vest expansive powers in the IBWC and its
U.S.and Mexican sections; but, a careful reading discloses that exercise of those
powers is made subject to approval by the respective governments. 1944 Water Treaty,
supra note 3, passim. In addition, Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme to implement the 1944 Water Treaty and other boundary and water treaties.
See 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011).
31. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INSPECTION, U.S.
SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 10 (2005)

OIG,

[hereinafter

2005

REPORT],

available

at

http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/44344.pdf.
32.

See

U.S.

INTERNATIONAL

BOUNDARY

&

http://www.ibwc.gov/home.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
33. Mumme & Little, supranote 5, at 256.

WATER

COMMISSION,
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administrative matters that it cannot be considered as an
The State Department's
organizational part of the Department."'
"It is not within
similarly
contends:
Office of Inspector General (OIG)
or desire) to
(or
competence
jurisdiction
OIG's or the Department's
35
the OIG
Ironically,
operations."
provide oversight of USIBWC
Congress
and
the
agencies
government
U.S.
acknowledges "that most
that
no other
agency
and
view the [State] Department as the parent
"36
exists.
choice
logical
C. GROSS MISMANAGEMENT, IMMINENT CATASTROPHE, AND PLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY

A limited investigation of USIBWC headquarters in 2005, during
which no attempt was made to inspect levees or "follow up each
allegation of neglect,"3 nevertheless led the State Department OIG to
warn: "Internal management problems have engulfed USIBWC,
threatening its essential responsibilities for flood control and water
management in the American Southwest." 3 Among other things, the
investigation found that the U.S. Commissioner "feels he can fire and
hire, set salaries including his own, and generally run his agency
without reference to other authority."" A follow up report in 2006
stated that, while there is no immediate crisis, a major storm or flood
could cause considerable damage and "usher in bouts of finger
[d]epartments, agencies, and jurisdictions
pointing between
concerned."4 0
In response, the State Department insists that legislation would be
needed to give it control over the USIBWC, yet still refuses to seek the
mythical missing mandate.4 1 Ironically, however, the Department
jealously guards its supposedly small patch of bureaucratic Astroturf.4 2
34. Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary
Resource Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 661, 679-80 (1990).
35. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INSPECTION, U.S.
SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 10 (2006)
at
available
REPORT],
2006
OIG,
[hereinafter
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/83888.pdf.
36. Id. See also, e.g., U.S. - Mex. Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Pub. L.
109-448, § 3, 120 Stat. 3328, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006) (defining the IBWC
as "an agency of the Department of State.").
37. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supranote 31, at 31 (noting that the OIG found "disturbing
evidence ... that maintenance of infrastructure is falling behind").
38. Id.at3.
39. Id. at 5, 11 (noting that the U.S. Commissioner set his own salary at a level
equivalent to that of an armed forces secretary, even though the USIBWC has fewer
than 300 employees).
40. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 35, at 4; see also Press Release, Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility, Obscure Border Agency Worst in Federal
Government (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.peer.org/news/news-id.php?row-id=1228.
41. SeeOIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 3535, at 5.
42. See, e.g., Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678-79 (describing the USIBWC's
success in resisting "predatory initiatives of other domestic Agencies", through the
support and political influence of the Secretary of State).
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Watching from the sidelines, the State Department thus preserves
"plausible deniability" that it should be held responsible for the
ensuing devastation. " The State Department's cloak of plausible
deniability, however, does not shield the President, who is extremely
ill-served by such gamesmanship. 4
Meanwhile, the White House shuffles Commissioners in and out of
the U.S. Section on an almost yearly basis, making little effort at
substantive reform and , at times dramatically increasing the agency's
budget, 6 thus rewarding gross malfeasance. This all-too-familiar
pattern of incentivizing failure 7 results in still more reports of fraud,
waste and abuse," leading one prominent environmental group to

43. The State Department may hope to hide among the alphabet soup of agencies
implicated in other recent disasters, such as the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill or
Hurricane Katrina, where the "finger pointing" implicated the former Minerals
Management Service (MMS), or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), respectively. See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, A
Tale of Two ImperiledRivers: Reflections from a Post-KatrinaWorld, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 60001, 600 n.5 (2007) (regarding agency blame for failed levees and weak emergency
response). The State Department is well-schooled in plausible deniability. See, e.g.,
David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking
Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 595, 657-658 (2006)
("One need only recall the account given by former Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke
concerning when the second Bush administration and National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice had information concerning possible terror attacks prior to 9/11.
Rice demonstrated as clearly as possible during her statements the ways that imprecise
record keeping allows plausible deniability as part of a strategy to avoid
accountability.").
44. No one knows this better than President Obama's pick to head the State
Department's Office of Legal Advisor, former Yale Dean and long-time international
human rights advocate, Harold Hongzu Koh. Indeed, one would expect Mr. Koh to
waste no time pursuing comprehensive reform throughout the State Department,
having dendunced its most recent decade of depredations. See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635
(2007).
45. See OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 11 ("There have been five
commissioners, permanent or acting, in the past five years, contrasting dramatically
There have been three more U.S. Section
with the stability of the past.")
Commissioners since 2004. History of Section Commissioners, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMMISSION,

http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/CommishHistory.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
46. See generally SEC'Y OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 683-696
at
available
BUDGET
2011],
STATE
DEP'T
[hereinafter
(2011)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 31, 36, 56 (2010) [hereinafter
available
at
ARRA
Plan
20091,
STATE
DEP'T
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126110.pdf.

47. See Zellmer, supra note 43, at 600-01 (regarding increased agency budgets in
the wake of Katrina malfeasance).
48. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert McCarthy, USIBWC General Counsel, to
Inspector General, Department of State (July 28, 2009) [hereinafter McCarthy Memo
at
available
OIG],
to
http://wv.peer.org/docs/tx/09_29_9_McCarthy-IG-complaint.pdf. See also 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.101(b) (11) (2011) ("Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and
corruption to appropriate authorities"); Laura D. Francis, Bureau of National Affairs,

Inc., MSPB Appeal Claims General Counsel Firedfor Making Protected Disclosures, 47 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. 1124 (Oct. 6, 2009).
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proclaim the USIBWC "arguably the most incompetent and abusive
agency in federal service"."9
Today, the USIBWC oversees a boundary region on the cusp of
calamity, as polluted aquifers threaten to run dry,o irrigation gobbles
up nearly all available water," ecological devastation spreads,52 and
the flow of sewage imperils border communities. In addition, flood
control levees are beginning to crumble, 4 while millions of dollars are
wasted on projects having nothing to do with the agency's mission. 5
Furthermore, the USIBWC employs special interest advisory
committees that mimic public participation, 6 whereas agency
environmental regulations that were adopted without public input
exclude a vast array of agency projects from significant review.
Meanwhile, inside the agency, deeply disillusioned employees rate

49. Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Obscure
Border Agency Worst in Federal Government (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.peer.org/news/news~id.php?rowid=1228. (As a matter of full disclosure,
PEER attorneys have represented the author in a whistleblower retaliation appeal to
the MSPB).
50. See, e.g., FAR WEST TEXAS PLANNING WATER GROUP, FAR WEST TEXAS WATER PLAN
at
available
Plan],
2011
FWTWPG
1-71
(2011) [hereinafter
1-47,
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/wrpi/rwp/3rdRound/201 1_RWP/RegionE/PDF's/Comp
leteFinalReport.pdf; PAUL WESTERHOFF ET AL., DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN
THE US-MEXICO BORDER REGION NUMBER W-03-19 35-36 (2004), available at
scerpfiles.org/cont-mgt/doc-files/W-03-19-final.pdf.
51. See, e.g., LOWER Rio GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLANNING GROUP, NRS
CONSULTING ENGINEERS FINAL PLAN: REGION M 2011 REGIONAL WATER PLAN 2-14 ( 2010)
at
available
Plan],
2011
LRGRWPG
[hereinafter
http://www.riograndewaterplan.org/waterplan.php (follow "Chapter 2: Current and
Projected Population & Water Demand for the Rio Grande Region" hyperlink).
52. See, e.g., Once a Mighty Delta:History, ENVT'L DEF. FUND,
ttp://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentlD=2642 (last updated June
20, 2003).
53. See e.g., Wren Abbott, State Orders IWBC to Clean up Dischargeinto River,
NOGALES INT'L,
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/10/27/news/doc4cc6flc82f37c8
25012667.prt (Oct. 26, 2010, 10:42 AM).
54. See, e.g., David Crowder, Losing Money on the Levees, EL PASO, INC..
http://elpasoinc.com/readArticle.aspx?issueid=300&xrec=5583 (last visited Jan. 29,
2011, 2:12 PM); McCarthy Memo to OIG, supranote 48, at 2-3.
55. See, e.g., McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 3-4 (regarding subsidies to
Department of Homeland Security for a barrier portion of ajoint levee-border barrier
structure).
56. See Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 5, 86 Stat. 770
(as amended (1997)) (prohibiting special interests from inappropriately influencing
the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee). See generally Press
Release, USIBWC Seeks Applicants For Colorado River Citizens' Forum (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/PressRelease_052009.pdf; Lower Rio
Grande Citizens'ForumMeeting, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(last visited Jan. 29,
http://www.ibwc.gov/CitizensForums/CFLower_RG.html
2011).
57. See Operational Procedures for Implementing Section 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 46 Fed. Reg. 44083, 44086 (Sept. 2, 1981)
[hereinafter, USIBWC NEPA Procedures].
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their leadership as among the worst in the federal government.58 And,
most alarming of all, the agency conceals essential information, and
downplays the threat of imminent catastrophic dam failures and
disastrous flooding.59
D.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION

Due to the State Department's pusillanimous refusal to live up to
its statutory responsibility for oversight of the agency, and its admitted
lack of competence or desire to do so, both it and the USIBWC should
be stripped of responsibility for all but the diplomatic aspects of treaty
administration. All other treaty projects, personnel, and funds should
be turned over to more competent domestic agencies.
Not
coincidentally, this would also permit the IBWC to eliminate the
antiquated treaty requirement that engineers dominate agency
leadership, rather than an array of competent professionals from a
variety of appropriate disciplines. The agency would thus be free to
focus on adaptive treaty interpretation, pursuant to treaty provisions
giving the IBWC the authority to interpret the treaty and adopt new
binding international agreements, 0 and to pursue new policy
initiatives, with maximum public participation, in areas such as water
conservation,
water
quality,
groundwater
protection,
and
environmental restoration.'
Admittedly, whether the USIBWC can or should survive, even as a
diplomatic institution, is open to question. Even without a conscious
policy to divest the USIBWC of responsibilities, the agency's role is
increasing secondary to other agencies and institutions, such as the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC). 6 Even more

58. , Partnership for Public Service and American University's Institute for the
Study of Public Policy, BEST PLACES TO WORK 2010, (last visitedJan. 29, 2011, 2:37 PM),
availableat http://www.bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/detail/GW00/pdf.
59. See, e.g., Emma Perez-Trevino, Deficiencies Remain at Two Dams, BROWNSVILLE
HERALD, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.allbilsiness.com/government/government-bodiesoffices-us-federal-government/I14877090-1.html.
60. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 25; c.f, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 705-713 (1998) (discussing
constitutionally-implied judicial powers for dynamic treaty interpretation among
private parties).
61. Although the IBWC has been loath to exercise its power to interpret and
extend the treaty to adapt to changing circumstances, critics have recognized the
wasted potential. See, e.g., Ingram & White, supra note 4, at 164-165. The United
States has also been unwilling to risk an unfavorable outcome by referring disputes to
impartial mediation in the IBWC. Note, The InternationalJoint Commission (United StatesCanada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (United States-Mexico):
Potentialfor Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 INT'L L. & POL. 499, 516
(1973).
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NAISD-00-26, U.S.-MEXIcO BORDER 16
(2000) ("With the creation of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and
North American Development Bank, the role of the Boundary Commission in
transboundary environmental infrastructure issues has been reduced."), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA374250&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf). See also Michael
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likely to displace the USIBWC, by dint of their size, powerful
constituencies, technical competence- and record of remarkable
engineering accomplishments, are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation.'
Unfortunately, both also have dismal records of environmental
destruction, secrecy, wasteful spending, and allegiance to regional
special interests. 6 The best hope for U.S.-Mexico boundary water
relations to achieve enlightened national and international policies is
to separate diplomacy from the money-driven, regionally-controlled
agenda of such institutions.66 This is also the last best hope for the
salvation of the USIBWC, and it can be accomplished without new
legislation or treaties, by exercise of executive authority and adaptive
treaty interpretation.
II. THE BOUNDARY AND WATER TREATIES
A. TREATY SOURCES
The word "treaties" refers to agreements made "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate." 67 International agreements that
are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent may be
concluded solely on the basis of presidential authority or on some
form of legislative authorization, including authority derived from a
treaty to which the Senate has already given its advice and consent.'
Robins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of Free Trade and The
Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 134 (1993) ("The IBWC, however, has
not been effective in addressing the major environmental problems on the border.").
63. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114
Stat. 2572 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Army to manage various projects
for flood control including the Nogales Wash and its tributaries).
64. See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION (2000),
http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (recounting the construction of the
Hoover Dam, the Central Valley Project, the Colorado River Storage Project, and the
Central Arizona Project).
65. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a "Post-Modern"
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 1285, 1285-87 (2004);
Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641, 679-82 (1999);
Zellmer, supra note 43, at 602; William deBuys, Navigating the River of Our Future: The
Rio Poco-Grande,41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265, 269 (2001) ("Through the post-war years
the Bureau and the Army Corps of Engineers, in one of the unhealthiest bureaucratic
competitions of all time, sought to outdo each other in building dams and reservoirs
throughout the West. The Rio Grande did not escape their attention.").
66. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 369, 374-376 (2010) (International water law assumes "that transboundary
rivers should be shared in such a way that allows each riparian state a realistic
opportunity to make an equitable and reasonable utilization of this water.. . . All
current formulations of equitable apportionment derive from the 1966 Helsinki Rules
and the refinement of the Rules in the July 8, 1997, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses").
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68. See MICHAELJOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32528 INTERNATIONAL LAw
AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFEcr UPON U.S. LAw 1, 3 (2010), available at
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Pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC has entered into
numerous such international agreements in the form of "Minutes,"
which serve to implement or extend treaty provisions.'
The State Department is responsible for compliance with statutory
reporting and publishing requirements for international agreements
other than treaties submitted to Congress. These authorities provide
that an international agreement may not be concluded on behalf of
the United States without prior consultation with the Secretary of
State, and that reportable agreements must be transmitted to Congress
within sixty days of entry into force.7 o The Department's Office of
Legal Adviser delegates this responsibility to the Office of Treaty
Adviser, which in 2003 acknowledged with "shock and chagrin" that it
had failed to comply with this responsibility with respect to over 600
agreements between 1996 and 2003."
The IBWC treaties and selected Minutes are included in "Treaties
in Force," a list maintained by the State Department,72 and (since
1945) in the "Treaties and Other International Acts Series" (TIAS),
also published by the State Department.n Citations to IBWC treaties
and Minutes in this article are to one of the above sources, if available,
or to another U.S. Treaty source,74 if available. In the case of many
IBWC Minutes not published elsewhere, the text of the Minutes may
be found on the IBWC website.75
B. TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO AND GADSDEN TREATY
The creation of the IBWC -

and perhaps its karma -

was

foreshadowed by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo7 and the

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf.
69. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 25; see also Minutes Between the United
States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties Minutes/Minutes.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
70. Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972).
71. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT No. ISP-C-05-01, REVIEW OF TREATY
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE OFFICE OF TREATY AFFAIRS 2 (2004), available at
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/146709.pdf.
72. UNITED STATES STATE DEP'T ,TREATIES IN FORCE A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE 178-79 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/tif/index.htm.
73. Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/index.htm.
74. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST) (19501982); Executive Agreement Series (EAS) (1928-1945); Treaty Series (TS) (17951945); U.S. Statutes at Large (Stat.) (until 1948); Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, compiled under the direction
of Charles I. Bevans (Bevans); United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS).
75. Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L BOUNDARY
& WATER COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2011).
76. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo].
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Gadsden Treaty of 1853," which established temporary joint
commissions to survey, map, and demarcate with ground landmarks
the United States and Mexico boundary. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ended the war between the United States and Mexico,
designated the Rio Grande as the Texas border, reduced the size of
Mexico by more than half, and doubled the territory of the United
States, including parts of present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico,
The Gadsden Treaty
Texas, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah."
reestablished the southern boundary of New Mexico and Arizona to
enable the United States to construct a railroad to the west coast along
a preferred southern route, and transferred an additional twenty-nine
million acres from Mexico to the United States." Shamefully, the
State Department attempts to foster collective American amnesia
about this imperialist conquest of Mexico,so the basis for a continuing
neocolonial relationship.8
C. CONVENTION OF 1884

As lands adjacent to boundary rivers were settled and developed
for agriculture into the late nineteenth century, questions increasingly
arose as to the location of the boundary when the rivers changed their
courses and transferred tracts of land from one side of a river to the
other. The two Governments established from time to time temporary
commissions to resurvey and demarcate the boundaries. One such
temporafy Commission was established pursuant to the Convention of
1882, which specified that each nation appoint a "surveying party,
77. See Treaty of Boundary, Cessation of Territory, Transfer of Isthmus
Tehuantepec, U.S.-Mex., art. I, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031' [hereinafter Gadsden
Treaty].
78. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 76; See, e.g., The Treaty of Guadalupe
OURDOCUMENTS.GOV,
Hidalgo,
(last visited Jan. 11,
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc,php?flash=true&doc=26
2011); See generally, Symposium: Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on its
150th Anniversary, 5 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1998).
79. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-59, TREATY OF GUADALUPE
HIDALGO, FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND
at
(2004), . available
32
NEW
MEXICO
CLAIMS
IN
GRANT
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0459.pdf. See also Treaty Terminating Article VIII of
the Boundary Treaty of December 30, 1853 (Gadsen Treaty), U.S.-Mex., April 13,
1937, 52 Stat. 1457.
80. For example, a recent "Background Note" on Mexico describes the country's
demographics, economy, geography, political history, and foreign relations, with
specific reference to the "decade-long struggle for independence from Spain"
between 1810 and 1820, and "the invasion of French forces in 1862," but cynically
skips over the Mexican-American War without mention. See Background Note: Mexico,
U.S. STATE DEP'T (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm.
81.

See, e.g., MICHAEL PARENTI, AGAINST EMPIRE 33, 38-39 (1995)

(discussing the

impacts of United States global domination); SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, UNEQUAL PARTNERS:
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 2 (2010); Gilbert G Gonzilez & Ratil Fernandez,
Empire and the Origins of Twentieth-Century Migrationfrom Mexico to the United States, 71
PAC. HIST. REV. 19, 19 (2002).
82. United States-Mexico Convention Providing for an International Boundary
Survey to Relocate the Existing Frontier Line Between the Two Countries West of the
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consisting of an Engineer-in-Chief, two Associates, one of whom shall
be a practical astronomer, and such number of assistant engineers and
Meeting together, the two
associates as it may deem proper.""
surveying parties were deemed the International Boundary
Commission (IBC)." By adoption of the Convention of November 12,
1884, the two nations agreed to maintain as the boundary the center of
the normal channels of the Rio Grande and Rio Colorado,
notwithstanding "slow and gradual" changes in the courses of those
rivers.
D. CONVENTION OF 1889
By the Convention of March 1,. 1889, the Governments of the
United States and Mexico re-established the IBC, which was intended
as another temporary body to apply the boundary principles previously
agreed upon." This time, however, its life was extended indefinitely,
first by agreement in 1900, " and again by article 2 of the 1944 Water
Treaty." The Convention of 1889 vested exclusive jurisdiction over
boundary questions along the Rio Grande or Colorado Rivers in the
IBC.8 ' The convention specifies the appointment of a Commissioner,
a Consulting Engineer, Secretaries, and Interpreters by each nation to
compose the IBC.9 o The IBC was empowered to investigate any
changes to the river boundary caused by avulsion or erosion and to
apply the respective principles of the 1884 Convention." The IBC was
to determine whether any works constructed in the rivers were
permitted or prohibited by prior treaties," subpoena witnesses," and
The Banco Convention of 1905
make binding determinations.
modified the Convention of 1884 to retain the Rio Grande and the
Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. II, July 29, 1882, 22 Stat. 986 [hereinafter Convention of
The
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/TREATYOF_1882.pdf.
1882],
Convention was renewed on Dec. 5, 1885, 25 Stat. 1390, and again on February 13,
1889, 25 Stat. 1493.
83. Convention of 1882, supra note 82, at art. II.
84. Id.
85. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico Touching the International Boundary Line Where it Follows the Bed of the
Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado, U.S.-Mex., art. I, Nov.12, 1884, 24 Stat. 1011
[hereinafter Convention of 1884].
86. Convention of 1889, supra note 2, at art. I.
87. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the
two Governments, Known as the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21,
1900, 31 Stat. 1936. There were numerous temporary extensions: Aug. 24, 1894, 28
Stat. 1213; Nov. 6, 1896, 29 Stat. 857; Oct. 29, 1897, 30 Stat. 1625; Dec. 2, 1898, 30 Stat.
1744.
88. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2.
89. Convention of 1889, supranote 2, at art. I.
90. Id. at art. II.
91. Id. at art. IV.
92. Id. at art.V.
93. Id. at art.VII.
94. Id. at art. VIII.
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Colorado River as the international boundary.
E. CONVENTION OF 1906

The Convention of May 21, 1906, provided for the distribution
between the United States and Mexico of the waters of the Rio Grande
above Fort Quitman, Texas for the eighty-nine-mile international
boundary reach of the Rio Grande through the El Paso-Juirez Valley.
This Convention allotted to Mexico 60,000 acre-feet annually of the
waters of the Rio Grande to be delivered in accordance with a monthly
schedule at the headgate to Mexico's Acequia Madre just above Juirez,
To facilitate such deliveries, the United States
Chihuahua.
constructed, at its expense, the Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico.
of
The Convention includes the proviso that "[iin case ...
extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in
the United States, the amount of water delivered to the Mexican Canal
shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water delivered to
lands under said irrigation system in the 'United States," downstream
of Elephant Butte Dam."
F. CONVENTION OF 1933
At the Convention of February 1, 1933, the two governments
agreed to jointly construct, operate, and maintain, through the IBC,
the Rio Grande Rectification Project, which straightened and
stabilized the 155-mile river boundary through the highly developed El
Paso-Juirez Valley. The project further provided for the control of
the river's floods through this Valley."
G. 1944 WATER TREAIY
The Treaty of February 3, 1944 for the "Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande" marks the
modern era of the IBWC." Article 1 defines various terms used in the
treaty. Article 2 indefinitely extends the Convention of 1889; changes
the name of the IBC to the IBWC; specifies a structure comprising a
United States Section and a Mexican Section; requires that each
section designate an "Engineer Commissioner ... two principal
engineers, a legal advisor and a secretary"; entrusts the IBWC with
authority for "settlement of all disputes" that may arise under the
95. Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Elimination of the
Bancos in the Rio Grande from the Effects of Article II of the Treaty of November 12,
1884, U.S.-Mex., arts. I, II, Mar. 20, 1905, 35 Stat.1863.
96. See Convention of 1906, supra note 15. A 1987 agreement provided for rediversion of Rio Grande waters allocated to Mexico under the Convention of 1906.
Boundary Waters Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico, June
24-Nov. 10, 1987, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 11,549.
97. Convention for the Rectification of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 1, 1933, 48
Stat. 1621 [hereinafter Convention of 1933].
98. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3; see also Mexican Water Treaty Reservations:
HearingBefore thw S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 79th Cong. 3 (1945).
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treaty; provides that the IBWC "shall in all respects have the status of
an international body"; and specifies that "wherever .. . Treaty
[provisions call] for joint action or joint agreement by the two
[g]overnments, or for the furnishing of reports, studies or plans to the
two [g]overnments, or similar provisions ... [such] matter[s] ... shall
be handled by or through the Department of State of the United
States and the [Secretariat] of Foreign Relations of Mexico."'
Article 3 sets forth a "guide" for the joint use of international
waters, with the following order of preference: "(1) Domestic and
municipal uses, (2) Agriculture and stock-raising, (3) Electric power,
(4) Other industrial uses, (5) Navigation, (6) Fishing and hunting, (7)
Any other beneficial uses which may be determined by the
Commission." In addition, the treaty provides that "[a]ll of the
foregoing uses shall be subject to any sanitary measures or works which
may be mutually agreed upon by the two [g]overnments, which hereby
agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border
sanitation problems."

100

Article 4 of the 1944 Water Treaty allocated the waters of the Rio
Grande from Fort Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico, between the United
States and Mexico. The treaty allocates to Mexico: (1) "all of the
waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the San
Juan and Alamo Rivers"; (2) "[t]wo-thirds of the flow [in] the main
channel of the Rio Grande from the Conchos, San Diego, San
Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo,"
subject to certain provisions; and (3) "one-half of all other flows ...
occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande" downstream from
Fort Quitman.
The treaty then allocates to the United States: (1) "[a]ll of the
waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the Pecos
and Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring and Alamito, Terlingua, San
Felipe and Pinto Creeks"; (2) one-third of the flow reaching the main
channel of the river from the six named measured tributaries from
Mexico and provides that "this third shall not be less, as an average
amount in cycles of five consecutive years, than 350,000 acre-feet
annually"; and (3) "[o]ne-half of all other flows .. . occurring in the
main channel of the Rio Grande" downstream from Fort Quitman.'o
Article 4 also provides that if an "extraordinary drought" prevents
Mexico from being able to deliver the 350,000 acre-feet annual average
required from the Mexican tributaries to the Rio Grande, "any
deficiencies existing at the end of the .. . five-year cycle shall be made
up in the following five-year cycle with water from the ... measured
tributaries" to which the United States has the right to a one-third
share. The term, "extraordinary drought," is not defined.'o2
99. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 1-2. Article 2 also terminated the
Convention of November 21, 1900 between the United States and Mexico. Id. at art. 2.
100. Id. at art.3.
101. Id.atart.4.
102. Id. at art. 4.
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Article 5 provides for the two Governments to jointly construct
dams on the main channel of the Rio Grande, for the conservation,
storage and regulation of the river's flow.'0 3 Articles 6 and 7 provide
for the IBWC to study, investigate and report to the governments on
such flood control works, including levees, floodways, works for
canalization and rectification, and hydroelectric facilities that the
IBWC finds should be built on the boundary rivers.o4
Article 8 provides for regulations to be adopted, subject to
amendment, providing that dams above the lowest on the Rio Grande
maintain the maximum quantity of water in storage consistent with
irrigation use, flood control, and power requirements.'o Article 9
provides that in the event of "extraordinary drought," which again is
not defined, "water stored in the international storage reservoirs and
belonging to the country enjoying. . . abundant water supply may be
of the [IBWC], for use of the country
withdrawn, with . . . consent
106

undergoing the drought."
Article 10 provides that a guaranteed annual quantity of 1.5
million acre-feet of the waters of the Colorado River are allotted to
Mexico. In the event of "extraordinary drought" (again not defined)
deliveries to Mexico are reduced proportionately to the reduction in
U.S. consumption.1o' Article 11 provides for timelines, places, and
methods of delivery of Mexican water, including by use of the AllAmerican Canal.'
Article 12 allowed Mexico to divert its allocation of water by
providing Mexico the authority to construct a main diversion structure
in the Colorado River, below the California-Baja California boundary
line. It further provides Mexico with the authority to build, at its own
expense, within the United States, any works it may need to protect
Mexican lands from floods and seepage that the construction and
operation of the diversion structure might cause.'"
Article 13 provides that the IBWC will study the need for
construction of flood control works on the Lower Colorado and to
make recommendations to the two governments for construction of
such works as are deemed necessary."'0 Article 14 provides that in
exchange for use of the All-American Canal to deliver Mexican waters,
Mexico shall pay a share of the cost of construction and operation of
the Imperial Dam and a section of the canal."' Article 15 concerns
schedules for delivery of Mexico's share of Colorado River waters."'

103. Id. at art. 5.
104. Id. at arts. 6-7.
105. Id. at art. 8.
106. Id. at art. 9(f).
107. Id. at art. 10.
108. Id. at art. 11.
109. Id. at art. 12(a).
110. Id. at art. 13.
111. Id. at art. 14.
112. Id. at art. 15.
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Article 16 calls for the IBWC to investigate and make
recommendations to the two governments for equitable distribution of
the waters of the Tijuana River system and for construction of flood
control works and works to promote "domestic, irrigation and other
feasible uses of the waters.""
Article 17 concerns general provisions allowing use of
international river channels for discharge of flood waters."' Article 18
makes international reservoirs formed by IBWC dams free for use by
residents of both countries and prohibits their use for military
Article 19 provides for adoption of regulations
purposes."'
concerning international power plants."' Article 20 specifies that each
country is free to construct its share of works through any public or
private entity, not limited to the IBWC itself, with the portion of works
located in each country being subject to its respective laws.' 17
Article 21 provides that the international boundary shall not be
affected by the creation of reservoirs pursuant to construction of
international dams."' Article 22 provides that the Convention of 1933
shall govern boundary matters where canalization or rectification
works are carried out on the Rio Grande or Colorado River."' Article
23 provides that where private property is required for construction of
treaty works, the country in which such property is located will bear
the cost of acquiring such property and that joint works or portions
thereof shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the country in which they
are located.o20
Article 24 provides the IBWC with the authority to "to initiate and
carry on investigations and develop plans for the works which are to be
constructed ... in accordance with the provisions of this and other
treaties or agreements"; to construct, operate and maintain such works
"in accordance with the respective domestic laws of each country";
and "[t]o settle all differences that may arise between the two
[g]overnments with respect to the interpretation or application of this
Treaty, subject to the approval of the two [g] overnments." 121
Article 25 empowers the IBWC to interpret and apply the
provisions of the treaty through the "Minute" system. The decisions
of the U.S. and Mexican Sections are to be recorded as Minutes and
sent to each government within three days of signature by the
Commissioners. Each government, the Department of State of the
United States and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations of Mexico must
approve the Minute within thirty days of receiving it. If there is no

113. Id. at art. 16.
114. Id. at art. 17.
115, Id. at art. 18.
116. Id. at art. 19.
117. Id. at art. 20.
118. Id. at art. 21.
119. Id. at art. 22.
120. Id. at art. 23.
121. Id. at art. 24.
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objection, the Minute becomes a binding agreement and extension of
the treaty between the two countries. 22
Articles 26 and 27 of the 1944 Water Treaty are transitory
provisions for implementation of the treaty, and Article 28 provides for
ratification of the treaty.12 ' The Protocol, which is made a part of the
treaty, re-emphasizes that where public works are located wholly within
one country and used only partly for meeting requirements of the
treaty, jurisdiction and control over such works will remain with the
designated federal agencies of that country, and such agencies are to
coordinate with its section of the IBWC. International works and those
constructed exclusively for treaty purposes are to remain under the
jurisdiction of the IBWC, in accordance with the treaty, although each
government may utilize the services of any public or private entity
pursuant to its respective domestic laws.12 1
H. 1963 CHAMIZAL CONVENTION
The Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963, resolved the
Chamizal dispute, a nearly 100-year-old boundary problem at El PasoJuirez. The dispute arose in the late nineteenth century when the
course of the Rio Grande river moved, and in the process transferred
some six hundred acres of territory to the north side of the river. The
dispute grew increasingly bitter after the United States refused to
abide by a 1911 arbitration award in favor of Mexico.'12 The 1963
Convention provided for the relocation of 4.4 miles of the channel of
the Rio Grande, thereby transferring over four hundred acres to the
south side of the river.126
1. 1970 BOUNDARY TREATY
The Boundary Treaty of November 23, 1970 provides that the Rio
Grande and the Colorado Rivers would remain the international
boundaries, and also resolved other pending boundary disputes.12 7
The treaty also recognizes the necessity for implementing legislation in
each country.128 It then provides for restoration and preservation of

122. Id. at art. 25.
123. Id. at arts. 26-28.
124. Id. at Protocol.
125. See Convention for the Arbitration of the Chamizal Case, U.S.-Mex., June 24,
1910, 36 Stat. 2481; Supplementary Protocol to the Chamizal Arbitration, U.S.-Mex.,
Dec. 5, 1910, 33 Stat. 2487. See, e.g., SHELDON B. LIss, A CENTURY OF DISAGREEMENT: THE
CHAMIZAL CONFLICT 1864-1964 33-36 (1965).
126. See Convention for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal, U.S.-Mex.,
Aug. 29, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 21.
127. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande
and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Nov. 23, 1970,
23 UST 371 [hereinafter 1970 Boundary Treaty] (terminating the Convention of 1884
and any inconsistent provisions of prior agreements, including the Convention of
1889, the Convention of 1933, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the Gadsden
Treaty).
128. See id. at 374-75.
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the character of the Rio Grande as the international boundary, in
order to minimize changes in the channel, and resolve potential future
sovereignty issues that might occur as a result.'29 The treaty further
provides for a procedural framework that attempts to prevent the loss
of either country's territory due to future changes in the river's
course.'s It specifically recognizes the right of each Government to
protect its banks from erosion, and its responsibility to avoid
construction in the Rio Grande channel that may cause deflection or
obstruction of normal or flood flows."' Finally, the treaty establishes
132
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean.
As a result of the 1970 Boundary Treaty, together with earlier
agreements:
[T]he [international] boundary extends 1,954 miles, excluding the
maritime boundaries of 18 miles in the Pacific Ocean and 12 miles in
the Gulf of Mexico. Beginning at the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S.Mexico continental boundary follows the centerline of the Rio
Grande a distance of 1,255 miles from the Gulf to a point in El Paso,
Texas and CiudadJudirez, Chihuahua. From this point, the boundary
follows a westward alignment marked by monuments and markers
overland below New Mexico and Arizona a distance of 534 miles to
the Colorado River. The boundary continues northward along the
centerline of the Colorado River for 24 miles, where it once again
follows a westward alignment marked by monuments and markers
overland below California to the Pacific Ocean a distance of 141
miles.13 3

II. THE IBWC MINUTES
A.

ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE 1944 WATER TREATY

Some argue that the power to interpret treaties, at least those
governing relations among private actors without the direct
involvement of states, is implicitly delegated to the judiciary under
constitutional principles.'3 4 According to this view, the doctrine of
"dynamic treaty interpretation" permits the judiciary to fashion new
substantive law as normative gaps emerge in a treaty's express
provisions, thus preventing rapid obsolescence under constantly
changing technological and social conditions. ' The constitutional
basis for such a judicial delegation has been challenged; the opposing
argument is that the president has "unilateral authority" to interpret

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 393-94.
See The InternationalBoundary: United States and Mexico, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/AboutUs.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
134. See Alstine, supra note 60, at 690-92.
135. Id. at 761-84.
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or reinterpret treaties, notwithstanding their domestic law effect."'
There is general agreement that the president may interpret treaties
that are not "self-executing," and thus do not have the force of federal
law absent statutory implementation.1 7
Luckily, the 1944 Water Treaty largely evades this debate by
explicitly placing authority for treaty interpretation with the IBWC.'"
The Treaty similarly provides the IBWC with the authority to make
decisions that arguably could extend the. provisions of the treaty
through the "Minute" system, subject to the right of the respective
Governments to timely disapprove such agreements.' Unfortunately,
the IBWC has been reluctant to use the latter power, leading to a static
reading of a sixty-five-year-old treaty, as if time stood still and the vast
growth and development of the border region never happened. The
USIBWC celebrates the "Minute" process, even posting on its website
the full text of pre-1944 decisions of the Commission, but an
examination of all 318 Minutes adopted by the IBWC since 1906
indicates there have been only a few occasions when IBWC Minutes
even hint at the promise of adaptive treaty interpretation.140
B.

PRE-1944 MINUTES

Although the application of the term "Minute" to mean a joint
decision of the Mexican and American sections would not be
referenced in a Treaty until 1944,'' the IBC nevertheless adopted 140
Minutes between 1906 and 1933. The character of these Minutes,
however, is more in line with the traditional meaning of the term, as
applied to a record of a meeting rather than a new binding agreement.
Several of the Minutes, for example, merely record the exchange of
credentials of members of both Sections of the Commission.142
136. Yoo, supranote 28, at 868-70, 878; contraAlstine, supra note 28, at 1263.
137. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1942-44 (2005) (distinguishing the
presidential power concerning treaties that are not "self-executing" from the exclusive
and final authority that the federal courts have to interpret "self-executing" treaties);
see also Alstine, supra note 28, at 1267-68.
138. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1222, 1255-56. The IBWC's unique status as
a non-judicial body able to resolve treaty disputes has been widely admired, even if its
application has been somewhat exaggerated. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Land.Feuds and
Their Solutions: FindingInternationalLaw Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
808, 826 (2006) (citing only the IBWC's own publication, unfortunately, to support
the claim that "the commission has successfully managed many aspects of the
border-typically, very technical work involving demarcation, sanitation, dam
management, and water-quality control").
139. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1258.
140. See Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L
BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
141. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1258.
142. International Boundary Commission [IBC], Minute 97: Credentials of Lawrence
M. Lawson Presented as Commissioner, Study to be Made of an International Convention for
Rectification of Rio Grande, at 1 (June 4, 1927), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min97.pdf; IBC, Minute 38: Credentials ofJoaquin
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Although many Minutes record decisions taken in apparently routine
IBC meetings, these were mostly mundane, such as directions given to
IBC engineers to inspect and report on various works or obstructions
in the river channels."' The thirty-six Minutes adopted pursuant to
the Convention of 1933 are mostly indistinguishable in character from
the earlier Minutes, except they include numerous references to
rectification works.1"

C. BustamantePresented as FirstEngineerof Mexican Section, at 1 (May 9, 1924), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min38.pdf; IBC, Minute 12: Gustavo P. Serrano
Presented Credentials as Commissioner and Presented Armando Santacruz, Jr., as Consulting
Engineer (Nov. 27, 1923), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl2.pdf; IBC, Minute 1: Exchange of Credentials
of Members of both Sections of the Commission (Oct. 3, 1922), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl.pdf.
143. E.g., IBC, Minute 138: Elimination of El Morilo Banco, at 1 (Feb. 25, 1932),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl38.pdf; IBC, Minute 129: Report
on Rio Grande Rectification, at 1-2 guly 31, 1930), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl29.pdf; IBC, Minute 118: Levee for Protection
of Town of Guadalupe, Chihuahua,at 1 (Dec. 30, 1929), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min118.pdf; IBC, Minute 111: Preliminary Report
on Stabilization of the Boundary Line and Rectification of the Rio Grandeby the Commissioners,
at 1 (Dec. 21, 1928), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minlll.pdf;
IBC, Minute 96: Brownsville, Texas Re-survey and Inspection of 40 Alleged Bancos, at 1 (Apr.
22, 1927), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min96.pdf; IBC, Minute 70:
Consulting Engineers Instructed to Make Survey of Colorado River and Investigate Changes,
Aerial Survey Suggested, at 1 (an. 14, 1926), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min70.pdf; IBC, Minute 57: Report of Consulting
Engineers Submitted Relative to Construction of Revetment on Rio Grandenear Matamoros,at 1
(May 27, 1925), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min57.pdf; IBC,
Minute 32: InstructionsGiven ConsultingEngineersfor Constructionand Placingof Markers in
English and Spanish on Gaging Stations, at 1 (Mar. 11, 1924), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min32.pdf; IBC, Minute 19: Consulting Engineers
Requested to Report in Writing if ObstructionsPlaced in River nearBrownsville Have Been Fully
Removed, at 1 (Dec. 7, 1923), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl9.pdf; IBC, Minute 8: Channel of Rio Grande
at Point Called "ElMulato" OrderedMarked by Stakes, at 1-2 (Oct. 16, 1922), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min8.pdf; IBC, Minute 3: Consulting Engineers
Instructed to Investigate Case or Construction of Dam in Rio Grande Opposite Colonia "El
at
1922),
available
16,
1
(Oct.
Porvenir",
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min3.pdf; IBC, Minute 2: Mexican Commissioner
Requested Investigation of Certain Bank and Obstruction Cases, American Commissioner
Suggested Their Submission in Writing for Consideration, at 1 (Oct. 3, 1922), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2.pdf.
144. IBC, Minute 172: Monumentation ofNew Bridge over the Rio GrandeBetween Hidalgo,
Texas and Reynosa, Tamaulipas,at 1 (Aug. 30, 1941), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl72.pdf; IBC, Minute 168: Works Which Each
Government Should Undertake on Account of Existing Conditions in the Channel of the Rio
Grande at El Paso, Texas, and Ciudadjuarez, Chihuahua,at 1-2 (Dec. 20, 1939), available
at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl68.pdf; IBC, Minute 158: Plan of Location
of the Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, at 1 (June 14, 1937),
IBC, Minute 145:
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl58.pdf;
Regulations Pertaining to Elimination of Tracts Segregated by the Rio Grande Rectification
Works, Pursuantto Convention ofFeb. 1, 1933, at 1-2 (June 11, 1935), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl45.pdf; IBC, Minute 144: Plans of Final
Location of Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, at 1 (June 14,
1934), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min144.pdf.
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MINUTES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO THE 1944 WATER TREATY

Article 25 of the 1944 Water Treaty imbues the term "Minute" with
extraordinary powers, stating, in part:
Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in the form of
Except where the specific approval of the two
Minutes ....
Governments is required by any provision of this Treaty, if one of
Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or
disapproval of a decision of the Commission within thirty days

reckoned from the date of the Minute in which it shall have been
it
pronounced, the Minute in question and the decisions which
145
contains shall be considered to be approved by that Government.

Notwithstanding the seminal "minute" language in the 1944 Water
Treaty, the vast majority of the one hundred forty-two additional
Minutes adopted since 1944 are again mostly indistinguishable from
earlier Minutes, except for the emphasis on new works to be
constructed under the Treaty, such as international storage dams and
water treatment facilities, as well as arrangements for water
deliveries.146 The scale of many of these decisions and projects,
however, suggests that the considerable power delegated to the IBWC
has been exercised to some extent.
In a 1958 Minute, the IBWC agreed to joint operation and
147
maintenance of the Nogales International Sanitation Project, for the
first time breathing life into the sanitation clause of the 1944 Water
Treaty.1 4 ' A 1967 agreement followed, to enlarge the international
149
facilities for the treatment of Nogales sewage,' and in 1988, the two
governments adopted a joint report concerning the "conveyance,.
treatment and disposal of sewage from [Ambos Nogales (both
Nogales)] exceeding the capacities previously allocated to [the United
States and Mexico] at the Nogales International Sewage Treatment

145. 1944.Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1257-58.
146. E.g., IBWC, Minute 304: Joint Grant Contribution Programfor Drinking Water and
Wastewater InfrastructureProjectsfor Communities in the United States - Mexico BorderArea, at
1 (Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min304.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 216: Operation and Maintenance of the International Plant for Treatment of Agua
Prieta, Sonora, and Douglas, Arizona Sewage, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1964), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2l6.pdf; IBWC, Minute 187: Determinations as
to Site and Required Capacitiesof the Lowest MajorInternationalStorage Dam to be Built on the
Rio Grande, in Accordance with the Provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty Concluded Feb. 3, 1944,
at 1 (Dec. 20, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl87.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 185: Proposing Agreement Relative to the Emergency Use of the All-American
Canalfor the Delivery of Waterfor Use in Mexico During the 1947 IrrigationSeason, at 1 (Jan.
25, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl85.pdf.
147. IBWC, Minute 206: Joint Operation and Maintenance of the Nogales International
SanitationProject, at 1 (Jan. 13, 1958), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min206.pdf.
148. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1225.
149. IBWC, Minute 227: Enlargement of the International Facilitiesfor the Treatment of
Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora Sewage, at 1 (Sept. 5, 1967), availableat
7
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min22 .pdf.
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Plant."' 5 o Similarly, a 1964 Minute provided for joint "operation and
maintenance of the international plant for treatment of Agua Prieta,
Sonora, and Douglas, Arizona sewage," 5 1 and in 1965, the IBWC
agreed to improve and expand the Douglas - Agua Prieta international
sewage treatment plant.'52
A similar evolution of Minutes led to the development of
additional sanitation works elsewhere along the border, pursuant to a
1979 Minute in which the IBWC agreed to develop plans for the
solution of sanitation problems all along the border.'
In 1985, the
IBWC approved plans for construction of a first stage treatment plant
near Tijuana,15 followed in 1990 by a conceptual plan for joint
construction of a secondary treatment plant,'15 and in 1997 by
recommendations for construction of sewage treatment works near
Tijuana.15 1 In 2004, the IBWC made further recommendations for
secondary treatment in Mexico of Tijuana River area sewage, in a
Minute that is especially notable because Congress had specifically
requested the Secretary of State to negotiate such a Minute.5 7 The
IBWC made tentative recommendations in 1980 "for solution of the
150. IBWC, Minute 276: Conveyance, Treatment and Disposal of Sewage from Nogales,
Arizona and Nogales, Sonora Exceeding the CapacitiesAllocated to the United States and Mexico
at the Nogales InternationalSewage Treatment Plant Under Minute No. 227, at 1 (uly 26,
1988), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min276.pdf.
151. IBWC, Minute 216: Operation and Maintenance of the International Plant for
Treatment of Agua Prieta, Sonora and Douglas, Arizona Sewage, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1964),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min216.pdf.
152. IBWC, Minute 220: Improvement and -Expansion of the InternationalPlant for the
Treatment of Douglas, Arizona, and Agua Prieta, Sonora Sewage, at 1 (uly 16, 1965),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min220.pdf.
153. IBWC, Minute 261: Recommendations for the Solution to the Border Sanitation
Problems,at 1-2 (Sept. 24, 1979),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min261.pdf.
154. IBWC, Minute 270: Recommendations for the First Stage Treatment and Disposal
Facilitiesfor the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana,
Baja California,at 4 (Apr. 30, 1985), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min270.pdf. The IBWC had earlier provided for
emergency connection of the sewage system of the city of Tijuana to the metropolitan
sewage system of the city of San Diego. See IBWC, Minute 222: Emergency connection of
the sewage system of the city of Tijuana, Baja California, to the Metropolitansewage system of the
city of San Diego, California,at 1-2 (Nov. 30, 1965), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min222.pdf.
155. IBWC, Minute 283: Conceptual Plan for the International Solution to the Border
SanitationProblem in San Diego, California/Tijuana,Baja California,at 1-3 (uly 2, 1990),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute283.pdf.
156. IBWC, Minute 298: Recommendationsfor Constructionof Works Parallelto the City of
Tijuana, B. C. Wastewater Pumping and DisposalSystem and Rehabilitation of the San Antonio
de los Buenos Treatment Plant, at 7-8 (Dec. 2, 1997), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min298.pdf.
157. IBWC, Minute 311: Recommendationsfor Seconday Treatment in Mexico of the Sewage
Emanatingfrom the TijuanaRiver Area in Baja California,Mexico, at 2, 5 (Feb. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min311.pdf,
see also Act of Nov. 7, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-457, 114 Stat. 1957, (codified as amended
at 22 U.S. C. § 277d-45(b) (2006)) (encouraging the restoration of estuary habitat
through more efficient project financing and enhanced coordination of Federal and
non-Federal restoration programs).
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New River border sanitation problems at Calexico, California Mexicali, Baja California Norte.""' A plan for joint funding of sewage
treatment operations in Mexicali followed in 1987,'"' with another
report in 1992 concerning Mexico's sewage treatment operations,'6
and ultimately an agreement to monitor pollution in the New River.16 '
Since then, Mexico has built wastewater treatment plants known as Las
Arenitas and Mexicali 11.162
In 1987, the IBWC adopted recommendations for the solution of
the border sanitation problem at Naco, Arizona-Naco, Sonora, which
essentially assigned responsibility for the problem to Mexico."' A 1989
Minute recommended joint construction of sewage treatment facilities
at Laredo, Texas/Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.'" The Nuevo Laredo
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (NLIWTP) was constructed
In 1998, the IBWC provided for cooperative
in the 1990s.' 61
agreements with the Border Environmen t Cooperation Commission
(BECC) in development of projects for the solution of border
sanitation problems, thereby implicitly acknowledging BECC's
leadership role.'66
Pursuant to Article 4 of the 1944 Water Treaty, which distributed
6
.the waters of the Lower Rio Grande between the two countries,' 1 the
IBWC adopted numerous Minutes concerning the storage,
158. IBWC, Minute 264: Recommendations for Solution of the New River Border Sanitation
Problem at Calexico, California - Mexicali, Baja California Norte, at 5 (Aug. 26, 1980),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min264.pdf.
159. IBWC, Minute 274: joint Projectfor Improvement of the Quality of Waters of the New
River at Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California, at 3-4 (Apr. 15, 1987), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min274.pdf.
160. IBWC, Minute 288: Conceptual Plan for the Long Term Solution to the Border
Sanitation Problem of the New River at Calexico, California - Mexicali, Baja California, at 2
(Oct. 30, 1992), available at http://wv'w.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min288.pdf.
161. Id., at 9.
162. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION UNITED STATES AND MEXICO,
2006 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2006), http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/2006_Annualreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT].
163. IBWC, Minute 273: Recommendationsfor the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem
at Naco, Arizona-Naco, Sonora, at 1-2, 4 (Mar. 19, 1987), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min273.pdf (amended on Sept. 19, 1996). See
IBWC, Minute 295: Recommendations to Incorporate into Commission Minute No 273, the
Project Proposed by the State of Sonora for Conveyance and Treatment of Naco, Sonora Sewage
Certified by the BECC on April 30,1996, at 2 (Sept. 19, 1996), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min295.pdf.
164. IBWC, Minute 279: joint Measures to Improve the Quality of the Waters of the Rio
Grande at Laredo, Texas/Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, at 2, 4 (Aug. 28, 1989), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min279.pdf.
165. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162, at 17.
166. IBWC, Minute 299: International Boundary and Water Commission Support to the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission in Development of Projects for the Solution of
available at
1998),
3,
(Dec.
2-3
at
Border Sanitation Problems,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min299.pdf; see also IBWC, Minute 304: joint
Grant Contribution Program for Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Projects for
Communities in the United States - Mexico Border Area, at 1 (Oct. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min304.pdf.
167. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1225-28.
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conveyance, and delivery of waters of the Rio Grande, including
several dealing with drought-induced water shortages.'6 Pursuant to
Article 5 of the 1944 Water Treaty, which provided for joint
construction of dams on the Rio Grande," the IBWC adopted a
Minute in 1946 approving the construction of the largest of these,
Falcon Dam.170 In 1960, the two Governments agreed to proceed with
construction of Amistad Dam upstream from Falcon."' The IBWC

168. See IBWC, Minute 309: Volumes of Water Saved with the Modernization and Improved
Technology Projectsfor the IrrigationDistricts in the Rio Conchos Basin and Measures for their
Conveyance to the Rio Grande,at 1 (July 3, 2003), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min309.pdf (minutes dealing with drought);
IBWC, Minute 308: United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During the Last Year of the
Current Cycle, at 1-5 (June 28, 2002), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute308.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 307: Partial
Coverage of Allocation of the Rio Grande Treaty Tributary Water Deficit from Fort Quitman to
Falcon Dam, at 1-3 (March 16, 2001), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min307.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 293: Emergency
Cooperative Measures to Supply Municipal Needs of Mexican Communities Located Along the
Rio Grande Downstream of Amistad Dam, at 1-5 (Oct. 4, 1995), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min293.pdf; IBWC, Minute 234: Waters of the Rio
Grande Allotted to the United Statesfrom the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and
Salado Rivers and the Las Vegas Arroyo, at 1-3 (Dec. 2, 1969), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min234.pdf; IBWC, Minute 201: Regulations for
Storage, Conveyance, and Delivery of Waters of the Rio Grandefrom Ft. Quitman, Texas, to the
Gulf
of
Mexico,
at
1
(Oct.
13,
1954),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min201.pdf.
169. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1228-30.
170. IBWC, Minute 182: Approval of 'Joint Report on Engineering Conference on Studies,
Investigations and Procedures for the Planning of Works to be Built in Accordance with the
Treaty
of
February
3,
1944
(Sept.
23,
1946),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl82.pdf;
see also IBWC, Minute 205:
Improvment of Generation of Hydroelectic Energy at the Falcon Plant (May 21, 1956),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min205.pdf; IBWC, Minute 202: Basis
for Joint Operation and Maintenance of the Falcon Dam and Hydroelectric Plant and for
Division
of
Costs
Thereof
(Jan.
11,
1955),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min202.pdf; IBWC, Minute 199: Establishment of
jurisdictional Line in Falcon Reservoir (Dec.
15,
1953),
available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl99.pdf; IBWC, Minute 192: Plans and
Proceduresfor Construction of Falcon Dam and Recommendations for Construction of Falcon
Hydroelectric
Plants
(Sept.
7,
1949),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl92.pdf; IBWC, Minute 190: Allocation to the
Two Sections of the Commission of Remaining Items of Work Preparatory to Construction of
Falcon
Dam
(Aug.
13,
1948),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl90.pdf; IBWC, Minute 187: Determinations as
to Site and Required Capacitiesof the Lowest Major InternationalStorage Dam to be Built on the
Rio Grande, in Accordance with the Provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty Concluded February 3,
1944 (Dec. 20, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl87.pdf.
171. Agreement Concerning the Utilization of Boundary Water: Construction of
Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande River, U.S.-Mex., Oct. 24, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2396; see
IBWC, Minute 292: Works of an Emergency Nature that Should be Undertaken Promptly for
Treatment of Sinkholes that have Developed in the Reservoir at Amistad Dam (Apr. 28, 1995),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min292.pdf (containing the first
report of troubling defects in Amistad Dam); IBWC, Minute 235: Division of Operation
and Maintenance Costs of Amistad Dam (Dec. 3, 1969),
available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min235.pdf (illustrating additional agreements
with respect to Amistad over the decades); IBWC, Minute 232: Demarcation of a
jurisdictionalLine in Amistad Reservoir (May, 9, 1968), available at
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also approved a variety of diversion dams pursuant to the 1944 Water
Treaty, including Retamal Diversion Dam on the Rio Grande,"12
Anzalduas Weir and Dam on the Rio Grande,"' and Morelos Diversion
Dam on the Colorado River.174 The IBWC has also undertaken to
address a problem of salinity in the Lower Rio Grande with
construction and maintenance of the Morillo Drain Pumping Plant."'
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min232.pdf; IBWC, Minute 215: Design and
Proceduresfor Construction ofAmistad Dam (Sept. 28, 1963), availableat
IBWC, Minute 213: Foundation
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min215.pdf;
Drillingand GroutingProgramfor Amistad Dam (Apr. 26, 1963), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min213.pdf; IBWC, Minute 210: Recommendations
RegardingConstructionofAmistad Dam (Jan. 12, 1961), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min21O.pdf; IBWC, Minute 207: Consideration of
Joint Report of the PrincipleEngineers on Site, Capacitiesand Type ofDam for the Second Major
InternationalStorageDam on the Rio Grande (June 19, 1958), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2O7.pdf.
172. IBWC, Minute 254: Operation and Maintenance of Retamal DiversionDam (Sept. 24,
1976), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute254_w-JR.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 238: Improvement of the International Flood Control Works of the Lower Rio Grande
at
available
1970),
10,
(Sept.
Minute 186:
IBWC,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute-238wJR.pdf;
Approval of the Construction by Mexico of a Temporary Diversion Dam.Across the Rio Grande
Below Retamal Heading(May 26, 1947), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl86.pdf.
173. IBWC, Minute 265: Installation of Stoplogs at Anzalduas Diversion Dam, at 1 (Dec.
13, 1980), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min265.pdf; IBWC, Minute
203: Plans and Proceduresfor Construction of the Anzalduas Diversion Dam, at 1 (Dec. 23,
1955), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min203.pdf; IBWC, Minute
198: Temporary Weir Across the Rio Grande at the Anzalduas Dam Site, at 1 (June 2, 1953),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl98.pdf.
174. IBWC, Minute 221: Final Liquidation of Costs Allocable to Mexico of Construction of
the South Gila Levee and Determination of the Part of its Operation and Maintenance Costs
available at
1965),
29,
1
(Nov.
at
Country,
that
to
Allocable
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min221.pdf; IBWC, Minute 211: Manner of
Payment of Mexico's Share of Cost of Construction of Group II Colorado River Levees Upstream
from Morelos Diversion Dam, at 1 (May 12, 1961), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min211.pdf; IBWC, Minute 209: Portion Allowable
to Mexico of Costs of Operation and Maintenance of the Group I Levees on the Colorado River
Upstreamfrom Morelos Diversion Dam, at 1 (Nov. 21, 1958), available athttp://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min209.pdf- IBWC, Minute 208: Final Liquidation
of Costs Correspondingto Mexico for Group I Levee Works Required Upstreamfrom the Morelos
Diversion Dam to Protect Lands Within the United States Against Damagesfrom Such Rise in
Rood Stages of the Colorado River as Might Result from Construction, Operation and
available at
1958),
(Nov. 14,
1
Maintertance of that Structure, at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min208.pdf; IBWC, Minute 197: Adoption of Rules
for the Operation and Maintenance of the Morelos Diversion Dam on the Colorado River, at 1
(June 30, 1951), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl97.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 195: Works Required Above the Morelos Diversion Dam to Protect Lands Within the U.S.
Against Damages from Such Floods as Might Result from the Construction, Operation and
Maintenanceof that Structure, at 1 (May 6, 1950), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl95.pdf- IBWC, Minute 189: Determinations as
to Site and Design Features of the Main Diversion Structure to be Constructed by Mexico on the
Colorado River and Work Necessitated Thereby for Protection of United States Lands, Pursuantto
the Provisions of Article 12(e) of the 1944 Water Treaty, at 1 (May 12, 1948), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl89.pdf.
175. IBWC, Minute 303: Operation and Maintenance of the jointly-Financed Works for
Solution of the Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem, at 1-2 (May 15, 2000), available at
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Referencing Article 13 of the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC
undertook clearing of the Colorado River channel downstream from
Morelos Dam.'
Under Article 15, which concerns schedules for
delivery of Mexico's share of Colorado River water, the IBWC adopted
Citing Article 16, the IBWC
numerous Minutes adjusting deliveries.'

http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min303.pdf; IBWC, Minute 282: Rehabilitation of
the Saline Waters DisposalSystem for Solution of the Salinity Problem in the Waters of the Lower
Rio Grande,at 1 (Mar. 26, 1990), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min282.pdf; IBWC, Minute 269: Replacement of
Pumps at the MorilloDrain PumpingPlant, at 1 (Nov. 9, 1984), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min269.pdf; IBWC, Minute 224: Recommendations
Concerning the Lower Rio GrandeSalinity Problem, at 1 (Jan. 16, 1967), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min224.pdf; IBWC, Minute 223: Measures for
Solution of the Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem, at 1-2 (Nov. 30, 1965), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min223.pdf.
176. IBWC, Minute 291: Improvements to the Conveying Capacity of the International
Boundary Segment of the ColoradoRiver, at 1-3 (July 16, 1994), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min291.pdf; IBWC, Minute 217: Clearing of the
ColoradoRiver ChannelDownstreamfrom Morelos Dam, at 1 (Nov. 30, 1964), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min217.pdf.
177. IBWC, Minute 314: Extension of the Temporary Emergency Delivery of Colorado River
Waterfor Use in Tijuana,Baja California,at 1 (Nov. 14, 2008), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_314.pdf; IBWC, Minute 310: Emergency
Delivery of Colorado River Water for Use in Tijuana, Baja California, at 1-2 (July 28, 2003),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min310.pdf; IBWC, Minute 287:
Emergency Deliveriesof ColoradoRiver Waters for Use in Tijuana, Baja California,at 1-2 (Oct.
6, 1992), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min287.pdf; IBWC, Minute
280: Disposal of Equipment Installed at the Expense of Mexico in United States Territory to
Enable Emergency deliveries of Colorado River Watersfor Use in Tijuana, Baja California, at 1
(Mar. 6, 1990), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min280.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 267: Extension of the Effect of Minute No. 266 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of
Colorado River Water for Use in Tijuana, at 1 (Aug. 13, 1982), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min267.pdf; IBWC, Minute 266: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 263 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waterfor Use in
at
available
3,
1981),
1
(Aug.
at
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min266.pdf; IBWC, Minute 263: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 260 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
available
at
1980),
(Aug.
6,
at
1
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min263.pdf; IBWC, Minute 260: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 259 Relatingto the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
at
available
1979),
11,
(Aug.
1
at
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min260.pdf; IBWC, Minute 259: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 256 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
Tijuana, at 1 (July 27, 1978), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min259.pdf; IBWC, Minute 256: Extension of
Minutes Nos. 240, 243, 245 and 252 Regarding Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waters
for Use in Tijuana, at 1 (Feb. 22, 1977), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min256.pdf; IBWC, Minute 252: An Amendment to
Minutes Nos. 240 and 245, Relatingto Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Watersfor Use in
Tijuana, at 1 (Aug. 31, 1976), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min252.pdf; IBWC, Minute 243: An Amendment to
Minute No. 240 Relating to Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waterfor Use in Tifuana, at
1 (Sept. 25, 1973), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min243.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 240: Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waters for Use in Tijuana, at 1
(June 13, 1972), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min240.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 194: Agreement Relative to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canalforthe Delivery
of Waterfor Use in Mexico During the Portion of the Calendar Year 1950 Until Articles 10, 11,
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approved ajoint flood control project for the Tijuana River in 1967.178
Additional Minutes were adopted pursuant to provisions of treaties
and conventions subsequent to the 1944 Water Treaty. The IBWC
adopted Minutes between 1963 and 1993 to implement the Chamizal
Convention.17 ' The 1970 Boundary Treaty was implemented through
numerous international agreements, such as those relating to
execution of the changes in location of the Rio Grande stipulated in
the Treaty; 80 "the international plan for the protection of the
Presidio-Ojinaga Valley against floods of the Rio Grande"; s' the
potential relocation of occupants of lands the United States will
transfer to Mexico under the Treaty;'
the demarcation and
and 15 of the Water of Treaty of 1944 Become Effective, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1950), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl94.pdf; IBWC, Minute 191: Agreement Relative
to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canal for the Delivery of Water for Use in Mexico
During the 1949 IrrigationSeason, at 1 (Mar. 8, 1949), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl91.pdf; IBWC, Minute 188: Agreement Relative
to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canalfor the Delivery of Water for Use in Mexico
During the 1948 Irrigation Season, at 1 (Mar. 12, 1948), available at
IBWC, Minute 185: Proposing
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl88.pdf;
Agreement Relative to the Emergency use of the All-American Canalfor the Delivery of Water for
Use in Mexico During the 1947 Irrigation Season, at 1 (Jan. 25, 1947), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl85.pdf.
178. See IBWC, Minute 258: Modification of the United States Portion of the Plan for the
Channelizationof the Tijuana River, at 1-2 (May 27, 1977), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min258.pdf; IBWC, Minute 236: Construction of
Works for Channelizationof the TijuanaRiver, at 1 (July 2, 1970), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min236.pdf; IBWC, Minute 225: Channelization of
the TijuanaRiver, at 1 (June 19, 1967), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min225.pdf.
179. See Act Approving Minute No. 228 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, U.S.-Mex., Oct. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2836 (concerning demarcation of
new international boundary between the United States and Mexico); see also IBWC,
Minute 290: Replacement of the International Cordova-Bridge of the Americas over the Rio
Grande at El Paso, Texas-CiudadJudrez, Chihuahua, Mexico, at 1, 3-4 (Sept. 21, 1993),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min290.pdf; IBWC, Minute 219:
Bridges to be Constructedover the New Channel of the Rio Grande Between El Paso and Ciudad
Judrez, and Their CorrespondingInternational Inspection Facilities, at 1 (July 16, 1965),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min219.pdf; IBWC, Minute 214:
Engineering ConsiderationsRelating to Relocation of the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas, and
CiudadJuarez,Chihuahua,at 1 (Aug. 28, 1963), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min214.pdf.
180. IBWC, Minute 262: Recommendations for Works to Preserve for the Rio Grande its
Character as the International Boundary in the Reach from Cajoncitos, Chihuahua to
Haciendita, Texas, at 1-4 (Dec. 26, 1980), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min262.pdf; IBWC, Minute 257: Completion of the
Relocations of the Rio GrandeStipulated in Article I of the Treaty of November 23, 1970, at 1-2
(May 18, 1977), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min257.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 246: Recommendations for Execution of the Changes in Location of the Rio Grande
Stipulated in Article I of the Boundary Treaty of 1970, at 1 (Jan. 28, 1975), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min246.pdf; see also Act Approving Minute 257 of
the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., May 26, 1977, 28
U.S.T. 5256 (concerning the relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande).
181. IBWC, Minute 247: InternationalPlanfor the Protection of the Presidio-OinagaValley
againstFloods of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Feb. 7, 1975), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min247.pdf.
182. IBWC, Minute 255: Consideration of Possible Property Rights of the Residents and
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monumentation of the land boundary'" and international bridges; 8 4
the creation of maps;' "recommendations for establishing a restricted
use zone on lands adjacent to the main channel of the Rio Grande in
the vicinity of Brownsville, Texas";" and the ongoing maintenance of

Occupants of the Horcon Tract and of Beaver Island, at 1-2 (an. 28, 1977), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min255.pdf; IBWC, Minute 251: Occupants of the
Horcon Tract, at 1 (Apr. 28, 1976), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min251.pdf.
183. IBWC, Minute 277: Location, Permanency and Visibility of InternationalMonument
No. 123-A, at 1 (Aug. 29, 1988), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min277.pdf; IBWC, Minute 272: Installation of
Monument 13-R, at 1 (Oct. 24, 1986), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min271.pdf; IBWC, Minute 271: Markers Installed
on the InternationalBoundary, at 1 (Sept. 9, 1986), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min271.pdf, IBWC, Minute 249: Placement of
Markers on the Land Boundary, at 1 (uly 14, 1975), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min249.pdf; IBWC, Minute 244: Maintenance of
the International Land Boundary Monuments, at 1 (Dec. 4, 1973), available at
IBWC, Minute 230: Additional
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min244.pdf;
Monuments 244A and 244B on the Land Boundary, Between InternationalMonuments Nos.
available
at
1968),
1
(May
8,
245,
at
244
and
IBWC, Minute 226: Additional
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min230.pdf;
Monuments on the Land Boundary Between InternationalMonuments Numbers 2 and 3, at 1
(une 23, 1967), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min226.pdf; IBWC, Minute 180: Reestablishment of
the Western Land Boundary at Monument No. 118, at 1-2 (an. 11, 1946), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl80.pdf.
184. IBWC, Minute 305: Demarcation and Monumentation of the InternationalBoundary
on the Bridges over the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass, Texas - PiedrasNegras, Coahuila II; Laredo,
Texas - Colombia, Nuevo Leon; Laredo, Texas IV- Nuevo Laredo, TamaulipasIII Pharr, Texas Reynosa, Tamaulipas; Los Indios, Texas - Lucio Blanco, Tamaulipas; and Veterans,
Brownsville, Texas - Matamoros, Tamaulipas III, at 1-2 (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
IBWC, Minute 302: Enhanced
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min305.pdf;
Demarcation and Monumentation of the International Boundary at International Boundary
River Bridges and Land Boundary Ports of Entry, at 1 (Dec. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min302.pdf; IBWC, Minute 286: Demarcation and
Monumentation of the InternationalBoundary on the New InternationalYsleta/Zaragoza Bridge
and Demolition of the Old Bridge, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1991), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min286.pdf; IBWC, Minute 275: Demarcation of the
International Boundary and Monumentation of the New InternationalBridges over the Rio
Grande between Del Rio, Texas and Cd. Acuna, Coahuila and between Hidalgo, Texas and
Reynosa, Tamaulipas,at 1 (Nov. 4, 1987), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min275.pdf.
185. IBWC, Minute 315: Adoption of the Delineation of the InternationalBoundary on the
2008 Aerial Photographic Mosaic of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min315.pdf; IBWC, Minute 278: Delineation of the
InternationalBoundary on Aerial PhotographicMosaics of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Mar. 31,
1984), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min278.pdf; IBWC, Minute
268: Modification to Minute No. 253 "Maps of the InternationalBoundary in the Rio Grande
available at
1984),
(July
26,
and in the Colorado River", at 1-2
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min268.pdf; IBWC, Minute 253: Maps of the
InternationalBoundary in the Rio Grande and in the ColoradoRiver, at 1-2 (Sept. 23, 1975),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min253.pdf.
186. IBWC, Minute 285: Recommendationsfor Establishinga Restricted Use Zone on Lands
Adjacent to the Main Channel of the Rio Grande in the Vicinity of Brownsville, Texas/
Matamoros, Tamaulipas,at 1, 3 (Nov. 8, 1991), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min285.pdf.

BOUNDARY WATER COMMISSION, US-MEXICO

Issue 2

227

the Rio Grande as the international boundary. 8 7
C.

MINUTES ADDRESSING GROUNDWATER AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES

Although the enormous impact of many post-1944 Minutes makes
it remarkable that the U.S. and Mexican governments entrusted the
IBWC with the authority to short-circuit what would otherwise, no
doubt, be elaborate approval processes for those governments, still it
must be said that few of the Minutes wandered far from the explicit
mandates of the 1944 Water Treaty. Two remarkable exceptions to the
foregoing, both concerning the Colorado River, mark occasions when
the IBWC appears to have explored the use of the power of the Minute
to extend the provisions of the 1944 Water Treaty in an adaptive
application to evolving environmental conditions.
The first of these occasions came in 1973 with the adoption of
Minute 242 and its ambitious proclamation for "a permanent and
definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the
Minute 242 contemplates "a comprehensive
Colorado River." 88
agreement on groundwater in the border areas," and provides for
mandatory consultation prior to either country further developing the
groundwater resources, something addressed nowhere in the 1944
Water Treaty.s18 The second landmark use of the Minute system to
suggest an expansion of the 1944 Water Treaty came only after
another three decades had passed. In 2000, the IBWC adopted
Minute 306, which promised cooperation by the United States and
Mexico in the development of studies and recommendations
concerning the riparian and estuarine ecology of the lower Colorado
River and its associated delta.'90
Unfortunately, neither Minute 242 nor 306 has produced any
substantive changes in how the IBWC manages the boundary waters,
and an examination of the circumstances surrounding their adoption
187. IBWC, Minute 313: Maintenance in the Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande, at 1
(Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min313.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 262: Recommendations for Works to Preservefor the Rio Grande Its Chatacteras the
InternationalBoundary in the Reach from Cajoncitos, Chihuahua to Haciendita, Texas, at 1-4
(Dec. 26, 1979), availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min262.pdf.
188. Agreement Confirming Minute No. 242 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968, 1971.
189. IBWC, Minute 242: Permanentand Definitive Solution to the InternationalProblem of
the Salinity of the Colorado River, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1973), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
190. IBWC, Minute 306: ConceptualFrameworkfor United States - Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
The IBWC adopted a third
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
agreement, Minute 289, that called for establishment of a water monitoring program
and database to observe surface and groundwater quality in the lower Rio Grande,
however, this was not an IBWC initiative, but rather a response to the Integrated
Border Environmental Plan that directed the IBWC to take such action in cooperation
with EPA and other agencies. Minute 289: Observation of the Quality of the Waters Along
the United States and Mexico Border, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1992), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min289.pdf.
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suggests little reason for optimism. The impetus for Minute 242 arose
in the early 1960s, when actions by U.S. irrigators caused a sharp
increase in the salinity of Colorado River Water delivered to Mexico,
Mexico protested
making it unsuitable for agricultural use.
strenuously, but the Colorado River Basin States prevailed upon the
State Department and the Bureau of Reclamation to block any
resolution that would result in loss of U.S. irrigation water to dilute the
Mexico's President
salinity of the water delivered to Mexico.
Echeverria paid a state visit to Washington in 1972, made a compelling
address to Congress, and persuaded President Nixon to appoint a
special representative to negotiate a solution to the problem."' The
resulting agreement formed the basis for Minute 242, guaranteeing
Mexico that the salinity of its water would not exceed that of U.S.
irrigators.'
The purpose of including the groundwater provision in Minute
242 was to raise the possibility of reaching a subsequent agreement to
limit "protective pumping" on both sides of the border, and following
the adoption of Minute 242, the State Department gave the USIBWC
the green light to seek such a groundwater agreement with Mexico.' 93
The proposal developed by the USIBWC, which heavily favored the
United States, would apportion groundwater with protection of
existing groundwater uses (a provision favored by Mexico), but permit
U.S. recovery of seepage losses from the All-American Canal and other
U.S. irrigation works (a provision insisted upon by California and
Arizona; Texas apparently opposed any groundwater agreement)."'
An alternative more favorable to Mexico described as "an approach
along the lines suggested by academicians in the United States and in
Mexico," was summarily eliminated due to opposition from Basin
States. 9 5
191. Letter from U.S. State Dep't, to Joseph Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, The
Diplomacy of the International Colorado River Salinity Problem, at 15, 17 (Dec. 17, 1982)
(draft) (on file with the University of Texas at El Paso ("UTEP") Library system).
192. Id. at 17-18; see also, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATE 173820, THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADOR HERBERT BROWNELL, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT FOR RESOLUTION OF THE SALINIT PROBLEM WITH MEXICO (1973) available at

http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=49800&dl=1 345.
193. Letter from William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, U.S. State Dep't, to Joseph Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner (Sept. 30, 1976)
(on file with the UTEP Library system).
194. See Memorandum from K. Scott Gudgeon, U.S. State Dep't, to T. Frank Crigler
(Nov. 29,1982) (on file with the UTEP Library system) [hereinafter Gudgeon Memo];
Letter from Joseph F. Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, to T. Frank Crigler, U.S. State
Dep't (Oct. 15, 1982) (with Draft Preliminary Report on Whether the United States
Should Seek an Agreement with Mexico on the Unapportioned Waters Along the
International Boundary) (on file with the UTEP Library system); see also Unsigned
Letter to "Joe" (presumably Joseph Friedkin) (Dec. 8, 1982) (on file with the UTEP
Library system).
195. Draft Preliminary Report on Whether United States Should Seek an Agreement
with Mexico on the Unapportioned Waters Along the International Boundary
(attached to Letter from Joseph F. Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, to T. Frank
Crigler, U.S. State Dep't (Oct. 15, 1982)) (on file with the UTEP Library system). The
documents included in UTEP Library's Friedkin papers do not describe this
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The possibility of reaching an agreement to resolve the closely
related problems of salinity, groundwater, and Mexican water
deliveries was looked at "with pessimism" by the State Department,
due to opposition from California and Arizona."' Eventually, in 2000,
the IBWC adopted Minute 306, which promised cooperation by the
United States and Mexico in the development of studies and
recommendations concerning the riparian and estuarine ecology of
Finally, Congress
the lower Colorado River and its associated delta.'
acted in 2006 to take the groundwater issue out of the hands of the
IBWC by designating the Department of the Interior as the lead
agency for establishing a program to characterize, map, and model
priority transboundary aquifers.'9 8
The IBWC has recently adopted Minutes that signal a renewed
interest in addressing groundwater and related ecological issues, but
once again, there is more to this development than is apparent on its
face. Minute 316 would permit the temporary use of water conveyance
infrastructure in the United States to provide substitute water to
sustain the Santa Clara Wetlands during a trial run of the Yuma
Desalting Plant (YDP). 19 The YDP would treat surplus water too
saline to count as treaty water, and which currently sustains the
Once treated, fresh water would be available for
wetlands. 20
consumption in the United States, but the water would no longer be
available for the wetlands.20 ' While Minute 316 depends entirely on
the ability and willingness of NGOs to supply 10,000 acre-feet of
substitute water during the YDP pilot run, and on Mexico and the
United States to supply like amounts, the IBWC still has not agreed
that any treaty waters would ever be made available for ecological uses.
Minute 317 establishes a binational "Consultative Council" to
continue to explore and make recommendations concerning
development of projects and initiatives to promote water conservation,
use of water for environmental purposes, and development of new
water sources through investment in desalinization facilities.20 ' The

disfavored alternative any further.
196. Gudgeon Memo, supra note 194.
197. IBWC, Minute 306: ConceptualFrameworkfor United States - Mexico Studiesfor Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and EstuarineEcology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
198. United States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Pub. L. 109-448,
120 Stat. 3328 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962).
199. IBWC, Minute 316: Utilization of the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain and Necessary
Infrastructure in the United States for the Conveyance of Water by Mexico and NonGovernmental Organizations of Both Countries to the Santa Clara Wetland During the Yuma
DesaltingPlantPilot Run (Apr. 16, 2010), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes/Min316.pdf.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. IBWC, Minute 317: Conceptual Framework for U.S. Mexico Discussions on Colorado
at
available
2010),
17,
(June
3
at
Cooperative Actions,
River
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes/Min3l7.pdf.
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language of Minute 317, however, goes no further than that of Minute
306 which in some ways was even more explicit, with references to
"preserving the Colorado River Delta ecology," "use of water for
ecological purposes," and "equitable distribution of resources. "203
Even Minute 317's creation of a binational council appears merely to
replicate the "binational technical task force" under Minute 306.204
The IBWC says adoption of Minute 317 is intended to facilitate USMexico cooperation related to the Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Act, under the leadership of the Department of the Interior.205
Perhaps suggesting more substantial developments ahead, is the
adoption of Minute 318 in December 2010, which delays delivery of
water allotted to Mexico as a result of irrigation infrastructure damage
caused by the April 2010 earthquake in the Mexicalli Valley, Baja
California.206 Minute 318 was written in close collaboration with the
Bureau of Reclamation, the agency "responsible for managing and
administering the waters of the Lower Colorado River on behalf of the
U.S. Secretary of the Interior," and the approval of Minute 318
coincided with a meeting of the Interior Secretary with Mexico's
Secretary of the Environment. 20 7 Interior Secretary Salazar trumpeted
completion of Minute 318 during his visit to Mexico, saying it "lays
important groundwork for a much-needed comprehensive water
agreement with Mexico on how we manage the Colorado River," as
desired by the seven Colorado River Basin States.20 s In a prepared
statement, Salazar said that in cooperation with the Bureau of
Reclamation, "the IBWC plans to commence negotiations of this
comprehensive water agreement immediately in January, 2011." 209
203. IBWC, Minute 306: Conceptual Frameworkfor United States - Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the. Riparian and EstuarineEcology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
204. Id.
205. IBWC, THE BOUNDARY MARKER 3 (2010),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/BMWinter_2010.pdf.
206. IBWC, Minute 318: Adjustment of Delivery Schedules for Water Allotted to Mexico for
the Years 2010 Through 2013 as a Result of InfrastructureDamage in IrrigationDistrict 014,
Rio Colorado, Caused by the April 2010 Earthquakein the Mexicalli Valley, Baja California, at
2-3 (Dec. 17, 2010), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html.
Although Minute 318 has
been represented as a humanitarian gesture, the agreement to store Mexican water in
a depleted Lake Mead also serves the short-term interests of drought-stricken Western
states.
207. Press Release, IBWC, Commission Signs Colorado River Agreement in
Response to April 2010 Earthquake Damage in the Mexicali Valley, at 2 (Dec. 20,
2010), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Press Release_122010.pdf
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Leaders Lay Groundwork for
Comprehensive U.S.-Mexico Water Agreement on Colorado River (Dec. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Elvira-Announce-WaterAgreement-to-Support-Response-to-Mexicali-Valley-Earthquake.cfm.
209. Joint Media Availability with Secretary Elvira on Water Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR
(Dec.
20, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/speeches/Joint-MediaAvailability-with-Secretary-Elvira-English-and-Spanish.cfm; see also, Joan DeLuca, U.S. Mexico Water Agreement: The US. and Mexico, and the Seven Colorado River Basin [U.S.]
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The Basin States will attempt to dictate the U.S. position on any
new water agreement, as they did the 1944 Water Treaty and the illfated negotiations surrounding adoption of Minutes 242 and 306. 210
That the- Bureau of Reclamation is now leading the charge for
negotiation of a new agreement, through the IBWC, suggests d6ja vu
all over again. Neither the Basin States nor the Bureau has evinced
If
much interest in equity, ecology, conservation, or diplomacy.'
insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, while expecting
different results, then the best hope for a sane solution to the
ecological crisis at the border is to elevate diplomacy over regional
special interests and to limit the Bureau of Reclamation strictly to
technical implementation of any new agreements.
IV. STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATIES
A. THE USIBWC ENABLING ACT
Legislative authorization of the IBC in its early years consists
merely of line items in annual appropriation acts. 2 12 On April 29,
1890, Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing an investigation
of concerning the use of waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation and
for the construction of a dam and reservoir near El Paso.21 ' The duties
were not assigned to the IBC, however, because its jurisdiction at that
time was limited to boundary matters. Instead, the U.S. Secretary of
State and the Mexican Minister at Washington signed a Protocol in
1896, establishing a new International Water Commission (IWC) with
U.S. and Mexican sections. The IWC held its first meeting in El Paso
that same year and shortly thereafter issued a joint report of its
investigation. In 1914, the U.S. Comptroller General signed an
opinion that resulted in the dissolution of the U.S. Section of the
IWC.214
The Act of May 13, 1924, authorized the President to appoint three
special commissioners to explore the potential for an agreement with
Mexico for the equitable use of the waters of the Lower Rio Grande,

States Are Bringing Resources Together, VOICE OF AM. (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-Mexico-Water-Agreement112654619.html.
210. The Basin States dominated Congressional hearings on the 1944 Treaty. See
generally 91 CONG. REc. 2805-2833 (1945).
211. Id.; see also Zellmer, supra note 43, at 615-16, n. 127.
212. See S. Rep. No. 81-2095 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3734, 3735, 1950
WL 1829; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 81-3018 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3744, 1950 WL 1830.
213. See 51 Cong. Rec. H3977 (1890) (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1890) (not printed in the
Statutes at Large); see also IBWC U.S. SECTION, CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF THE
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND/OR WATER COMMISSIONS,
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: WITH AN INDEX TO PERTINENT TREATIES - 1848-1970 33-34

(R. P. Daguerre eds., United States Section of The Commission, 1972), available at
University of Texas at El Paso, UTEP Special Collection Reference F781.1594C357f.
214. IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 35.
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again bypassing the IBC.215 The Secretary of State directed that the
title of the Commission would be "Commission on the Equitable Use
of the Waters of the Lower Rio Grande."2 1 A Joint Resolution of
March 3, 1927, authorized adding the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers to
the IWC mandate.21' The Secretary of State directed that under its
enlarged powers the title of the Commission would be the
"International Water Commission."a21 Finally, by the Act of June 30,
1932, Congress transferred the powers, duties, and functions of the
IWC to the IBC, thereby abolishing the IWC.21 1
Still, the duties assigned to the IBC were of a limited nature,
encompassing boundary maintenance matters and the newly delegated
exploratory duties with respect to water. This changed dramatically in
1935, with the passage of the U.S. Section's "Enabling Act", which
amended the 1924 Act and authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBC:
to conduct technical and other investigations relating to the defining,

demarcation, fencing, or monumentation of the land and water
boundary between the United States and Mexico, to flood control,
water resources, conservation, and utilization of water, sanitation and
prevention of pollution, channel rectification, stabilization, drainage
of transboundary storm waters, and other related matters upon the
international boundary between the United States and Mexico; and
to construct and maintain fences, monuments and other
demarcations of the boundary line between the United States and
Mexico, and sewer systems, water systems, and electric light, power
and gas systems crossing the international border. 220

Congress authorized the President "to construct, operate, and
maintain on the Rio Grande River below Fort Quitman, Texas, any and
all works or projects which are recommended to the President as the
result of such investigations and by the President are deemed
22
necessary and proper." '
The 1935 Act authorized the President:
to construct, operate and maintain any project or works which may be
provided for in a treaty entered into with Mexico ... subject to such
rules and regulations for continuing supervision by the said American
Commissioner or any Federal agency as the President may cause to be
promulgated, to turn over the operation and maintenance of such
project or works to any Federal agency, or any State, county,
215. Act of May 13, 1924, ch. 153, 43 Stat. 118 (providing for a study regarding the
equitable use of water in the lower Rio Grande in cooperation with the United States
and Mexico) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011)).
216. See id.; IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 35.
217. Act of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 381, 44 Stat. 1403 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011)).
218. IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 36.
219. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 510, 47 Stat. 417 (codified at 22 U.S.C § 277a
(2011)).
220. Act of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 561, 49 Stat. 660 (codified at 22 U.S.C § 277a (2011)).
221. Id. § 277a.
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municipality, district, or other political subdivision within which such
project or works may be in whole or in part situated, upon such
terms, conditions, and requirements as the President may deem
appropriate.
The 1935 Act also authorized:
the President, or any Federal agency he may designate . . . to enter
into agreements with political subdivisions ... [granting] the United
States, gratuitously, lands or easements in lands necessary for the
construction, operation, and maintenance ... of any such project or
works, or for the assumption by one or more of any such political
project or
subdivisions ... of the operation and maintenance of such
223
works in whole dr in part upon the completion thereof.
The Congress further authorized the President "to acquire by
purchase, exercise of the power of eminent domain, or by donation,
any real or personal property which may be necessary" for such
projects or works. 224 A final proviso authorizing. the President to
withdraw from sale, public entry or disposal of public lands "under the
mining laws or any other law relating to the public domain" of the
United States was repealed in 1976.
Further amendments in 1935 and thereafter generally authorized
the Secretary of State, through the USIBC, to dispose of unneeded
226
lands and to issue revocable licenses for use of project lands;
authorized and made appropriations for the construction, operation
and maintenance of the -Rio Grande Canalization Project; 227 and
provided for reconstruction or replacement of bridges as necessitated
by the Rio Grande Canalization Project. 228 Additional legislation in
the 1940s authorized the Secretary, through the USIBWC, to
reconstruct the. Rio Grande Valley Gravity Canal and Storage
Project;229 authorized the Rio Grande Bank Protection Project; 230 and
authorized the construction of hydroelectric generating facilities at
Falcon Dam.
Further amendments in 1996 authorized the Secretary of State,
acting through the USIBWC, to make improvements to the Rio
Grande Canalization Project to stabilize the Rio Grande in the reach
between the Percha Diversion Dam in New Mexico and the American

222. Id. § 277b(a) (1)-(2).
223. Id. § 277c(a).
224. Id. § 277c(b).
225. See 22 U.S.C. § 277c (c) (2011).
226. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 763 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277e (2011)).
227. Id. § 277b(d).
228. Act of Apr. 22, 1940, ch. 129, 54 Stat.151.
229. Act of June 28, 1941, ch. 259, § 1, 55 Stat. 338 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277f
(2011)).
230. Act of Apr. 25, 1945, 59 Stat. 89 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277b(b) (2011)).
231. Act of Oct. 5, 1949, ch. 593, 63 Stat. 701.
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Diversion Dam in El Paso.232
B. THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN TREATY ACT OF 1950
The American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950233 enacted § 277d-1 to
277d-9 of 22 U.S.C. §. 277. The Act authorized the Secretary of State,
acting through the USIBWC, "to purchase, or condemn, lands, or
interests in lands, for relocation of highways, railroads. . . telephone,
or electric transmission lines," or any other properties deemed
necessary for the construction or operation and maintenance of any
project; and to convey or exchange Government properties so
acquired or improved or to grant easements therein, by instruments
executed by the Secretary of State.
The USIBWC was further authorized to construct, operate, and
maintain all roads, highways, railways, power lines, buildings, and
facilities necessary in connection with any such project, and ... to
provide housing, subsistence, and medical and recreational facilities

for the officers, agents, and employees of the United States ...

engaged in the construction, operation, and maintenance of any such
project.

The 1950 Treaty Act also authorized. appropriations to be
expended for treaty and statutory purposes, including for
construction, operation, and maintenance of stream gaging stations;
personal services and rent; services of attorneys, appraisers, and others;
travel expenses; acquisition of real and personal property; purchase of
firearms and ammunition for guard purposes; and other such
231
purposes."The American-Mexican Treaty Act also authorized the USIBWC to
acquire, "by purchase or by proceedings in eminent domain," certain
properties owned by the Imperial Irrigation District of California, and
to "reconstruct, operate and maintain such properties in connection
with the administration of" the 1944 treaty."
The Act further authorized the Secretary of State to enter into an
agreement with Mexico for the IBWC to operate the Douglas-Agua
Prieta sanitation project, subject to agreement by the city of Douglas,
Arizona that it contribute an equitable proportion of the costs of such
The Act
operation and maintenance allocated to the United States.
similarly authorized such agreement for the construction, operation,
and maintenance of a sanitation project for the cities of Calexico,

232.
U.S.C.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. 104-319, § 104, 110 Stat. 3866 (codified at 22

§ 277b(d) (2011)).
American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950, ch. 948, 64 Stat. 846.
American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950, 22 U.S.C. § 277d-1 (a) (2011).
Id. § 277d-2.
Id. § 277d-3.
Id. § 277d-4.
Id. § 277d-6.
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California, and Mexicali, Mexico, with a similar requirement for
equitable financial participation by the city of Calexico.m
In 1953, Congress authorized a similar agreement for the
operation and maintenance of the Nogales sanitation project, located
at Nogales, Arizona, with a similar requirement for financial
participation by the city of Nogales.240 That same year Congress
provided funding for the Anzalduas Diversion Dam,"2 ' and the next
year provided for the transmission and disposition of electric power
from Falcon Dam.242
In 1960, Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to join with Mexico to construct, operate, and
maintain the Amistad international storage dam on the Rio Grande,
above the previously built Falcon Dam.m Concurrently, Congress
authorized the construction of facilities for generating hydroelectric
energy at Amistad Dam.244 Congress provided further that releases of
the United States' share of waters from Amistad for domestic,
municipal, industrial, and irrigation uses in the United States, shall be
made pursuant to order by the appropriate authority of the State of
Texas. 245 A 1963 law added arrangements for power distribution and
use from Amistad.m
In 1964, Congress approved a settlement for flood damage claims
resulting from the Falcon Dam construction.24 ' Additionally, Congress
authorized the USIBWC to enter into agreements with local
organizations for the maintenance of flood and arroyo sediment
control dams to be constructed in the Rio Grande watershed between
Caballo Dam and El Paso, Texas, and facilitate and implement the
operation and maintenance of the Rio Grande canalization project.2
A 1966 Act of Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to conclude an agreement with the Government
of Mexico for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a
drainage canal through Mexican territory for the discharge of waters
of El Morillo and other drains into the Gulf of Mexico.2 " The law also
addressed joint solutions for the salinity problem in the Lower Rio

239. Id. § 277d-8.
240. Act ofJuly 27, 1953, ch. 242, § 1, 67 Stat. 195 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-10
(2011)).
241. Act of Aug. 5, 1953, Pub. L. No. 195, 67 Stat. 370.
242. Act ofJune 18, 1954, ch. 310, 68 Stat. 255.
243. Act ofJuly 7, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-605, § 1, 74 Stat. 360 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-13 (2011)).
244. Id. § 277d-14.
245. Id. § 277d-15.
246. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-137, 77 Stat. 475.
247. Act of Aug. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-447, 78 Stat. 481.
248. Act of Sept. 18, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-600, 78 Stat. 956 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-29 (2011)).
249. Act of Sept. 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-584, § 1, 80 Stat. 808 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 277d-30 (2011)).
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C. THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN CHAMIZAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1964
The American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964 enacted

§ 277d-17 to 277d-25 of Title 22 of the U.S.C,51 which implemented
the Chamizal Convention that was signed August 29, 1963. The act
authorized the Secretary of State, through the USIBWC, to investigate
construction of a new river channel, and "to acquire by donation,
purchase, or condemnation, all lands requiredfor transfer to
Mexico as provided in [the Chamizal Convention] ... for relocation of
highways, railroads, electric transmission lines, bridges, or other
facilities, [as needed]." 5
The 1964 Act further authorized: 1) the construction of various
works, including replacement of the Bridge of the Americas that
crosses the Rio Grande between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, and 2)
turning "over the operation and maintenance of any such works to any
Federal agency, or any State, [or local government] within which such
project or works [is situated]".5

It also authorized compensation for

owners and tenants of lands affected by relocation.25' Later legislation
concerning Chamizal established the Chamizal National Memorial,25 5
and provided for the Chamizal Border Highway.2 56
D. TIJUANA RIVER FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
In 1956, Congress expanded the authorization for emergency
flood control on the Rio Grande to also include the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers. 5 Congress also, authorized taking emergency actions
"to protect against health threatening surface and ground water
pollution problems along the United States-Mexico boundary."2 5
A 1964 law authorized the Secretary of State, acting through the
Government of Mexico,
USIBWC, "to conclude with the ...

250. Id.
251, American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-300, 78
Stat. 184 (codified at .
252. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-17(a-b) (2011).
253. Id. § 277d-18(a-b).
254. Id. § 277d-19(a).
255. Act ofJune 30, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-479, 80 Stat. 232.
256. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-795, 80 Stat. 1477.
257. Act ofJune 20, 1956, ch. 414, § 101, 70 Stat. 302 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d12 (2011)). A 1990 amendment authorized emergency actions to protect against
health threatening sanitation problems by repairing or replacing existing capital
infrastructure along the border. SeeAct of Feb 16, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 412(a),
104 Stat. 69. A further 1994 amendment replaced the 1990 language by specifying
authority to take emergency actions, "consistent with the emergency provisions of the
Safe Drinking Water Act, to protect against health threatening surface and ground
water pollution problems" along the border. Act of Apr. 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103236, § 423(b), 108 Stat. 457.
258. Act ofJune 20, 1956, ch. 414, § 101, 70 Stat. 302 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d12 (2011)).
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agreements for emergency flood control measures ... in the reaches
of the lower Colorado River between Imperial Dam and the Gulf of
California," including actions to clear brush and guard against
sedimentation of the river channel."'
In 1966, Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to conclude an agreement with the Mexican
Government for "joint construction, operation, and maintenance" of
the Tijuana River flood control project.2"
A later statute made
acquisition of lands for construction of the project contingent upon
the City of San Diego providing an appropriate share of funds."'
E.

THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN BOUNDARY TREATYACT OF 1972

The American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972, which
enacted § 277d-34 to 277d42 of Title 22, implemented the 1970
Boundary Treaty.6 2 The Act authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to investigate matters relating to:

"(A) ... the preservation of the river boundaries between the United
States and Mexico; (B) the establishment and delimitation of the
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific Ocean;

(C) water resources; and (D) the sanitation and the prevention of

pollution."2 6 3 The Act also authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to acquire by donation, purchase, or
condemnation, all lands ... required ... (A) for transfer to Mexico as
provided in the treaty; (B) for construction of... new river channels
and the adjoining levees in the territory of the United States; (C) to
preserve the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the boundary by
preventing the construction of works which may cause deflection or
obstruction of the normal flow of the rivers or of their floodflows; and
(D) for relocation of any structure or facility. . . necessitated by the
project.
Lastly, the Act authorized the Secretary of State, acting through
the USIBWC, "to remove, modify, or repair the damages caused to

Mexico by works constructed in the United States. "265
The 1972 Boundary Treaty Act further directed that administration
of nearly five hundred "acres of land acquired ... from Mexico near
Hidalgo-Reynosa ... be assumed by the Department of the Interior,

259. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-411, § 1, 78 Stat. 386 (codified at 22 U.S.C.

§ 277d-26(a-b) (2011)).

260. Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-640, § 1, 80 Stat. 884 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-32 (2011)).
261. Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. 94-425, 90 Stat. 1333 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-33
(2011)).
262. American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-549, § 101, 86 Stat.
1161 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 277d-34 to 42 (2011)).
263. 22 U.S.C. §277d-34(1) (2011).
264. Id. § 277d-34(2).
265. Id. § 277d-34(3).
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United States Fish and Wildlife Service . . , as a part of the national
wildlife refuge system."" The Act further authorized "international
flood control works for protection of lands along the international
Section of the Rio Grande in the United States and in Mexico in the
2"
However, the Act prohibited the use of
Presidio-Ojinaga Valley."m
appropriated funds "for flood control works on any land, site, or
easement, unless ... acquired under the treaty for other purposes or
by donation."'
F.

THE RIO GRANDE POLLUTION CORRECTION ACT OF 1987

The Rio Grande Pollution Correction Act of 1987 enacted § 2 7 7 g
to 2 7 7 g-3 of Title 22 of the U.S.C. 6 9 This act directed the Secretary of
State, through the USIBWC, to' conclude agreements with the
Government of Mexico:
for the purpose of correcting the international problem of pollution
of the Rio Grande caused by discharge of raw and inadequately
treated sewage and other wastes into such river from the border cities
including but not limited to Ciudad Acuna, Nuevo Laredo,
270 - and
Reynosa, Mexico, and Del Rio, Laredo, and Hidalgo, TexaS
The Act further authorized the construction of facilities approved
by the two Governments.'

In the 1990 Amendments, Congress authorized operation of the
interceptor system, which was "constructed to intercept sewage flows
from Tijuana from selected canyon areas.""' It further authorized

operation of the Rio Grande bank protection project; as well as the
operation of the Anzalduas diversion dam for irrigation or water
supply purposes, which is subject to payment by water users for
portions of the dam as allocated by the Secretary of State.
Amendments to another statute authorized emergency actions
"consistent with the emergency provisions of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, to protect against health threatening sanitation problems by
repairing or replacing existing capital infrastructure along the

border."

266.
267.
268.
269.

274

Id. at § 277d-39.
Id. at § 277d-41.
Id. at § 277d-42.
Rio Grande Pollution Correction Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-465, § 1, 102 Stat.

2272 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2 77g to 277g-3 (2011)).
270. 22 U.S.C. § 2 7 7g(a) (2011).
271. Id. § 27 7 g-1(1-2).

272. Id. § 277b(a).
273. Id. § 277b(b-c). Another act extended authority for construction of works on
the Rio Grande to include drainage of transboundary storm waters. Id. § 277a.
274. Id. § 277d-12.
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G. TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE CLEANUP ACT
OF 2000

In the Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act
of 2000, Congress acted "to authorize the United States to take actions
to address comprehensively the treatment of sewage emanating from
the Tijuana River area, Mexico, that flows untreated or partially
treated into the United States causing significant adverse public health
The Act directed both the USIBWC
and environmental impacts."'
and the Administrator of the EPA to take action to ensure the
secondary treatment in the United States or Mexico of effluent from
the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant (IWTP) and
"of additional sewage emanating from the Tijuana River area,
Mexico. "276

V.

CRITICISM OF THE USIBWC

A.

PRAISE GIvEs WAY TO CRITICISM

The U.S. Section of the IBWC is headquartered in El Paso, Texas,
and is one of few Federal agencies headquartered outside Washington,
D.C., which may partially account for its aura of independence, as well
as the absence of oversight.277 Its Mexican Government counterpart
(La Comisfon Internacional de Limites y Agua, or "CILA") is located
across the Rio Grande at Ciudad Juarez, in the Mexican state of
Chihuahua.2 7' The juxtaposition of conditions in the two cities today
sadly reflects the continuation of a neocolonial relationship that is not
limited to land and water.279

275. Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, Pub. L.
106-457, § 802, 114 Stat. 1977 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43 (2011)).
276. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(a) (1) (A-B) (2011).
277. The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization, and
Proceduresfor Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/AboutUs.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). One
irony of the State Department's disavowal of responsibility for the USIBWC is that it
leaves the agency without headquarters in Washington, D.C., a requirement applicable
to all executive departments, absent statutory waiver. See 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 and 72 (2011).
278. Id.
279. Ciudad Juarez is one of the deadliest cities in the world, having experienced
3,000 murders in 2010 alone. See Nick Valencia, Juarez Counts 3,000th Homicide of 2010,
CNN (Dec. 15, 2010, 6:02 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/12/15/mexicojuarez.
homicides/index.html. El Paso, on the other hand, celebrates its claim to be the safest
major city in the United States. El Paso Called the Safest Big City in the U.S.,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 23, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/abqnews/
abqnewseeker-mainmenu-39/2539-630am-el-paso-called-safest-big-city-in-the-us-.html.
Meanwhile, the United States supplies eighty seven percent of the illegal guns used in
Mexican murders. See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & WILLiAMJ. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40733, GUN TRAFFICKING AND THE SOUTHwEsT BORDER 1-2 (2009),

available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40 7 33_20090729.pdf. The United States
also pays Mexican crime lords billions of dollars annually in return for a steady flow of
illegal drugs.

Id. at 1; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG
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Notwithstanding its creation in the wake of conquest, and the
uneasy alliance between victor and vanquished, the IBWC generally
won high praise throughout the twentieth century for its engineering
expertise and ability to diplomatically resolve difficult transboundary
water issues. 2 so The IBWC engaged in aggressive technological
initiatives designed principally to secure a reliable source of water for
development on both sides of the border region, and for building
canals, flood control projects, dams and wastewater treatment plants
located along the Rio Grande, Colorado and Tijuana Rivers."'
Various authors have referred to the IBWC as "one of the most
prestigious international resource management agencies in the
world,"2 2 and "the finest example of functional cooperation in
transboundary resources management between highly dissimilar
Of course, such -unabashed
countries anywhere on the globe."2
admiration for diplomatic accomplishments fails to reflect the reality
that, even in the absence of war, conflict and unequal power define
binational relations.8
Actually, many such tributes are offered as a preface to criticism, or
at least in presentation of competing perceptions of the IBWC. For
example, the IBWC has been labeled both "the most venerable
binational water management agency in North America," and "an
institutional dinosaur, a stodgy brick and mortar agency, dominated by
engineers, intractable, defensive," with a "reputation as a
monopolistic, secretive agency with a penchant for controlling and
hoarding vital data on border water dynamics. "285
Such a mixture of praise and criticism is to be expected, for the
IBWC's projects, however meritorious, have always had some

CONTROL STRATEGY DATA SUPPLEMENT 2010, 63 (2010), available at
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcsIO/ndcslOdata_supl/ 10dat
asupplement.pdf. Of course, the U.S. government itself does not sell the guns and
purchase the drugs, however, federal, state, and local laws enable the continuation of
the exploitative relationship. CHU & KROUSE, supra note 279, at 2-3.
280. See, e.g., OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 7 ("USIBWC has a long history of
quiet, acknowledged technical competence. For over 100 years, the American and
Mexican Commissioners of the IBWC - civil engineers - found appropriate solutions to
most of the water and sanitation issues affecting both sides of the border. In other
words, the commission worked as the treaties intended. More recently, USIBWC has
gone through several years of internal management turmoil.").
281. See INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, U.S. SECTION, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2008 FY 2013 3-4, 7-9 (2010), availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/StrategicPlan.pdf.
282. E.g, Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 661.
283. Stephen Mumme, Innovation and Reform in TransboundaryResource Management:
A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and
Mexico, 33 NAT. REsOuRcEsJ. 93,93 (1993).

284. See generally, e.g., Mark Zeitoun & J. A. Allan, Applying Hegemony and Power Theory
to Transboundary Water Analysis, 10 WATER PoucY (Supplement 2) 3, 5-6 (2008),
availableat
http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/010S2/wp010S20003.htm
(discussing
the
implications of power disparities in the management and allocation of transboundary
water).

285.

Mumme, SustainableDevelopment Era, supra note 5, at 117, 122.
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detrimental impacts. For example, the Rio Grande Channelization
Project, completed by the USIBWC in 1943, destroyed between 12,000
and 20,000 acres of riparian wetlands along the one hundred-mile
reach of the Rio Grande from Caballo Dam in New Mexico to the
Texas State line."*
Yet the IBWC's reputation is typically redeemed, at least in part, by
its technical engineering accomplishments:
Criticism of the IBWC is almost as old as the Commission itself. Over
the past sixty years, the Commission, particularly its U.S. Section, has
been attacked for numerous grievances. Complaints include U.S.
intrusion on national sovereignty, unnecessary duplication of
functions of domestic water management agencies, the adoption of
an overly technical and politically narrow interpretation of treatybased responsibilities, use of an ad-hoc approach to dealing with
problems and disputes falling within the scope of its official mandate,
and failure to respond to local constituencies. By contemporary
standards, the IBWC is deficient in various areas, ranging from the
adequacy of its mandate to administration and operational
procedures. Centered on the task of protecting national treaty water
endowments, the IBWC was, and arguably remains, poorly positioned
to address contemporary water management concerns or to promote
an agenda of sustainable development of border water resources.
The Commission, however, is also praised as a model of
institutionalized bi-national cooperation. It is the lead agency for
of bilateral
transboundary water management and the settlement
disputes relating to managing shared water resources.2 8 7
Ironically, even USIBWC shortcomings, such as its lack of oversight

and accountability, insulation from public input, and allegiance to
elite interests, are also viewed as assets. Accordingly, its "complete
independence in administrative matters," is credited to the agency's
"conservatism," 288 and to its need to keep a "low profile with the
general public along the border [in order to] effectively cultivate [] the
support of the elite political clientele that is crucial to
decisionmaking. "289
Beginning in the 1970s, rapid growth and development along the
2,000-mile long border coincided with a rising tide of public
consciousness about water quality, water shortages, pollution, and

sanitation, as well as a growing demand for public participation in
government decisions.290 A law review Comment in 1971 suggested
286. See U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, Chapter 4: Water Development and Management
Programs,in THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS, VOL. 11 (1996) available at
http://www.doi.gov/oepc/wetlands2/v2ch2.html.
287. Stephen P. Mumme, Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reforms
for the U.S. - Mixico Border: The Casefor Strengtheningthe InternationalBounday and Water
Commission, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 929, 930 (2005).
288. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 672-73.
289. Id.at675.
290. See Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283, 285-86, 288-90; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, What is Border 2012, People Along the Border, U.S. - MEXIcO BORDER 2012 (Oct.
12, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/Border2012/framework/people.htmi (stating that the
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that the IBWC was institutionally incapable of addressing complex
ecological issues and condemned the IBWC for its narrow technical
focus, describing the purportedly diplomatic institution as an
"international Army Corps of Engineers."2 9 ' The authors of a 1979
paper opined that, " [b] ecause of the limited scope of its authority, the
IBWC is somewhat inadequate to bring about a definitive resolution of
issues in an area where political considerations take precedence over
sound water management.""'
Such concerns were increasingly
One observer
expressed or acknowledged throughout the 1980s. 2
listed the IBWC's shortcomings:
[T]he IBWC has attributed minor significance to the Treaty's
concern with border sanitation. The IBWC has construed narrowly
the Treaty's mandate for "solution of all border sanitation
problems." The IBWC has limited its sanitation responsibilities to the
development of sewage disposal projects, refusing to address the
more complex and hazardous problems of industrial discharges, toxic
wastes, groundwater mining and contamination, and air pollution.

Apparently, the IBWC wishes to avoid political controversy over its
jurisdictional authority.

The IBWC also refuses to use its clearly defined Treaty powers to
their fullest extent. The Commission has authority to initiate
investigations and to make decisions involving the utilization of the
international waters. These decisions, referred to as "Minutes," are
binding on the nations unless one of the governments objects within
thirty days. These informal decision-making powers give the IBWC
tremendous discretion to focus both nations' attention on
environmental problems and to make recommendations for their
solution. The apolitical Commission, however, has denied itself any
role in the fashioning of environmental policy, relying on the
uncertain initiative of executive levels of government to bring an
issue before the Commission. The IBWC consistently avoids political
controversy, preferring to concern itself only with data-gathering,
acting as a liaison between the two foreign offices, and completing
assigned water projects."9 (citations omitted)

B.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Criticism of the IBWC heated up in the 1990s, as an increasing

border population boom was sparked, in part, "by the maquiladora program, begun in
1965 to provide economic incentives to foreign (mostly U.S.-owned) assembly plants to
locate in the border region. The rate of industrial development increased further
after the North American Free Trade Agreement. . . removed most barriers to trade . .
. among Canada, the United States and Mexico."); see generally M. ANGELES VILLARREAL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32934, U.S.-MExICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: TRElNDS, ISSUES,
7 (2011) availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf.
291. Johnston, supra note 9, at 164.
292. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 7, at iv.
293. See, e.g., Mumme, StateInfluence, supranote 7, at 625, 633.
294. Sinclair, supranote 5, at 113-14.
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number of scholars and environmental critics took up the charge. The
growing hostility toward the IBWC led one of the leading voices
concerning transboundary water management to observe: "For the
environmental groups, the Commission could be considered public
enemy number one." 295
this widespread
reflected
A 1993 scholarly monograph
IBWC:
disillusionment with the
The [IBWC] has been questioned by many border scholars and
activists who criticize the IBWC for its inability to act as an
independent border institution, and for the lack of transparency in
its decision-making processes. The IBWC is infamous for being an
old-fashioned, engineering driven institution that focuses on large,
capital-intensive brick and mortar projects. The IBWC has also been
too bureaucratic and for being a
criticized for being too slow and
296
nonpublic oriented institution.
Critics argued that the IBWC is biased towards construction
projects, and lacks diplomatic and management skills."' Scholars
partially attribute this problem to Article 2 of the 1944 Water Treaty,
which requires that the Commissioners of both the U.S. and Mexican
Sections must be licensed engineers. 298 The antiquated requirement
has ill-served the Commission in modern times, and, at times, both
sections have disregarded it.299
Overall, the IBWC was simply seen as not having an interest in
environmental projects.
With regard to border environmental infrastructure, the IBWC has
completed a number of projects in its over fifty-year history. An
examination of the total list of IBWC projects, however, reveals that
only a few constitute real environmental infrastructure. If items such
as bridges and the various flood control projects are eliminated from
the list, then there are not many truly environmental infrastructure
projects."o
A Harvard Law Review Comment summarized the USIBWC's
environmental default this way: "A lack of [a community of
professionals committed to progressive environmental policies] within
the [USIBWC], which almost always defers to the judgment of the
Army Corps of Engineers, precludes extensive involvement and input
3 1
by environmental organizations and NGOs." 0

295. Albert E. Utton, Protectingthe Environment in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, 1 U.S.MEX. L.J. 211, 212 (1993).
296. Spalding, supranote 5, at 118.
297. See, e.g., Sanchez, supranote 6, at 283, 290, 297.
298. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2.
299. See infra notes 628, 629.
300. Spalding, supranote 5, at 120.
301. Developments in the Law- InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, supra note 9, at 1578 n.
143.
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Equally toxic to its critics was the IBWC's resistance to public
participation. As one author wrote in 1993:
Public participation is perhaps the best evidence of the growing
distance between the border community and the IBWC. The
reluctance of the Commission to accept public participation in those
issues under its jurisdiction for decades is becoming more intolerant

to the affected public.

The demands for broader public participation, mistakenly perceived
by the Commission as antagonistic or 'interference in their affairs,'
are no more than the response of those communities to a new reality
of the border. The truth is that border problems, particularly water
issues, have outgrown the jurisdiction of the Commission. Their
solution can no longer depend on the limited technical skill of the
they require an integrated and
Rather,
IBWC engineers.
302
interdisciplinary approach.
Comparing public participation policies of the Canada/United
States International Joint Commission (IJC) with those of the IBWC,
another author noted that the ICJ "is justly renowned for this aspect of
its activities ... in rather stark contrast to the public participation
situation of the IBWC."3 3 The author noted that the IBWC had
"grave shortcomings in the field of public participation ...":so4"Not
only is little substantive public information made available, but the
tradition of hearings, open meetings, workshops, and briefings,
bringing interested persons and groups into interaction with the
Commission and its staff, is lacking. The IBWC clearly evolved in a
quite different binational context." 0
As one of many observers to occasionally summarize the charges
made against the IBWC, a leading supporter of the agency conceded
that the charges "certainly have merit, at least by degrees, and deserve
to be taken seriously."o30 The supporter continued:
302. Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283.
303. Hayton, supra note 6, at 277-78. The IBWC has frequently been compared
unfavorably to the IJC. See, e.g., Richard K. Paisley et al., Transboundary Water
Management: An Institutional Comparison Among Canada, the United States and Mexico, 9
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 177, 189-91 (2004); Keith A. Henry, The Internationaljoint
Commission and the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
305, 306 (1993).
304. Hayton, supra note 6, at 279.
305. Id. at 278. Indeed, the two are very different types of organizations. Whereas
the IBWC comprises a U.S. Section and a Mexican Section, each pursuing its own
interests as distinct parts of an international institution, the IJC exists only as an
international body, and has no respective national sections. Thus, the IJC is a truly
"binational" institution, whereas the IBWC is more properly termed a "bilateral"
body. See Lee Botts & Paul Muldoon, Using the Boundary Waters Treaty for the 21st
Century: Revitalizing the Great Lakes Governance Regime, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1553, 1559
(2008); see generally, The Boundary Waters Treaty CentennialSymposium, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1417 (2008).
306. Mumme, ManagingAcute Water Scarcity, supra note 5, at 156.
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Analysts drawn to administrative concepts like "ecosystem
management" or "drainage basin management" have long chaffed at
the more limited jurisdiction of the Commission, viewing it as a
political creation, mired in sovereignty, and mismatched to modem
management challenges raised by ecological zones and hydrological
cycles. The Commission's mandate, to build and operate joint works
and resolve such disputes as may arise related to the treaties under its
jurisdiction, is seen as essentially reactive and ad hoc rather than
proactive and capable of addressing problems in a systematic,
Finally, the
comprehensive, and future-oriented fashion.
Commission's diplomatic structure is criticized as insular, secretive,
and unresponsive to public concerns, factors conceived for the
purpose of defending sovereign entitlements rather than forging
consensual grassroots solutions to transboundary problems. 3o7
Another critic put it more succinctly: "The IBWC's most
commonly cited shortcomings include its limited scope and unclear
mandate (narrow focus on water quantity, rather than quality, issues,
for example) as well as its 'cumbersome' institutional structure, which
hinders prompt responses to environmental problems and obstructs
30
any public participation element."o
C.

GROUNDWATER POLLUTION AND DEPLETION

The upsurge in criticism of the IBWC in recent decades has
coincided with explosive growth along the border and a growing
awareness that a variety of water management issues have reached a
point of crisis: groundwater pollution and depletion; water shortages
and drought; untreated sewage; salinity in the Colorado River;
pervasive pollution of the region's rivers; and deteriorating
international relations.
Mexico and the United States share underground aquifer basins
connected to the Rio Grande, and the Colorado, Tijuana, Santa Cruz,
Although a number of federal laws indirectly
and New Rivers.'
protect groundwater, there is no comprehensive federal regulatory
State laws regarding groundwater ownership and
scheme.s1 o
exploitation vary among the U.S. border states, but all vest expansive
rights in the owner of the surface to reasonable use of the water."' A
major criticism of the IBWC is that its scope and jurisdiction exclude
related
and
quality,
water
of groundwater,
consideration
environmental, conservation and distribution issues, at least as

307.
308.

Id. (citations omitted).
Land, supra note 5, at 108-09 (citing MARY KELLY, FACING REALITY' THE NEED FOR

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO
BORDER (1991)).

309. See M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated
Environmental Plan for the Mexico-United States Border Area, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 680
(1993).
310. See Adrienne Paule, Undergound Water: A Fugitive at the Border, 13 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 1129, 1131 (1996).
311. See generally Barber, supranote 309, at 667-78.
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traditionally construed under the 1944 Water Treaty. 12
Groundwater provides a significant source of water used all along
the border. The Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer is "a significant source of
drinking water" for Mexicali, Mexico, and a "significant source of
irrigation water" for farmers in Northern Baja."' In Far West Texas,
the Hueco Bolson and the Mesilla Bolson Aquifers provide
approximately half of the municipal water supply for the City of El
Paso, with nearly one million residents. The Hueco Bolson Aquifer
also serves as the principal source of municipal supply for Ciudad
Juarez, a city of 1.5 million residents. Large-scale groundwater
withdrawals have caused significant declines in the water table, and
water-quality degradation due to lateral brackish water intrusion into
In addition to salinity, groundwater
the fresh water zones."
contamination is endemic in the border region, "' particularly by
arsenic that both occur naturally and results from industrial pollution,
and by phosphates and nitrogen from agriculture run-off."'
Although Texas law permits the Texas Water Commission to
regulate groundwater, the agency has been reluctant to do so. 31' The
State requires joint planning in management areas among
groundwater conservation districts. According to the Texas Water
Code:

"Groundwater

Conservation

Districts . ..

are

the

state's

preferred method of groundwater management .. . "31 Among other
things, the Water Code requires that, "[n]ot later than September 1,
2010, and every five years thereafter, the districts shall consider
groundwater availability models and other data or information for the
management area and shall establish desired future conditions for the
As of October 1,
relevant aquifers within the management area."'
2009, desired future conditions had not been adopted for any aquifers
in the state, and were not expected for several more years."
Neither groundwater nor ecological concerns are specifically
included in the 1944 Water Treaty's Article 3 list of IBWC priorities,
although there is a catch-all category for "other beneficial uses. "321
While the IBWC took a tentative step toward addressing the omission
312. See, e.g., Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation, supra note 7, at 88-89. See
generally Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict over TransboundaryGroundwaters:
Some Institutional and Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 506-07
(1980); Hall, supra note 8, at 907 ("Despite the seemingly inescapable connection
between population growth, industrial development, and groundwater demand, the
IBWC has managed largely to avoid addressing the issue of transboundary
groundwater management throughout its nearly 114 years of combined operation.").
313. Paul Stanton Kibel, A Line Drawn in Water: Aquifers Beneath the Mexico-United
States Border, 12 U. DENv. WATER L. REv. 191, 193-94 (2008).
314. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-47 and 1-71.
315. See WESTERHOFF ET AL, supra note 50, at 4-5.
316. Id.
317. Barber, supra note 309, at 676.
318. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (2011).
319. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108 (d) (2011).
320. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-6.
321. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3.
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of groundwater management with the adoption of Minute 242 in 1973,
which provides for mandatory consultation on any construction that
would affect groundwater, nothing more has been done to extend the
3 2
jurisdiction of the IBWC concerning groundwater management.
One critic observed with alarm in 1993, that
[S]ince 1973 and approval of Minute 242, the IBWC has had general
rules for establishing a bilateral regime to conserve, manage, and
distribute transboundary groundwaters. Despite the fact that this
regime was urgently needed 18 years ago, practically nothing has
been done in this respect by the Commission to date. This is viewed
already be
as a most desperate situation, and some grave disputes may
323
on the horizon as a result of the Commission's passivity.
After another dozen years, nothing had changed, resulting in "a

324
race to the bottom in various localities along the border."
Some have long suggested that only a new groundwater treaty will
force the IBWC to act.325 A regional agreement between Mexico and a
state or local government that shares the aquifers is both a "reasonable
and constitutional alternative for managing groundwater on the
border."32 1 In any event, even IBWC supporters who once hoped the
agency might play a role in negotiating such a treaty have' been
disappointed.32 1

322. See Mumme, supra note 8, at 341-42 ("Today the goal of Minute 242 remains
unfulfilled. Despite a train of intermittent discussions and localized problems, little
progress has been made since 1973. The inevitable result is the current unsustainable
yet escalating race amongst parties on both sides of the border to drain these vital
resources."); see also Hall, supra note 8, at 908 ("The clear anticipation of and call for a
'comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas' found in paragraph 5
of the Minute was never realized, and little progress in developing a formal agreement
has been recorded to date, thirty years after the signing of Minute 242.").
323. Szekely, supranote 4, at 399.
324. Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation,supra note 7, at 83-84.
325. See Burman & Cornish, supra note 13, at 397, 400; Philip Dunlap, Comment,
Border Wars: Analyzing the Dispute over GroundwaterBetween Texas and Mexico, 12 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 215, 239-241 (2006); Robert C. Gavrell, The Elephant Under the Border: An
Argument for a New, Comprehensive Treaty for the Transboundary Waters and Aquifers of the
United States and Mexico, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 189, 214, 217, 219, 221,
224-27 (2005); Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of
InternationalGroundwaterPolicy Along the United States-Mexico Border and a Roadmap to
an Agreement, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1211, 1237 (2004); Robert D. Hayton & Albert E.
Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 663,
663, 665 (1989); Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict over Transboundary Groundwaters,
supra note 312, at 506-07; Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for
Solving Border GroundwaterIssues, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 57, 58 (2003); Paule, supra note 310,
at 1133; Ann Berkeley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to
the Use of Transbounday Groundwaters,25 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 713, 713,717,721 (1985).
326. Jennifer Evans, TransboundaryGroundwaterin New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico: State
and Local Legal Remedies to a Challenge Between Cities, States, and Nations, 30 WM. & MARY
ENvrL. L. & POLY REv. 471, 473 (2006).

327. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation in Transboundary
Aquifer Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 16 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 77, 85
(2005) (suggesting it may be unrealistic to expect the IBWC to aggressively promote
groundwater management given the lack of support among border state governments,
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WATER SHORTAGES AND DROUGHT

As for surface water, irrigation uses account for more than eighty
percent of the U.S. share of water in the Rio Grande, and more than
fifteen percent is consumed for municipal uses; industrial use is
negligible, amounting to less than 0.4 percent.2 8 With the U.S. border
population projected to triple by 2060, municipal use is projected to
double. 2 Nearly all water use in the Lower Rio Grande Valley is
derived from Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs, the two major
international reservoirs that are located on the Rio Grande. "These
impoundments provide controlled storage for over 8 million acre-feet
of water... . .3' The United States owns 58.6 percent of the useable
storage in Falcon Reservoir and 56.2 percent of the total conservation
storage capacity in Amistad Reservoir. Mexico owns the balance in
each."'
Beginning in the early 1990s, severe drought prevented Mexico
from meeting its obligations to deliver water quantities specified by the
1944 Treaty.332 The flows in the Rio Grande during the 1990s-2000s
were "the lowest experienced during the last half century."3 3 As a
result, farmers and ranchers in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and
their congressional representatives became hostile towards Mexico. 4
Texas's U.S. Senators introduced a rather belligerent demand that
"[t]he President of the United States should promptly utilize the full
power of his office to bring about compliance with the 1944 Treaty on
Water Utilization in order that the full requirement of water be
available for United States use during the next full crop season" and
"[t] he United States Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission should work to bring about full compliance with the 1944
notwithstanding the resultant "race to the bottom.")
328. See LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at ES6.
329. LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at 2-11. The U.S. population in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley is projected to increase from 1.62 million people at present to 3.94
million by 2060. Id. at 2-2. Approximately ninety-seven percent (833,640) of the
border population in west Texas reside in El Paso County, one of the fastest growing
regions in Texas. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at ES2.
330. LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at 3-7.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 3-125.
333. Id., at 3-32.
334. See generally, STEPHEN R. VIfJA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22085, THE UNITED
STATES - MEXICO DISPUTE OVER THE WATERS OF THE LOWER RIO GRANDE RIVER CRS-3 and
-6 (2005), available at http://www.whprp.org/nle/crsreports/05mar/RS22085.pdf. See
also, e.g., Susan Combs, The Mexico Water Debt, 67 TEx. B.J. 198, 201 (2004) (the author,
a Texas Agriculture Commissioner, charged, "Mexico's failure to abide by its treaty
obligations and address its accumulated debt has caused an estimated $1 billion
economic loss to the Rio Grande Valley."); Jill Warren, Mexico's Compliance with the
1994 Water Treaty Between the United States and Mexico: A Texas Perspective, 11 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 41, 44-45 (2003) ("Texans and their elected officials are rightfully frustrated by
this course of events. The United States and Mexico reach agreements, but Mexico
does not fulfill the terms of those agreements. The Texas leadership team is running a
full-court press on officials of the United States and Mexico to attempt to force a
solution to this devastating problem.").
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Treaty on Water Utilization and not accept any water debt or deficit
repayment plan which does not provide for the full repayment of water
owed."335
The 1944 Water Treaty stipulates rationing rules for periods of
"extraordinary drought," but does not define the term. 3 6 Amid
increasing political tensions on both sides of the border, the IBWC
issued several Minutes attempting to balance scheduled amounts due
against the fact of water shortages,3 " and although these allowed the
IBWC to muddle through the impasse, they ultimately did little to
resolve tension between the United States and Mexico over water
distribution and binational management.3 8 Again, these problems left
observers to look for answers beyond both the IBWC and the 1944
Treaty.339
A 2005 Report to Congress noted: "Many have also stated that the
structure and role of the IBWC-a role traditionally rooted in the
protection of national sovereign interests-should be reevaluated to
reflect the growing need for cooperation and assign a stronger
commitment to forming policy on the River's sustainable
development. "40
E.

ENDANGERED RIVERS,

FLORA AND FAUNA

The IBWC has long been criticized for being so narrowly focused
on water quantity that it neglects water quality issues, including
environmental mitigation for its own construction projects, and the
boundary waters are anything but pristine. The storied Rio Grande
(known in Mexico as the Rio Bravo del Norte), which extends 1,900
miles from its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado to its

335. 157 CONG. REc.25,658 (2000).
336. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4; see also Mumme, Revising the 1944
Water Treaty, supranote 16, at 653-54.
337. See, e.g., IBWC Minute 309, supra note 168; IBWC Minute 308, supra note 168;
IBWC Minute 307, supra note 168; IBWC Minute 293, supra note 168.
338. Texas irrigators invoked Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which allows a foreign investor
to challenge host nation actions that are tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation; however, Mexico and the State Department obtained a dismissal
because NAFTA applies only to host nation investments and all the lost investment was
in Texas, not Mexico. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel & Jonathan R. Schutz, Rio Grande
Designs: Texans' NAFTA Water Claim Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 228, 229, 26567 (2007). In 2005, Mexico agreed to a repayment schedule. See also Gregory F.
Szydlowski, The Commoditization of Water: A Look at CanadianBulk Water Exports, the Texas
Water Dispute, and the Ongoing Battle Undei NAFTA for Control of Water Resources, 18 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 665, 679-80 (2007).
339. See Ingram, supra note 13, at 190-91; Lopez, supra note 15, at 500-08; Mumme,
ManagingAcute Water Scarcity, supra note 5, at 155-57; Barbara J. Morehouse et al., The
Implications of Sustained Droughtfor TransboundaryWater Management in Nogales, Arizona,
and Nogales, Sonora, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 783, 784 (2000); Mumme, supra note 16, at
655-58; See Craig J. Pritzlaff, The Tragedy of Another Minute: IBWC Minute 308's Failure to
Mend the Rio GrandeRiver, 9 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 617, 624 (2003).
340. STEPHEN R. VlflA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22085 THE UNITED STATES - MEXICO
DIsPuTE OVER THE WATERS OF THE LOWER Rio GRANDE RIVER CRS-6 (2005), available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05mar/RS22085.pdf.
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delta in the Gulf of Mexico, is the fourth longest river in the United
States."' The entire Rio Grande/Rio Bravo watershed covers an area
approximately 335,000 square miles, with approximately half the
watershed in the United States and the other half in Mexico. 4 The
USIBWC is responsible for monitoring and coordinating efforts to
improve the quality of water within the Rio Grande in its 1,254-mile
international boundary section, partially pursuant to contract with the
state of Texas.
The Rio Grande flows freely for 175 miles in Colorado before its
nearly 500 mile journey through New Mexico is impeded by Elephant
Butte and Caballo dams. 4' The river dries up by the time it reaches El
Paso/Ciudad Juarez and does not resume significant flows for another
250 miles downstream, at the confluence with the Rio Conchos (with
headwaters in Mexico), a stretch deemed the "Forgotten Reach of the
Rio Grande."1 5 Revitalized by the Rio Conchos, the Rio Grande is
designated as a Wild and Scenic River for the nearly 200 miles that it
winds through Big Bend National Park in Texas."' The river is once
again impounded at Amistad Dam, and then again by Falcon Dam,
before it flows into the Gulf of Mexico.
The Elephant Butte Dam and Reservoir in New Mexico is
approximately 125 miles north of El Paso and can store over two

million acre-feet of water. Water in the reservoir is stored to meet
irrigation demands in [southern New Mexico and the] El Paso and
Juarez Valleys and is released in a pattern for power generation.
Above El Paso, flow in the River is largely controlled by releases from

341. Jean W. Parcher, et al., U.S. Geological Survey, A Descriptive Overview Of The Rio
Grande-Rio Bravo Watershed, 1 J. OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 159, 159-60
at
available
(2010),
U.S.
http://wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/journal oftransboundary/Parcher.pdf;
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER FACT SHEET, LARGEST RIVERS IN THE UNITED STATES,

Various
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/ 1987/ofr87-242/pdf/ofr87242.pdf.
lengths have been reported for the Rio Grande, all near 1,900 miles, and the river is
sometimes reported as the fifth longest in the United States. The St. Lawrence River is
similar in length, although half is located in Canada. As discussed in the Water Fact
Sheet, length calculations are imprecise due to natural variability over time and
problems of measurement and definition.
342. USIBWC, TEXAS CLAN RIVERS PROGRAM, 2010 BASIN HIGHLIGHTS REPORT FOR
THE RIO GRANDE BASIN IN TExAS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/CRP/documents/BHR2010-final.pdf.
343. About the Texas Clean River Program,INT'L BOUNDARY &WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/CRP/about.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
344. For the history and legal developments surrounding operation of dams, see
Susan Kelly et al., History of the Rio Grande Reservoirs in New Mexico: Legislation and
Litigation,47 NAT. RES.J. 525 (2007).
345. See Parcher, supra note 327 at 159-60. See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS
ALBUQUERQUE DIsT., FORGOTTEN REACH OF THE Rio GRANDE, FORT QUITMAN TO
PRESIDIO, TEXAS (2008), availableat

http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/comm-exec/pubs/as/200.pdf.
346. Parcher et al., supra note 341 at 165.
347. Id. at 164-65.
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Caballo Reservoir located below Elephant Butte.348
The Bureau of Reclamation manages both Elephant Butte Dam
and Caballo Reservoir, controlling all downstream releases.'
From El Paso to Fort Quitman, flow consists of treated municipal
wastewater from El Paso, untreated municipal wastewater from Juarez,
and irrigation return flow. " From Presidio downstream to the
Amistad Reservoir, "the Rio Grande often lacks sufficient flow to
adequately support minimum recreational, environmental, or
agricultural needs; and during dry periods, may fall significantly short
of supplying such needs."35 1
The Pecos River is the largest Texas river basin that flows into the
Originating in New Mexico, "the Pecos River
Rio Grande. 35
contributes an average of 11 percent of the annual streamflow into the
Rio Grande near Amistad Reservoir.... [but] contributes more than
29 percent of the annual salt loading into the reservoir."3 3
American Rivers, a national non-profit organization, has declared
the Rio Grande an Endangered River three times since 1993."4 In
2007, the World Wildlife Fund ranked the Rio Grande among the
world's top ten rivers at risk, citing severe threats from water
diversions, widespread alteration of the floodplain, dams and
pollution." "Heavy metals and pesticides have been identified along
the course of the Rio Grande. Elevated fecal coliform and nutrient
levels occur -in the River downstream of border cities, primarily
because of untreated wastewater from Mexico."356
The Colorado River originates in the mountains of Colorado and
Wyoming, and flows more than 1000 miles before it reaches the
Colorado River Delta, which is located entirely within the borders of
Mexico. 57 Over the course of the last century, the flows in the Delta
have fallen by nearly seventy-five percent," and when combined with
land use changes, result in a ninety-five percent loss of Delta wetlands

348. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at ES8.
349. Id. at 1-75.
350. Id. at ES8.
351. Id. at 3-10.
352. Id. at ES8.
353. Id. at 3-19.
354. America's Most Endangered Rivers Report: 19861995, AMERICAN RIVERS,
available at
http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/protecting-rivers/endangeredrivers/background/past-reports.html (listed in 2003, 1994, and 1993).
355. VWFs Top 10 Rivers at Risk, Rio Grande Makes List, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(Mar. 19, 2007), availableat
http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2007/WWFPresitem925.html.
356. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 3-15.
357. Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: ManagingEcosystem Conservation in the
ColoradoRiverDelta, 40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 819, 822 (2000).
358. Id. at 824.
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and riparian areas.159 The Delta hosts numerous threatened and
endangered species."' Aside from exploring solutions to the problem
of salinity on the Colorado River, the only IBWC actions to even
tentatively raise the issue of the disappearing Colorado River
ecosystem is Minute 306, adopted in 2000, which authorized a
binational investigation of the ecology of the Colorado River Delta,
and its restatement in Minute 317, adopted in 2010.361
The problem of salinity in the Colorado River means that
Colorado River water reaching Mexico is so saline as to render it
virtually unusable, and the IBWC has been heavily criticized for the
IBWC Minutes adopted in 2010
way it has handled the problem.6
indicate that proposed operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant (YDP) in
Yuma, Arizona, would treat agricultural wastewater now delivered to
Mexico as surplus.16 1 Once treated, the water could be counted as
treaty water, and thus increase a like amount of fresh water available
for use in the -United States. Unfortunately, this would cut off the
supply of wastewater that has historically drained into Mexico and now
sustains the Santa Clara Wetland, an integral part of the Upper Gulf of
California and Colorado River Delta Biosphere Reserve, the highest
category of protection that Mexico assigns to a wetland, in addition to
being declared a protected wetland under the RAMSAR Wetlands
Convention.3" Proposed alternatives such as water leasing and water
banking have been proposed to avoid operation of the YDP."'
The Tijuana River watershed spans the U.S.-Mexico international
border as it flows from its headwaters between the Laguna and Juarez
Mountain Ranges to the Pacific Ocean. The River's main stem runs
through a number of major industrial Mexican cities before reaching
Tijuana and eventually entering the United States at the San Ysidro
International Border Crossing. Rapid urbanization and growth in the
San Diego-Tijuana trans-border region in the last fifty years has led to
significant changes in regional land use."'
The implementation of the Maquiladora Program to spur border
trade in the 1960s led to rapid industrialization and subsequent
359. Id.
360. Id. at 829-30.
361. See Minute No. 306, supra note 190; Minute No. 317, supra note 202.
362. See, e.g., Note, Nicole Ries, supra note 7, at 523-24 ("the IBWC ... appears
institutionally incapable of negotiating bilateral decision-making when domestic
politics mandate incompatible solutions"). See also, Pitt, supranote 9.
363. See Minute No. 316 IBWC, supranote 199; Minute No. 317, supranote 202.
364. See generally Kara Gillon, Environmental and Other Implications of Operating the
Yuma DesaltingPlant, 19 PAc. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 129, 130, 13941
(2006). See also Minute No. 316 IBWC, supra note 199; Minute No. 317, supra note
202.
365. See Gillon, supra 364; Tarlock, supra note 66, at 389-90. See also U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION: MANAGING WATER IN THE WEST (2009), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmental-docs/ydp/appa_b_c_d.pdf (including
public comments on Draft EA).
366. See TED Case Studies: Tijuana River Pollution,AM. UNIV. (2007), availableat
http://www.american.edu/TED/TIJUANA.HTM.
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population growth."' Problems worsened with NAFTA and further
rapid population growth and development in the 1980s and 1990s."
Lack of sewers and insufficient wastewater treatment capacity in
Tijuana have contributed to elevated pathogen and nutrient levels in
the waters crossing the border." Extensive agriculture and industrial
operations have also contributed to high concentrations of pesticides,
heavy metals, and PCBs.s"o Pollution in the Tijuana River is so
excessive that many beaches have been closed to swimming, and there
have been alarming reports of a rising incidence of infant brain
anencephaly near Tijuana and San Diego."'
The IBWC's perceived mismanagement of the sewage problem was
summarized this way twenty years ago:
Through the years, mounting criticisms of IBWC suggest that it is
nonresponsive and perhaps even counterproductive in solving
problems. IBWC has demonstrated a history of being uncooperative
with other agencies and not being diligent in solving problems for
which it was expressly commissioned to address in the 1944 Water

Treaty.372

F.

NEW BORDER INSTITUTIONS

Many critics believe the. IBWC as an institution has simply been
surpassed by the complexity of transboundary water management in
the twenty-first century. As one expert observed in 1993,
The apolitical nature and technical expertise of those who are
directly responsible for the work of the Commission, and which
constituted the keys to its successes, has apparently dwindled or
perhaps even vanished. More importantly, there are those concerned
with the fact that, even if the Commission maintained the degree of
excellence it showed during the past century, the enormity of the new
capacity, as it was
challenges ahead go well beyond its management
not designed to deal with such situations.373
Many observers have noted that when the IBWC was established by
the 1944 Water Treaty it was one of the only federal agencies working
for binational cooperation on the U.S.-Mexico border, a situation that
Over the past few decades many new institutions
no longer exists.

367. See John H. Minan, Recent Developments in Wastewater Management in the Coastal
Region at the United States-Mexico Border,3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 51, 56 n.13 (2002).
368. Id. at 56-57.
369. Id. at 57.
370. See id. at 56-58, 61; Peter Smith, The Watershed Economy: Legal Challenges Facing the
TijuanaRiver, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 337, 344-n.57 (2008).
371. Smith, supra 370, 337-38..
372. Altomare, supra note 12, at 390.
373. Szekely, supra note 4, at 399.
374. Bennett &'Herzog, supra note 4, at 974 ("The truth is that the management of
water in the U.S.-Mexico borderland has become a much more complex problem than
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have been established on the border to manage binational resources
and work for greater cooperation between the two countries, including
the Border 2012 Program, Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC), North American Development Bank (NADB),
Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), and many others.3 75
In addition, state governments, 3 76 and increasingly local
governments,3" traditionally play a dominant role in water

the creators of the IBWC could ever have imagined.").
375. See generally, State Department, supra note 80 ("The 1983 La Paz Agreement to
protect and improve the border environment led to Border 2012, a 10-year . . .
environmental program for the U.S.-Mexico border region. The Border 2012
Program is the latest multi-year, bi-national planning effort to be implemented under
the La Paz Agreement and succeeds Border XXI, a 5-year program that ended in
"The 1993 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
2000."
(NAAEC) created the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation . .
. by the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, to improve enforcement of environmental laws and
"A November 1993 agreement
to address common environmental concerns."
between the U.S. and Mexico [established] the North American Development Bank
(NADBank) and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) under
the auspices of NAFTA, in order to address border environmental problems. The
NADBank uses capital and grant funds contributed by Mexico and the U.S. to help
finance border environmental infrastructure projects certified by the BECC. The
BECC works with local communities to develop and certify environmental
infrastructure projects, such as wastewater treatment plants, drinking water systems,
and solid waste disposal facilities." Each institution originally had its own Board of
Directors, but they merged into one entity in 2005). See also, e.g., Agreement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., Aug.
14, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2916 (the La Paz Agreement stipulates that "[n]othing in this
Agreement shall prejudice or otherwise affect the functions entrusted to the
International Boundary and Water Commission in accordance with the Water Treaty
of 1944"); Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., Nov.
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 62; Eileen Zorc, The
Border 2012 US. Mexico EnvironmentalProgram:Will a Bottom-Up Approach Work?, 16 GEO.
INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 533, 536 (2004); Christopher P. Brown & Stephen Mumme,
.Applied and Theoretical Aspects of Binational Watershed Councils (Consejos de Cuencas) in the
U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 895, 912 (2000); David A. Gantz, The
North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission: A
New Approach to Pollution Abatement Along the United States-Mexican Border, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1027 (1996).
376. See Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor
Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 156 (2002) ("[D]espite the
combination of the commerce power and the Supremacy Clause that together allow
the national government to propound a meaningful water policy with allocative
features, the national government has not done so and is unlikely to do so any time
soon."). See also Colorado River Compact, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057, art I, III (1928)
(dividing the waters of the Colorado River between the basin states), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/gl000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf Rio Grande Compact,
ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785 (1938) (providing for the distribution of the U.S. share of the
waters of the Rio Grande among Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, above Fort
Quitman, Texas); see Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Constitutional Framework for Water
Regulation in Mexico, 35 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 489, 490 (1995).
377. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed
Management, 20 PACE ENvrL. L. REv. 149, 149-50 (2003) (addressing the evolving role
of local government in watershed conservation).
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The State of Texas, for example, has created sixteen
management.'
local bodies to coordinate long-range water supply planning
throughout the state. Two of these regional groups cover the entire
Rio Grande in Texas. The Rio Grande Regional Water Planning
Group (LRGRWPG) covers an eight-county area of south Texas
The other Rio Grande
comprising the Lower Rio Grande Valley.'
regional planning group is the Far West Texas Water Planning Group
(FWTWPG), which comprises seven counties in far west Texas solely
within the Rio Grande River Basin.so
G. REFORM OR REPLACE THE IBWC
The IBWC has been given some credit for belated progress in
collaborating with other agencies along the border. 81 Yet the
overwhelming sentiment is that the agency should be replaced or
radically reformed. 8 1 Some critics believe the IBWC is no longer up to
the task of managing the boundary waters, and should be replaced by
a modern twenty-first century binational institution, either one like the
BECC or an altogether new institution."' Others believe the IBWC
can be salvaged, but only through radical reforms.
Two leading scholars recommended in 1993 that the governments
of Mexico and the United States move toward "meeting the challenge
of sustainable development by creating a new institution or changing
or reconstituting the present International Boundary and Water
Commission to move toward the ecosystem management needs of the
boundary region."3

A similar ambivalence

about the IBWC's

potential for reform was expressed in the following manner: "It seems
doubtful that regulatory solutions and planning can be avoided if
border environmental health is to be protected, and yet the United
States Section is unlikely to change, "38 the authors observed, yet
378. The U.S. Supreme Court has fostered a perception of "purposeful and
continued deference to state water law by Congress." California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645, 653 (1978). See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701 (1978)
(stating that Congress has historically almost "invariably deferred" to state water law
with regard to the power of federal entities). But see, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Deflating the
Deference Myth: NationalInterests vs. State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use,
2006 UTAH L. REv. 241, 243, 312 (2006).
379. See LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-2, 1-5.
380. Id. at ES-1.
381. Mumme, Advancing BinationalCooperation,supra note 7, at 99-101.
382. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 9, at 165 (noting IBWC and the La Paz Agreement
Coordinators both "have been strongly criticized for their historic failures in
addressing border pollution problems. Consequently, many NGOs argue that these
groups should be replaced, restructured, or subordinated to EPA or SEDUE, or in the
alternative, a new binational agency should be created.")
383. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 112-15, 122-24, 132, 134, 136 (finding the
IBWC "has denied itself any role in the fashioning of environmental policy," however,
the author concludes that the La Paz Environmental Agreement is largely symbolic in
nature, offering neither established rules of conduct nor enforcement mechanisms to
safeguard shared resources).
384. Dworsky & Utton, supranote 12, at 449.
385. .See, e.g., Ingram & White, supranote 4, at 173.
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"[t]he proposal to alter the design and mission of the IBWC, as
opposed to establishing entirely new institutions, certainly deserves
more debate.""
Others have no such uncertainty, as demonstrated by the Executive
Director of the Texas Center for Policy Study in a 1993 publication: "I
do not agree that the IBWC should be the agency which is given
broader responsibilities for pollution control in the border region. It
is an unacceptably closed structure that has little accountability and is
responsive only to entrenched interests.""'
A 1992 review of several proposals for reform of the IBWC
discussed a similar range of views: "The most radical solution is
advanced by TCPS [Texas Center for Policy Studies] which
recommends 'removal of IBWC's lead jurisdiction on water quality
problems in border area rivers and underground water and transfer of
that jurisdiction to a new binational agency that is open to public
participation and accountable to border area governments.'" 388
Other critics have suggested a more moderate path with specific
recommendations.
The time has come for the U.S. and Mexico to modernize the
Commission. This does not mean renegotiating the 1944 water treaty
in any significant respect.
In our view, however, effective
modernization will require that the countries confront the long-held
fiction that controversial water issues can be resolved, out of the
public eye, solely through the application of what is traditionally
viewed as the commision's technical expertise. As a first step,
changes are required to ensure that the commissioners have the full
range of stature and skills necessary to address the political and
diplomatic aspects of controversial transboundary water management
issues. In this regard, the current limitation of an "engineercommissioner" is no longer useful.

Effective modernization will also require the two federal government
elevate the priority of border water issues within their respective
foreign relations secretaries; more fully intergrate the U.S. and
Mexican sections of the commission; significantly expand the
resources available to the commission; and develop clear procedures
to avoid the type of crises [i.e. water shortages] confronting us now
along the Rio Grande.38 9

H. POTENTIAL TREATY AMENDMENTS
Some proposals to reform the IBWC insist on the need to amend
the 1944 Water Treaty, although it is far from clear that any such

386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 175. See also, Gaines, supra note 12, at 446.
Kelly, supra note 7, at 301-02.
Mumme, New Directions, supra note 5, at 545.
KELLY & SzEKELY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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amendment is needed to accomplish substantial change in the
institution, at least in the U.S. Section. Whereas most critics propose
amendments to the Treaty to deal with the issues of drought and
groundwater management,"' other proposals are as seemingly
mundane as removing the requirement that the Commissioners be
engineers, making room for a broader pool of qualified professional
managers and water experts.
Others question the wisdom or even the need to amend the 1944
Water Treaty. Any attempt to amend any provision of the Treaty, the
argument goes, even something as seemingly innocuous as the
engineer-commissioner requirement, will inevitably lead to calls for
amendments regarding more substantive provisions regarding water
allocation, water quality, groundwater management, and overall
institutional reform, pitting entrenched interests against one another
in a battle with highly uncertain outcomes."'
Perhaps surprisingly, however, a recent survey of 172 local Texas
government officials that manage water resources in the U.S.-Mexico
border region found strong support for amending the 1944 Water.
Treaty.'
Two-thirds of respondents agreed that "[t]he 1944 Treaty
should be amended to address the allocation of groundwater," and
eighty-one percent of survey respondents agreed that "the Treaty
should be amended to define the term extraordinary drought."39 4 A
majority agreed that "the 1944 Treaty should be amended to include
ecological and environmental uses of international waters as a top
priority." "
It seems that support for amending the Treaty may come from
other unexpected places, as well, even growing out of concern for
United States national security.
The treaty produced an enduring American advantage in terms of
maintaining a water status quo with Mexico.

dividends

for American

interests,

Despite paying large

the treaty

now produces

considerable tensions between the two countries and contributes
towards increased instability in Mexico. This paper shows how the
United States used the treaty to protect domestic interests while
hindering sustainable development on the Mexican side of the
border. In today's environment this situation is counter-productive

390. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 15, at 496, 498, 508; Mumme, supra note 16, at 655;
Umoff, supranote 16, at 98.
391. See Sanchez, supra note 6; see also Schmandt, supra note 11, at 152-53(suggesting
a second, non-engineer Commissioner who is responsible for integrated river
management).
392. Mumme, supra note 5, at 552 ("This, of course, does not mean that a revision
to the 1944 Water Treaty, stripping IBWC of its water quality management functions, is
inconceivable."); see also Mumme, supranote 283, at 101.
393. OLIvIA N. THOMPSON, BINATIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES OF LocAL
TEXAS OFFICIALS IN THE U.S.-MExIco BORDER REGION, at i (2009), availableat
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/313.
394. Id. at 65.
395. Id. at 66.
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for regional security. This paper addresses the consequences of our
adherence to the treaty, potential impacts from climate change, poor
infrastructure investments in Mexico, population growth, the North
American Free Trade Agreement and implications for future policy
considerations related to Mexico and its internal stability.396
Yet amendment of the Treaty may be entirely unnecessary, given
the authority of.the IBWC to interpret its requirements through the
adoption of Minutes."' In this view, the Minute process is seen as an
avenue for addressing in detail subjects that are dealt with only in the
broadest terms in the 1944 Water Treaty, thus actions such as the
adoption of Minute 242 dealing with groundwater and Minute 306
dealing with the Colorado Delta ecosystem permit the IBWC to
expand its scope without the need for a Treaty amendment. One
scholar observes that the IBWC has hamstrung itself by its slavish
adherence to an outdated construction of the 1944 Water Treaty, "an
historically entrenched focus on physical borders and the sovereign
delimitation of a shared natural resource.""' This critic urges the
IBWC to work on the development of a "twenty-first century Minute"
stating a commitment to "modern international principles of
watercourse law."' 99
VI. NEGLIGENT STATE DEPARTMENT OVERSIGHT
A.

STATE WARNS GROSS MISMANAGEMENT IMPERILS BORDER REGION

A 2005 investigation of the USIBWC by the State Department
Office of Inspector General revealed a shocking level of
mismanagement and resultant threats to the agency's mission, even
though the investigation was narrowly limited to personnel matters
and did not even touch upon issues of policy, procedures, or the state
of dams, sanitation plants or other infrastructure. 400 A Report issued as
a result of the investigation warned that "[i]nternal management
problems have engulfed USIBWC, threatening its essential

396. MARK A. ANSPACH, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE, KLEPSUDRA: How THE RIo
GRANDE TREATY INCREASED INSTABIITY IN MEXICO (2008), availableat
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486548&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
397. Mumme, supra note 5, at 555-57.
398. Ingram, supra note 13, at 165 (proposing that the 1944 Treaty language can be
salvaged and citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the 6th Committee, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/51/869 (1997)).
399. Id. at 164 (proposing the adoption, as a guide, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
Report of the 6th Committee, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/869 (1997)).
400. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 23 ("The inspection did not and could not
survey levees, measure water depths, or follow up each allegation of neglect [yet]
[tihere is disturbing evidence . . . that maintenance of infrastructure is falling
behind.").
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responsibilities for flood control and water management in the
American Southwest."4 0 1 The .2005 Report included findings that
"management actions have undermined the morale of the agency, led
to an alarming departure of key personnel, and raised fundamental
questions about the lack of U.S. government oversight of the

USIBWC." 402

Among the wide range of problems identified by the 2005 OIG
Report was that the Commissioner set his own salary (at a level
equivalent to that of an armed forces secretary) and "feels he can fire
and hire, set salaries including his own, and generally run his agency
without reference to other authority."40 s The Report notes with some
consternation that "[alppointment by the President of the U.S.
Commissioner does not [even] require the advice and consent of the
The Report condemns inaction by the .USIBWC
Senate." 404
concerning the health and safety of its employees, describing a Field
Office that "lies immediately below the abandoned plant and grounds
of a metals smelting and refining company. For over a century, this
plant spewed out smoke and slag over the area, leaving toxic waste
piles looming over the USIBWC facility."405
The Report notes that "while personal doctors in some cases
warned their patients to leave their employment on the site," and
"[t] he city of El Paso evacuated a residential area next to the site some
years ago on the grounds that pollution levels were too high for
safety," the "USIBWC does not appear to have been adequately
responsive."4o6
B.

STATE DISAVOWS AUTHORITY OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR

USIBWC

A follow-up report in 2006, addressing the USIBWC's pledges of
reform, offered little reason for optimism, stating: "The U.S. Section is
out of the national limelight, but a major storm and flood could
overwhelm the barriers and cause considerable damage. This would
usher in bouts of finger pointing between Departments, agencies and
jurisdictions concerned."0 7 The 2006 Report concludes, "The agency
is simply too small, too isolated, and too vulnerable to management
abuse to continue without the protection and oversight of a major
government department."4 08
By all accounts, the U.S. Department of State has maintained a
hands-off policy toward the IBC-IBWC for most of its 120-year
existence.

401. Id. at 3.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 11.
404. Id. at 13.
405. Id. at 29.
406. Id.
407. OIG, 2006
408. Id.

REPORT, supra note

35, at 4.
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The agency has an unusual relationship with the Department. While
its budget is included within the Department's budget request to
Congress, issues of oversight, and who might exercise that oversight
in areas apart from foreign policy, have never been adequately
defined. Over the years, USIBWC has been largely independent in
terms of internal management and operations.
The Department seems to share the view of the USIBWC, which
"considers itself an independent federal government agency whose
leader is answerable only to the President.""'o Indeed, the Department
"has been unwilling or unable to claim full responsibility for the
agency despite the fact that most U.S. government agencies and the
Congress view the Department as the parent agency and that no other
logical choice exists. "411
Notwithstanding the apparent exasperation of the OIG with the
Department's hands-off policy, the OIG itself questions even its own
authority to investigate the USIBWC, stating:
[E]ven the jurisdiction of OIG over the U.S. Section remains subject
to dispute. While the Department of State, the Department ofJustice,
and the White House have supported OIG's oversight, and the
current leadership of USIBC has accepted it, there is no clear
legislative authority. A future Commissioner could challenge OIG
oversight, as did the most recent permanent Commissioner, forcing
the same scramble to find "derivative" authorities. 412
Whereas the OIG has at least drawn official attention to the
problems at the USIBWC, it does not claim to have conducted an
exhaustive investigation, and it seemingly lets even the Department off
the hook for anything beyond foreign policy concerns, stating: "It is
not within OIG's or the Department's jurisdiction (or competence or
desire) to provide oversight concerning the dams, levees, power plants,
sewage treatment plants, and other facilities administered by the joint
commission."4 13
The 2006 OIG report explains that " [o]ptions such as integration
of the U.S. Section into the Department of the Interior or the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers have been considered in the past and

409. OIG, 2005

REPORT supranote 31, at 5-6.
410. Id. at 10.
411. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.
412. Id. at 12. Belated as it was, the State Department is not the only government
agency to comment on USIBWC mismanagement over the years. See, e.g., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
OPERATIONS NEED MORE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 4-5

AND

WATER

COMMISSION:

U.S.

(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98238.pdf.
413. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 4. The OIG goes on to claim, with no
support in its report and in contradiction to its own 2005 Report, discussed above, as
well as contrary to virtually every published report that exists anywhere, as discussed in
Part V, "By all accounts, USIBWC's professionals have done well to maintain the
organization's infrastructure on a barebones budget." Id.
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discarded for good reason (such as conflicts with treaty provisions). "414
Although the OIG Reports do not go into any further detail about
these decisions, this is likely a reference to State Department's
successful defeat of recommendations to transfer the U.S. Section's
operational functions to the Bureau of Reclamation, which the Bureau
of the Budget made in 1947, the Hoover Commission made in 1949,
the Rockefeller Committee (President's Advisory Committee on
Governmental Organization) made in 1953, and as President
Eisenhower initially approved in 1953.15
The 1953 dispute, which appears to have been primarily a power
struggle between State and the Interior Department,4 16 was belatedly
backed up by a State Department legal opinion acknowledging that
the U.S. Section "is not sufficiently independent to be classed as an
'independent agency' in the sense that term is used in statutes and
Executive Orders, yet there is sufficient independence provided for in
administrative matters that it cannot be considered as an
organizational part of the Department.""
Thus, the Department is unwilling to accept responsibility for
oversight of the USIBWC, even acknowledges that it is not competent
to do so, and goes so far as to claim it has no authority over the agency,
yet it fights to defend such allegedly artificial bureaucratic turf. The
2006 OIG Report states that the Department believes it is foreclosed by
treaty and statutory language from managing the USIBWC,
notwithstanding the contrary language set out in this article that
appears to assume State Department oversight.
The Department and other key U.S. government elements have
interpreted treaty provisions and other laws and regulations to give

them derived authorities over the U.S. Section, but these are not

414. Id. Generally, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation
manages reservoirs that provide water for irrigation projects and power generation,
whereas the Army Corps of Engineers maintains waterways for navigation purposes,
undertakes flood control projects, builds and operates hydropower facilities, and
operates irrigation and flood control projects. See generally Bureau of Reclamation: About
Us, BUREAU OF RECIAMATON, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/index.html (last
updated Feb. 17, 2011) (stating that the Bureau of Reclamation manages reservoirs for
irrigation projects and power generation); Civil Works Mission, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG'RS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2011)
(stating that "Civil Works programs include water resource development activities
including flood control, navigation, recreation, and infrastructure and environmental
stewardship.").
415. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678; see also Roger Lee Eldridge, A
Comprehensive Approach to U.S.-Mexico Border Area Water Management, 4 S.W. REV. MGMT.
& EcoN. 89, 91 (1985) (stating that in 1947 the Hoover Commission recommended
that the "project construction and management function ... be transferred to the
Bureau of Reclamation.").
416. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678 (referring to State Department and
USIBWC success in resisting "predatory initiatives of other domestic Agencies");
Eldridge, supra note 314, at 91 (describing similar reversal of Truman administration
proposal).
417. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 680.
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clearly defined or universally accepted. No one in the Department or
elsewhere has taken the lead in resolving the issue.
Again without specifying what statutory or treaty provisions are
affected, the OIG concludes: "The Department of Justice, the
Department of State, and the OIG team all agree that integrating the
U.S. Section into the Department of State will require legislation." 419
The OIG Report leaves no doubt about the need for oversight but
buys into the notion that this requires legislation, without specifying
exactly what statutes need to be amended or what that would
accomplish, and at the same time imagining great bureaucratic
hurdles by making comparisons to completely non-analogous agencies.
Current USIBWC management prefers a limited relationship
rather than full integration into the Department, believing it can
benefit from the Department's oversight and protection of its
personnel system while enjoying maximum flexibility in its
operations. Some Department offices share this view. The OIG
inspection team does not believe that measures short of full
integration of the agency into the Department will resolve the
oversight issue, based on its observations of the experience of recent
years in USIBWC history. Attempts to define the meaning of "report
to" inevitably lead to the conclusion that legislation would be needed
in any event. It is unclear what a memorandum of understanding
would provide for and with what legal authority. The agency is simply
too small, too isolated, and too vulnerable to management abuse to
continue without the protection and oversight of a major government
department. The Department was asked in early 2005 to provide its
own solution to the oversight problem and could not do so.

The optimal solution is to bring the USIBWC into the Department
of State. This would clear away legal ambiguities frustrating rational
management and oversight of personnel, administrative, and security
operations. This solution would mirror the position of the Mexican
Section of the IBWC, which falls under the Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Relations. The integration of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency into the
Department indicate that the difficulties attached to integration of
the USIBWC are not beyond the Department's ability to overcome.
The Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the OIG
team all agree that integrating the USIBWC into the Department of
State will require legislation.42
Ironically, the State Department's claims of limited authority are
inconsistent with even its own actions, which suggest the Department
feels it has just as much authority as it chooses to exercise. For
example, detailed reports on the USIBWC's implementation of its
$220 million in Recovery Act projects are found not on the agency's
418.
419.

OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 17.
Id.at5.

420. Id.
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According to the 2006 OIG

With the growing complexity, sensitivity, and importance of
border issues affecting the agency, as well as a history of management
problems in recent years, the Department has necessarily exercised
oversight of some USIBWC functions beyond the mandated foreign
policy aspect. In so doing, the Department's oversight authority for
foreign policy and its implied responsibility for budget matters have
been interpreted by the Department to justify OIG's assertion of
authority over USIBWC, to require the agency to "coordinate" major
personnel actions with the Department, and to permit the Bureau of
to question and influence
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WH)
.
USIBWC budget levels and priorities.
The State Department's relationship to the USIBWC suggests that
it wants control without responsibility, especially with the very real
possibility of a major disaster. The Department seems much less
concerned about the boundary ecosystem, the health, and safety of
millions of residents on both sides of the border, and the pocketbooks
of U.S. taxpayers than it is about the blame game. 2
C. EXEMPT EMPLOYEES PRETEXT
Whatever the bureaucratic motives for its reluctance to manage the
USIBWC, the State Department alleges that legislation is needed to
give it explicit authority over personnel matters. In a profound
misunderstanding of Federal personnel laws, or pretext for abdication
of responsibility, the OIG and the State Department both imagine
nonexistent obstacles due to the fact that USIBWC employees are in
In
the "excepted service" rather than the "competitive service". 2
both its 2005 and 2006 reports on the USIBWC, the OIG goes on at
length about the imagined obstacles to State Department oversight
presented by this excepted service status.
USIBWC has been something of an orphan agency, left to its own
resources except for guidance on foreign policy issues and some
limited financial oversight. It has experienced, professional human
resources specialists, but they have not had the freedom to administer

421. See U.S. Department of State Information Related to the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/recovery
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
422. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 3. This type of informal influence may be
worse than nothing, since it gives an isolated mid-level bureaucrat in Washington a
surprising degree of control over the USIBWC "priorities."
423. See note 43, supra.
424. "The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), following an OPM audit
conducted in 2003, directed the USIBWC to convert employees from competitive Civil
Service to 'excepted service.' OPM determined that the agency is exempt from the
competitive provisions of Title V of the United States Code because its appointment
authority is derived from the treaties and conventions establishing the agency." OIG,
2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 14.
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procedures in keeping with normal federal practice. The result has
been confusion, some abuse, and certainly a severe morale impact.
The personnel of USIBWC are in limbo, with questions on all sides as
to their status and rights, if any.

Given the complex statutory authorities relied on by the USIBWC to
carry out its work, it is possible that legislation would be required to
permit the Department to take on personnel administration for the
U.S. Section. Legal steps needed to transfer personnel authority, and
to protect the interests of USIBWC employees, should be reviewed by
lawyers at relevant agencies, including the Department of State,
Department ofJustice, Office of Special Counsel, Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), and Office of Government Ethics. 425

Ironically, the 2005 OIG Report cites a 1998 OPM report on
eighteen exempt agencies, which include the State Department itself,
that found "few differences from nonexempt agencies in the exempt
agencies' recruitment, hiring, and promotion practices."4 2 1 It is
completely unclear, then, what concerns the State Department has

about USIBWC employee rights, "if any." 427
The 2006 OIG Report repeats these nonspecific concerns, noting
that because "USIBWC personnel are in an excepted Civil Service,"
they are "not subject to all the protections afforded to competitive
employees." 2 "If the USIBWC became part of the Department, or if
OIG had confirmed statutory authority," the OIG concludes, "there
would be routine oversight, opportunities for appeals of personnel
actions, and advice and support available to the agency and the

Commissioner."4 29
The State Department's misplaced concerns may be allayed by
reference to the relevant statutory authorities and an improved
understanding of what it means to be an excepted service employee
(although, being an excepted service agency, the State Department
surely should be under no misconceptions such as those expressed in
the OIG Reports). Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines "employee" as ". . .
an individual in the competitive service. . ." or ". . . an individual in

the excepted service . . ."430 Excepted service includes "all positions in
the executive branch of the Federal Government which are specifically
excepted from the competitive service by or pursuant to statute, by the
President, or by the Office of Personnel Management, and which are
not in the Senior Executive Service. "431

425. Id.; OIG, 2005 REPORT, supranote 30, at 12.
426. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 30, at 38-39.
427. Id. at 12.
428. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 3.
429.
430.
431.

Id. at 15.
5 U.S.C. § 7511(a), (c) (2011).
Id. § 2103(a); 5 C.F.R. § 213.101 (2011).
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The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has explained the
difference.
The above definition distinguishes between the "competitive" and
the "excepted" service. The executive branch of Government that is
governed by Title 5 of the United States Code is composed of the
competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive
Service. Most of the executive branch's civilian positions are part of
the competitive civil service. Such positions are filled through
competition among applicants under competitive examining
procedures administered by OPM.
The competitive examining
process is characterized by rating and ranking applicants and
referring to selecting officials only the top ranked or high-quality
applicants. Qualified applicants who have been rated and ranked are
placed on a list known as a register. Under the competitive
examining process, either the top three candidates under the "Rule
of Three," or all candidates in the highest quality category under the
Category Rating procedures, are referred for selection. Positions
filled through the competitive examining process are referred to as
the competitive service.

On the other hand, there are some positions in the Federal civil
service that are excepted from OPM's competitive examining
procedures. In addition, there are positions that would ordinarily be
in the competitive service but are in the excepted service while
occupied by individuals who are appointed under an excepted
appointing authority or programs established by law, the President,
or OPM. Individuals appointed through these latter authorities or
programs are trainees who can be converted to the competitive
service upon successful completion of the program. For excepted
service positions, agencies develop and establish their own examining
procedures within the guidelines of the merit system principles and
veterans' preference rules. These positions are collectively referred
to as the excepted service. 432
The difference between competitive and executive employees,
then, is in the hiring procedure, a procedure also used by the State
Department. Indeed, although the name "excepted service" implies
otherwise, it actually accounts for about half of all federaljobs. * Both
are still covered by merit system principles, as acknowledged by the
01G. As for having fewer rights, "if any," excepted service employees
are explicitly guaranteed the right to appeal adverse personnel actions
respecting: 1) removal, 2) suspension for more than fourteen days, 3)

432. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., NAVIGATING THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD AFTER VAN
WERSCH AND MCCORMICK 6 (2006),
available at http://www.mspb.gov/studies/browsestudies.htm (follow "Navigating the
Probationary Period After Van Wersch and McCormick" hyperlink).
433. See U.S. GENERAL. AccouNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-72, THE EXCEPTED
SERVICE: A RESEARCH PROFILE 1 (1997); see also U.S. MERIT Sys. PROT. BD., REFORMING
FEDERAL HIRING: BEYOND FASTER AND CHEAPER 31 (2006) (looking at the decline in
competitive examining).
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reduction in grade or pay, or 4) furlough for thirty days or less.434
Indeed, the MSPB had rejected just such a myopic interpretation
of employee rights, "if any," as expressed by the OIG, and did so prior
to publication of the 2006 OIG report that repeated the
interpretation; this rejection occurred in a case that not coincidentally
involved the retaliatory dismissal by the IBWC of its General
Counsel."' The IBWC decision demolished the State Department's
feeble claim that IBWC employees are in some special class with few,
"if any," rights. Mr. Wilcox, the agency's General Counsel, alleged
that he was removed in retaliation for protected whistle blowing. The
agency contended Wilcox had no appeal rights, arguing that
USIBWC's hiring authority derives not from Title 5 of the U.S. Code,
as is the case with other Federal agencies, but from Article 2 of the
1944 Water Treaty.' The agency also contended that the USIBWC is
not even a federal "agency" as defined by Title 5, but a subdivision of
an international organization.
The MSPB rejected these claims, noting that "the IBWC is deemed
an international organization, but that designation does not extend to
the U.S. Section as to matters within its exclusive control, supervision,
orjurisdiction."43 The MSPB also ruled the USIBWC is an "executive
agency," which means an Executive department, a Government
corporation, or an independent establishment. 439
The agency also relied both on 1) a February 2, 1950 letter from
the Civil Service Commission's Chief of the Personnel Classification
Division stating that "[T]he IBWC was not subject to the provisions of
the Classification Act of 1949", and 2) a February 12, 2003 letter in
which "OPM's Office of Merit Systems Acting Assistant Director
transmitted the findings of a review, and concluded that the IBWC was
established by treaties and conventions, and therefore its 'HRM
program' is not covered by Title 5."440 The MSPB did not rule on
those claims, but held that numerous other provisions of Title 5 cover
the USIBWC, all of which rely on the same definition of "agency.""'
D. WISHFUL THINKING

Perhaps surprisingly, the OIG reports have drawn almost no
comment from scholars or others, amid the unfortunately insular
academic debate about whether to reform or replace the IBWC. In a
unique departure from the standard critique, however, a recent article

434. Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat.
461 (guaranteeing such employees the right to appeal a reduction in grade or a
removal to the Merit System Protection Board).
435. Wilcox v. Int'l Boundary Water Comm'n, 103 M.S.P.R. 73, 77-79 (2006).
436. Id. at 75.
437. Id. at 76-77.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 77.
440. Id.
441. Id.
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cites the 2005 OIG report and then focuses on the role of USIBWC
leadership, or lack thereof, in the agency's failing performance.4 4 2 The
authors briefly revisit two of the well-worn arguments: first, that the
USIBWC is a captive of parochial regional interests that conflict with
its twin roles of water management and diplomacy, and second, that
increasingly complex environmental issues necessitate accommodation
of new constituencies and collaboration with new agencies, requiring
technical, diplomatic and professional talents lacking in the politicallyoriented leadership of the USIBWC." 3 Then, taking note of the OIG
reports, they go on to assess the failed leadership of the agency,
arguing that in addition to traditional theories of leadership that
emphasize leadership traits and skills, heightened politicization
associated with a changing operational environment and mission,
together with a lack of executive branch oversight, increased the
structural risks of executive failure, resulting in "what can only be
regarded as a profound administrative failure in the management of
the IBWC's U.S. Section." 44 4
Rather than offering solutions, however, the article ends on an
inexplicably Pollyanna-ish note, seeming to hope against all evidence
to the contrary that, "[t]he U.S. Section's new management appears
ready to learn from the past and take advantage of new opportunities
to strengthen binational water management on the U.S.-Mexican
border."" The authors offer no evidence to support their optimism
about new leadership at the USIBWC (not even a self-serving interview
with the new Commissioner) and, as discussed below, there is none to
be found in recent events either.
VII. CURRENT CHAOTIC CONDITION OF THE USIBWC
A.

USIBWC EMPLOYEES SAY LEADERSHIP WORST IN NATION

Perhaps nothing is as telling about the current chaotic condition
of the USIBWC than the fact that the morale of its employees, long on
a downward trajectory, has reached a new low. USIBWC employees
have repeatedly rated it among the worst places to work in the entire
federal government, with the very worst leadership."' The USIBWC
perennially ranks at the very bottom of all small Federal agencies when
it comes to employee morale, and dead last when it comes to trust in
Agency leadership. Employee satisfaction with the agency and agency
leadership has fallen steadily since 2007, the first time the agency
participated in a national survey, popularly known as "Best Places to
Work" in the Federal Government.4 47

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Mumme & Little, supranote 4, at 253-55.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 253, 263-66.
Id. at 267.
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 58.
Id.; see also, David Crowder, IBWC Ranked Second-Worst FederalAgency by Employees,
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In 2010, the government-wide employee satisfaction score set forth
by Best Places to Work-achieved an all-time high average of 65 out of
100, representing a slight increase from 2009.448 The best small agency
rated an 86.8 and the best large agency an 81.8."' By comparison, the
IBWC garnered a score of 48, a drop from 49 in 2009, just edging out
the Selective Service System at 47 as the worst place to work in the
Federal Government; no large agency ranked below 57.4"o "The 2010
survey for the fifth time in a row showed the primary driver in the
federal space is effective leadership," according to the Institute for the
Study of Public Policy Implementation (ISPPI).451 In 2010, the IBWC
came in dead last in this category. IBWC's Effective Leadership score
was 33, down from 37 in 2009.452
The agency made an inadvertent public admission of its chaotic
management in a September - 15, 2009, contract solicitation for
reorganization assistance that stated "the agency is declining
significantly in overall indicators of human capital performance,"
caused by "numerous reorganizations of the USIBWC headquarters
[that] have taken place ...without the benefit of consistently
methodical approaches .

. . ."45

The agency cancelled the solicitation

one month later, without explanation. The irony was not lost on
Washington Post columnist Al Kamen who commented with sardonic
restraint, "The solicitation was canceled November 16, so maybe
things have gotten better on their own."454
The lack of professional management at the U.S. Section is evident
in a wide range of alleged misconduct, including rampant workplace
hostility and threats of violence, illegal manipulation of payrolls, secret
electronic surveillance of employees, and similar wrongdoing. 5 5
Unfortunately, due to the State Department's hands-off policy, and the
EL PASO INC., Sept. 13, 2010,
(documenting
http://www.elpasoinc.com/readArticle.aspx?issueid=303&xrec=5649
the IBWC's low ranking in the survey).
448. The Big Picture,
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/analysis (last visited
Mar. 22, 2011).
449. Welcome to the 2010 Best Places to Work Rankings, BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG,
http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
450. Overall Index Scores,
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/irankings/overall/small

(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
451.
452.

BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 448.
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 58.

453. Conduct a Program Assessment, FEDERAL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIEs (Sept. 15, 2009),
(follow
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=ist&tab=searchresults&.
"Conduct a Program Assessment" link) (showing the solicitation for bids to conduct a
program assessment, dated September 15, 2009, and cancelled November 16, 2009,
including recommendations to reorganize IBWC).
454. Al Kamen, Do You Have What It Takes to Be a Bailout Cop?, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/13/AR2009121302525_2.html?sid=ST2009121400400.
455. McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 1, 5-7, 9-11.

I BOUNDARY WATER COMMISSION, US-MEXICO

Issue 2

269

Office of the Inspector General's doubts about its own jurisdiction, no
serious investigation of these charges is likely.
B.

MILLIONS WASTED ON DETERIORATED LEVEES

The USIBWC built and maintains over five hundred miles of levees
along the Rio Grande that protect more than three million Texas and
(Levees in Mexico protect several million
New Mexico residents.'
Mexican border residents.) A 2001 geo-technical analysis determined
that sixty percent of the Rio Grande flood control system was deficient.
457

In 2009, the USIBWC received $220 million in funding under
President Obama's Recovery Act stimulus progfam, virtually the entire
amount USIBWC requested for levee repair or replacement.4 8 While
the agency was accustomed to an average annual construction budget
the pressure to quickly spend the
of approximately $6 million,"

456. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF
GOVERNORS, REPORT AUD/CG-10-12, INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT ON AUDIT OF
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION: CONTRACT AWARD AND
MANAGEMENT OF FUNDS PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 2

at
available
REPORT],
AUDIT
IBWC
[hereinafter
(2010)
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/145260.pdf.
457. Id.
458. Id. (stating that the Department of State received $600 million of Recovery
funds, of which $220 million was designated for the IBWC to use for "the repair
and/or rehabilitation of levee segments"); see also State ARRA Plan 2010, supra note
46, at 5 (stating that the $787 billion Recovery Act was signed into law on February 17,
2009, and provided USIBWC with funds for the Rio Grande Flood Control System
Project). See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS,
http://oig.state.gov/arra/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (presenting an
overview of the act).
459. The USIBWC's annual construction budget has remained relatively constant
for many years. In the fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the construction budget was
approximately $6 million. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE BUDGET IN BRIEF - FISCAL YEAR

2002 107 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2155.pdf.
In the fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, the annual construction budgets were $5.4
million, $3.5 million, and $8.5 million, respectively. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE BUDGET
IN BRIEF - FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST 101 (2005), availableat

7
USIBWC's
The
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28 90.pdf.
construction budget was approximately $5.2 million for the fiscal year 2006. See U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION- FISCAL YEAR 2008 827 (2008),

In the fiscal
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2155.pdf.
year 2007, the construction budget remained at $5.2 million. For the fiscal year 2008,
the agency received a substantial one-time supplement of $66 million for courtordered construction of secondary wastewater treatment capability at the South Bay
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP) in California, and a dramatic
increase of approximately $20 million in levee construction funds. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETJUSTIFICATION- FISCAL YEAR 2009 801 (2009),

The
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf.
construction budget in the fiscal year 2009 soared to $263 million, including $220
million under the Recovery Act, another $22 million to bring the SBIWTP into
compliance with the Clean Water Act and its discharge permit, and an additional $17
million for levee work. The construction budget was reduced to $43 million in the
fiscal year 2010, including another $6 million for the SBIWTP and $21 million for
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Recovery Act funds predictably overwhelmed the agency. Flush with
funds, the agency tore down newly built levees allegedly so that it
could rebuild them with Recovery Act appropriations, wasting millions
of dollars as a consequence.6
In the process, the USIBWC cancelled
earlier construction contracts that were not a part of the Recovery Act,
under conditions that pushed several small businesses and contractors
to the brink of bankruptcy. 461
The agency was so anxious to spend the Recovery Act windfall that
its very first construction contract solicitation listed hundreds of pages
of state, rather than federal, contract regulations and building
specifications, which it had lifted verbatim from a private architectural
firm's designs for a non-federal client, along with the designs
themselves.462 The agency even agreed to subsidize the border barrier
being built by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") by
combining a levee with a border barrier wall in a single structure and
using Recovery funds to pay millions of dollars of the cost of the
border barrier in addition to the cost of the levee.463 By doing so, the
USIBWC was able to piggyback on DHS's exemption from compliance
with a wide range of environmental laws.464
In addition to the Recovery Act funds, the USIBWC received
another $37 million in 2009 emergency appropriations to reconstruct
fifteen miles of levees at Presidio, Texas, that had been completely
levees. The construction budget request for the fiscal year 2011 is approximately $27
million, including another $21 million for levees and $5 million to begin
rehabilitation of Amistad and Falcon Dam.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION- FIScAL YEAR 2011 691-94

(2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf.
460. Crowder, supranote 54.
461. Id.
462. See Recovery - Construct Banker Floodway North Levee, FEDERAL BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITIES (July 24, 2009),
(follow
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=list&tab=searchresults&
"Recovery - Construct Banker Floodway North Levee" link to original and amended
solicitations) (in possession of author); see also McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48,
at 2.
463. See McCarthy Memo to OIG, supranote 48, at 3. Such an agreement would be a
violation of the Purpose Act, 31 U.S:C. § 1301 (2011), and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1341 (2011). Violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act can carry civil and criminal
penalties. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1350 (2011).
464. The REAL ID Act of 2005 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to
"waive all legal requirements . . . necessary to ensure expeditious construction" of the
U.S-Mexico border fence. Pub. L. No. 109-13,. Div. B, Title 1, § 102(c), 119 Stat. 306
(2005), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (Improvement of Barriers at Border).
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the exemptions law have been
unsuccessful. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007);
County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. EP-08-CA-196-FM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83045, at
For more information on border fence
*9, *13 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).
construction and the REAL ID Act, see generally CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., BORDER
SEcURIY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2009), available at

discussion
of
For
a
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf.
constitutional and policy concerns regarding such delegated waiver authority, see
generally Kate R. Bowers, Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of Waiver
Authority in EnvironmentalLaws, 34 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv. 257 (2010).
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destroyed by floods in 2008.465 Although geotechnical reports strongly
recommended construction on a new alignment, due to unsuitable
soils that had contributed to the original failure of the levees, the
USIBWC chose to rebuild the levees along the original alignment
because it was under pressure to act quickly."' These cosmetic levees
give a false appearance of protection and will again be subject to
disintegration in a flood of even lesser flow levels, wasting tens of
millions of dollars, not including the flood damages that may result.6 7
C.

SANITATION PLANTS SPEW Toxic WASTES

Pursuant to the terms of the 1944 Treaty, through which the
United States and Mexico agreed to give preferential attention to the
solution of all border sanitation problems, the IBWC operates a small
number of international Wastewater Treatment Plants. The South Bay
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP), located in San
Diego County, California, and adjacent to Tijuana, Mexico, has for
years continuously violated effluent limitations under the Clean Water
Act, and delays have plagued construction of court-ordered secondary
treatment facilities .4 The USIBWC recently renewed a five-year, $35
million contract with Veolia Water North America, which has operated
the plant since its inception in 1996.6
465. Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act
of 2009, H.R. 2638 110th Cong. (2008). See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
COMMIsSIONS: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETJUSTIFICATION 743 (2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123638.pdf.
466. Id.
467. See George Sills, Letter Report: August 2009 Geotechnical Levee Assessment of
U.S. IBWC Levees at Presidio, TX, October 28-29, 2008 and January 6-7, 2009, (2009)
availableat http://peer.org/docs/tx/1-31 11_PresidioLeveeexcerpts.pdf ("it is very
critical to move the levee landward as far as practical to achieve improvement of the
river flow within this reach"); see also U.S. SECTION OF INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: FLOOD CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS AND
PARTIAL LEVEE RELOCATION, USIBWC PRESIDIO FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT, PRESIDIO,
at
available
(2010),
2-9
ES-6,
at
TEXAS,
(rejecting
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/FinalEISPresidoFCP_022210.pdf.
realignment alternative and selecting alternative to rehabilitate the levee system along
the current alignment notwithstanding acknowledgement that "preliminary
geotechnical studies (ERDC 2008) indicated several structural problems in this area");
McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 3.
468. See e.g. Chlifornia v. Duran, No. 01-CV-0270-BTM(JFS), at 1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2004), available at
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/water-issues/programs/iwtp/docs/ibwc-ordl.pdf.
See also ERIC TERRILL ET AL., SCRIPPS INST. OF OCEANOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT: COASTAL
OBSERVATIONS AND MONITORING IN SouTH BAY SAN DIEGO, IBWC/ SURFRIDER CONSENT
DECREE 159-60 (2009),
at
available
http://cordc.ucsd.edu/about/docs/sboo-ibwc/IBWC-MonitoringSBOO.pdf; IBWC
& EPA, RECORD OF DECISION FOR FINAL EIS OF SBIWTP CLEAN WATER ACT COMPLIANCE
(2008) (recounting difficulties and controversies encountered in attempting to decide
how to comply with consent decree).
469. International Boundary & Water Commission Renews Veolia Water North America
Contract: Agreement to Extend Long-Standing Relationship, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Dec. 15,
2010, 11:00AM),
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A second plant, in Nogales, Arizona, received 128 citations
between January 1995 and January 2000 for violation of water quality
standards.4 70 The USIBWC continues to struggle to comply with court
orders to clean up the plant's effluent.47 ' The IBWC has faced further
heavy criticism as well for its crumbling flood control channel in
Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, whose disrepair contributed to millions of
dollars in damages in 2008.7' These and other experiences have led
critics to describe the IBWC's role at Ambos Nogales (both Nogales) as
a series of failures over a period of more than fifty years.7
D. SKIRTING NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal
agencies to ensure that environmental considerations are given careful
attention and appropriate weight in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and for other federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. 47 4 The regulations of
the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) set forth the procedures
for complying with NEPA.4 "* The CEQ Regulations require that each
federal agency develop their own regulations to detail how it will

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101215005203/en/InternationalBoundary-Water-Commission-Renews-Veolia-Water.
470. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001).
471. See Abbott, supra note 53 (citing elevated levels of toxic metals in effluent from
the NIWTP in reports from May 2008 to June 2010, the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality (ADEQ) issued an order requiring IBWC to clean up its
effluent and to stop its practice of spreading contaminated sludge on grazing pasture.)
"The order also alleges that IBWC knew it had excessive cadmium levels in its
biosolids on June 1, 2009, but delayed notifying the state until Aug. 4, 2010. According
to its permit under the Clean Water Act, IBWC is supposed to call ADEQ within 24
hours of learning about any exceedance 'which may endanger health or the
environment."' Id. See also Mark Shaffer, Ariz. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, ADEQ Issues
Order to IBWC for Cadmium Water Quality Violations and Failureto Properly Manage Sewage
Sludge (Oct. 25, 1010), availableat
("'The state is
http://www.azdeq.gov/function/news/2010/download/102510.pdf
telling the responsible federal agency, the IBWC, enough is enough. We need them to
step up to the plate and across the border to prevent toxic wastewater and sludge and
invest in 21st Century infrastructure, ADEQ Director Benjamin H. Grumbles said").
472. See Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, supra note 40. See also
Manuel C. Coppola, Crews Wrap up Sewer Line Repairs, NOGALES INT'L (Nov. 5, 2010,
11:50 AM),
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/11/05/news/doc4cd42dbadd05
2028877752.txt (reporting that Arizona's two United States Senators had written to
President Obama to complain that IBWC "has failed to provide the resources needed
for a long-term fix to the problem," which they said is estimated to require $20
million); Manuel C. Coppola, IBWC Working with City, Corps to Address Fooding,
NOGALES
INT'L
(Aug.
13,
2010,
10:26
AM),
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/08/13/news/doc4c655f30285e0
835852169.txt (reporting on flood damages to the IBWC Nogales Wash flood channel
and estimates of more than $60 million in needed repairs).
473. Ingram & White, supranote 4, at 158-74.
474. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)
475. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2010).
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comply with NEPA. 7 1 Both NEPA and the CEQ regulations emphasize
engaging the public in the develo ment and implementation of
individual agency NEPA procedures.
The USIBWC adopted its Operational Procedures under NEPA in
1981, with minimal public input from a border population that was
just beginning to appreciate the importance of the agency's NEPA
compliance. 7'
The USIBWC acknowledged, "[c]omments were
received only from the Council on Environmental Quality in response
to the Federal Register notice containing the proposed procedures.""
The CEQ suggested revision of section 100.3 of the USIBWC's NEPA
procedures to provide that the section shall comply with the
procedures and CEQ regulations except where compliance would be
inconsistent with statutory or treaty requirements.4 so Indeed, the
USIBWC complied with this suggestion, thus exempting the vast
majority of its actions from NEPA review:
The operational Procedures apply to all Section programs and
activities to the maximum extent possible without impairing its
international mission. Domestic requirements must not impair the
Section's performance of the United States' international obligations
with [sic] are carried out consistent with the treaties and foreign
policy of the United States. The Section shall comply with these
would
procedures and the CEQ regulations except where compliance
48
be inconsistent with statutory or treaty requirements. '
In addition to the broad exclusion for treaty requirements, the
USIBWQC adopted additional "categorical exclusions, "482 pursuant to
CEQ regulations that permit agencies to exempt from NEPA's
procedural requirements actions that do not have significant
The USIBWC lists thirteen
environmental consequences.4 83
categorical exclusions, including but not limited to:
Actions specifically required under any treaty or international
agreement, or pursuant thereto, to which the United States is a party,
or required by the decision of international organizations (including
courts), authorities or consultations in which the United States is a

476. Id. § 1507.3(a).
477. See id. § 1506.6(a) (requiring agencies to make "diligent efforts to involve the
public in preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures"); id. § 1507.3(a)
(providing that an agency's NEPA procedures shall be adopted only after an
"opportunity for public review," and that once in effect, the procedures must be made
"readily available to the public").
478. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44083-44094.
479. Id. at 44083.
480.- Id. at 44083-84.
481. Id. at 44084.
482. Id. at 44086.
483. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011) ("Categorical exclusion means a category of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures
adopted by a federal agency in implementation of these regulations.")
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member or participant .... Leases of government land for grazing
and agricultural purposes .... Recreational leases to any city, county,
state or federal agency .... Leases or licenses regarding buried
utilities, including gas, water and sewer pipelines, and telephone
cables, irrigation drains, and storm sewers, sanitary sewers
discharging treated effluent, telephone and electric power poles and
lines, irrigation pumps, drain structures and ditches, fences, roads,
highways and bridges, water wells, boat docks and boat launching
facilities.... Temporary or single-time permit of project facilities. 48
The breadth of these exclusions is breathtaking. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine what projects undertaken by the USIBWC would not come
within one or more of the exclusions. This is not to say the USIBWC
has not undertaken Environmental Assessments (EA) and
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for some projects, but it
appears to have been done on a voluntary ad hoc basis with no public
input into the decision whether or not to use a categorical exclusion.48 5
It is unclear whether the public would even know about agency actions
when it has invoked a categorical exclusion, because the agency is
required to produce only an internal agency memorandum.'
Moreover, the USIBWC exclusion of all actions taken pursuant to
treaty requirements becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy since the IBWC
decides what actions to take under the 1944 Water Treaty.
Further,
it misrepresents the language of the Treaty itself, which specifies that
actions to be taken by the respective governments are to fully comply
with the domestic laws of each section.8
The CEQ regulations also require agency procedures to identify
"extraordinary circumstances" pursuant to which full NEPA
documentation is required even for actions that are normally classified
as categorical exclusions.48 9 "Extraordinary circumstances are factors
or circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a
significant environmental effect that then requires a further analysis in

484. ' USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44086.
485. Even if a proposed action fits within the definition of a categorical exclusion,
and does not raise extraordinary circumstances, the CEQ Regulations make clear that
an agency can at its discretion decide "to prepare an environmental assessment ... in
order to assist agency planning and decisionmaking." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b) (2011).
486. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44087 ("Categorical Exclusions.
An environmental memorandum will be prepared which includes a description of the
proposed action, and a finding that the action is categorically excluded and no further
environmental action is needed to comply with NEPA, executive orders, regulations
and other acts. This memorandum shall be referenced in decision documents.")
487. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1257.
488. Article 24 of the 1944 Water Treaty provides, in part, "The International
Boundary and Water Commission shall have, in addition to the powers and duties
otherwise specifically provided in this Treaty, the following powers and duties: ... (b)
To construct the works agreed upon or to supervise their construction and to operate
and maintain such works or to supervise their operation and maintenance, in
accordance with the respective domestic laws of each country." Id. at 1255.
489. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011) ("Any procedures under this section shall provide for
extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a
significant environmental effect.").
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an [EA] or an [EIS]. "49

The USIBWC Procedures include an "an extraordinary
circumstance" statement, but provide no criteria for when it would
apply.49 1 In its entirety, the statement reads: "In an extraordinary
circumstance, as determined by the Commissioner, in which a
normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect,
This barebones
an environmental assessment will be prepared."'
language does not identify what factors or circumstances might
constitute extraordinary circumstances and essentially leaves the
determination to the unfettered discretion of the Commissioner.493
Reference to CEQ Guidance on "Establishing, Applying and
Revising Categorical Exclusions under the NEPA," suggests numerous
shortcomings in the USIBWC's use of categorical exclusions and
extraordinary circumstances.4 4 The CEQ Guidance emphasizes that
"categorical exclusions are not exemptions or waivers of NEPA review;
The CEQ Guidance
they are simply one type of NEPA review."*4
states that categorical exclusions "should clearly define the eligible
category of actions, as well as any physical temporal or environmental
factors that would constrain its use." 4 96
Citing examples of extraordinary circumstances identified by an
agency, such as impact on protected species or habitat, the CEQ
Guidance states "agency NEPA implementing procedures should
clearly describe the manner in which an agency applies extraordinary
circumstances and the circumstances under which additional analysis
Further, "if extensive
in an EA or an EIS is warranted.""
extraordinary circumstances are needed to limit a . proposed
categorical exclusion, the agency should also consider whether the
categorical exclusion itself is appropriate.""'The USIBWC statement
of extraordinary circumstances is completely inadequate, both as
The Ninth Circuit has required
promulgated and as applied.
documentation to demonstrate that a Federal agency has considered
the environmental impact of extraordinary circumstances. 9 The CEQ
regulations direct Federal agencies to "continue to review their
490. Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley on Establishing, Applying and Revising
Categorical Exclusions under the National Environmental Policy Act 2 (Nov. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter CEQ Guidance], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/NEPA%20Categorical
%20Exclusion%20Guidance%2023-11-2010.pdf.
491. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44086.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. CEQ Guidance, supranote 490, at 2-3.
495. Id. at 2.
496. Id. at 5.
497. Id. at 6.
498. Id.
499. California v. Norton, 311 F. 3d 1162, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2002); see also, Kevin H.
Moriarty, Note, Circumventing The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act: Agency Abuse Of The
Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2312, 2329-30, 2333 (2004) (analyzing
"extraordinary circumstances" language).
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policies and procedures and in consultation with [CEQ] to revise them
as necessary to ensure full compliance with the purposes and
provisions of [NEPA]."500

The CEQ Guidance states: "Where an

agency's categorical exclusions have not been regularly reviewed, they
should be reviewed by the agency as soon as possible,o' The CEQ
recommends a "seven-year cycle" for review of agency categorical
exclusions, to ensure they are appropriate "in light of evolving or
changing conditions that might present new or different
environmental impacts or risks."o 2 The USIBWC categorical
exclusions, inadequate as they are, have not been reviewed in 30 years.
E.

CATERING

To SPECIAL INTERESTS

In recent years the USIBWC has established advisory groups in an
attempt to counter criticisms that it is secretive and resistant to public
input. The USIBWC established five regional "Citizen Forums"
between 1999 and 2005, each comprising a membership appointed by
the U.S. Commissioner, "to facilitate the exchange of information
between the USIBWC and members of the public about Commission
activities. "o50 In addition, the USIBWC's "Clean Rivers Program" has
established separate "Basin Advisory Committees. "50o It appears that
the USIBWC establishment of these advisory committees is in direct
violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),' which has
stringent requirements for establishment of such groups.
Enactment of FACA in 1972 was prompted by the belief of many
citizens and Members of Congress that a proliferation of advisory
committees was duplicative, inefficient, and lacked adequate control
or oversight. Additionally, there was strong public sentiment that such
committees failed to sufficiently represent the public interest by
allowing special interests special access to sway policy-makers.os
Through FACA, Congress sought to sharply limit the increasing
number of advisory committees and to open their activities to public
FACA requires continuing congressional review of each
scrutiny.0
advisory committee to ensure that it fulfills its defined purpose, that its
membership is "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed," 50' and that the

500.
501.
502.

40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (2011).
CEQ Guidance, supranote 4900, at 15.
Id.atl6.

503.

San

Diego

Citizens

Forums,

INT'L

BOUNDARY

http://www.ibwc.gov/Citizens_Forums/CF_SBIWTP.html
504.

See

Basin

Advisory

Committees,

INT'L

&

WATER

COMM'N,

(last visited Mar. 8, 2011).

BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMM'N,

http://www.ibwc.gov/crp/participation.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
505. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2006).
506. See WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40520, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITEES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2009),

availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf.
507. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
508. Id.§5(b)(2).
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committee will "not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing
authority or by any special interest." 5 "
Congress charged the General Services Administration (GSA) with
administering FACA, granting it authority to develop and apply
guidelines and controls to improve the performance of advisory
committees. 1 0 All advisory committees that are subject to FACA must
file a charter every two years with the GSA."1 ' FACA-governed entities
are defined specifically within the act, to include:
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task
force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup
thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"),
which is -

(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or

(B) established or utilized by the President, or

(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or
more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that
such term excludes any committee that is composed wholly of fulltime, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal
Government, and (ii) any committee that is created by the National
or the National Academy of Public
Academy of 5 Sciences
12
Administration.
There is no reason to doubt that the advisory committees created
by the USIBWC are covered by the FACA, yet there. is no record of the
USIBWC having complied with the requirements for establishing such
Additionally, a large part of the
advisory groups under the FACA."
intent and purpose of the FACA, to ensure that special interests are
not given special access to sway public policy, is frustrated by the makeup of the USIBWC's committees. Although the full membership
information is not posted on the USIBWC's website, a review of press
releases in the last couple of years reveals the committees are stacked
51
with representatives of local irrigation districts. " Thus, even if the

509. Id.§5(b)(3).
510. Id. § 7.
511. Id. § 14 (a) (B) (2) (2006).
512. Id., § 3(2).
513. See DatabaseSearch, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY DATABASES ONLINE,
http://fido.gov/facadatabase/databasesearch.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
514. See, e.g., Press Release, USIBWC, USIBWC Appoints Colorado River Citizens
Arizona (Aug.
Forum Board Members; Public Meeting Set For September 1 In Yuma,
9
20, 2009), available at-http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/PressRelease_08200 .pdf.
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USIBWC successfully completed the procedural steps required to
create such committees, they would be unlikely to satisfy FACA's
requirement that membership be "fairly balanced in terms of the
points of view represented.""'
AJustice Department opinion states that "Congress did not intend
the Federal Advisory Committee Act ... to apply to such a body
created jointly by the United States and another nation," such as the
U.S.-Japan Consultative Group on Economic relations.' However, the
USIBWC advisory committees do not advise the IBWC, an
international body, they advise the U.S. Section, a federal agency.
Thus, the USIBWC has used the FACA, much like NEPA, to give the
appearance of public participation while actually skirting the law and
shutting the public out.
F.

NEGLECTED DAMS POSE CATASTROPHIC THREATS

The most alarming fact about the current state of the USIBWC and
its failing infrastructure, however, concerns the unsafe condition of
two major storage dams on the Rio Grande, and the agency's efforts to
hide from the public breathtaking information about the imminent
threat of a major catastrophe.'
The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) in 2009 rated three massive storage dams operated by
the IBWC in its highest hazard classification, another dam as a
"significant" hazard, and three dams as presenting a "low" hazard."'
Indeed, the USIBWC itself had previously recognized that that

515. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2) (2006).
516. Memorandum from Larry A. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to the President 3 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 321, 322 (1979).
517. See, e.g., Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, supra note 39
("Two international storage dams operated by USIBWC have been rated unsafe.
Millions of residents on both sides of the border are at high risk of inundation by
floods due to the disrepair.").
See also, Emma Perez-Trevino, Inspections Indicate
Weakness
in
Some
Dams,
BROWNSVILLE
HERALD,
July
14,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/dams-1 14378-indicate-inspections.html;
Emma Perez-Trevino, State Keeping Eye on Dams and Levees, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, July
19,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/texas-1 14531-divisioncommission.html; Emma Perez-Trevino, Former IBWC Counsel Alleges Abuses Affecting
Safety,
BROWNSVILLE
HERALD,
August
7,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/water-1 15220-grande-dams.html
(documenting concerns with the IBWC).
518. FEMA, P-759, DAM SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3677 (follow download link); Federal
law imposes duties on both the Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA with respect to
dam safety. The law requires the Corps of Engineers to "carry out a national program
of inspection of dams for the purpose of protecting human life and property." 33
U.S.C. § 467(a) (2006). Excluded from the program, however, are dams under the
jurisdiction of the-IBWC, unless the IBWC requests the Corps to inspect its dams. Id.
FEMA is responsible for coordination of dam safety, including an Interagency
Committee on Dam Safety, which ironically, includes IBWC representation. Id. §
467(e). FEMA has adopted Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety to establish a basic
structure for agencies' dam safety programs. Federal Guidelinesfor Dam Safety, FEMA,
(last modified Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/damfailure/fema333.shtm.
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none of the IBWC dams located on the Rio Grande are considered
"Safe". Using criteria developed by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the IBWC itself assigned safety ratings to its dams on a scale
that ranges from Class I to Class V, with Class V being "Safe." "'
Ratings assigned to the two massive IBWC storage dams on the Rio
Grande are especially alarming, as they are deemed to be in "urgent"
and "high priority" need of repair. '
Amistad Dam, dedicated in 1969, is the largest of the storage dams
and reservoirs built on the international reach of the Rio Grande.
Amistad Storage Dam was rated Class II, "Urgent (Potentially
Unsafe)."522 The actual report on which the conclusions are based is
referenced on the IBWC website.52 ' But, the USIBWC refused to
release an updated report in response to a FOIA request from Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER).524
Although not acknowledged on the IBWC website, the rating
assigned to Amistad means "failure could begin during normal
operations or be initiated as the consequence of an event. The
likelihood of failure from one of these occurrences, prior to
remediation, is too high to assure public safety." The operator of a
Class II dam is supposed to "[i]mplement interim risk reduction
[c] onduct
measures, including operational restrictions,...
heightened monitoring and evaluation ... [and] [g]ive very high
priority for investigations to supportjustification for remediation."52 1
Falcon Dam, built between 1950 and 1954, "is the lowermost major

519.

See

Safety

of

Dams,

INT'L

BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMM'N,

http://www.ibwc.gov/MissionOperations/SoD.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
There are five Dam Safety Action Classes. They are as follows: I - Urgent and
Compelling (Unsafe); 11 - Urgent (Unsafe or Potentially Unsafe); III - High Priority
(Conditionally Unsafe); IV - Priority (Marginally Safe); V - Normal (Safe), id.
520.

Amistad Dam, INT'L BOUNDARY& WATER COMM'N,

[hereinafter Amistad
http://www.ibwc.gov/MissionOperations/SoDAmistad.html
Dam] (last visited Mar. 22, 2011); Falcon Dam, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Mission-Operations/SoDFalcon.html [hereinafter Falcon Dam]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
521. Amistad
Project
Office,
INT'L
BOUNDARY
&
WATER
COMM'N,
(last
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/FieldOffices/amistad.html
visited Mar. 22, 2011).

See generally INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN

FY 2008- FY 2013 (2010), http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/StrategicPlan.pdf [hereinafter
IBWC STRATEGIC PLAN].

522. See Amistad Dam, supra note 520.
523. Amistad Project Office, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(follow
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/Field_Offices/amistad.html
the link "Joint Report of the Technical Advisors of the IBWC regarding the
Geotechnical, Electrical, Mechanical and Structural Safety of Amistad Dam") (last
visited Apr. 18, 2011).
524. See Jared Taylor, Environmental Group Sues IBWC over Withheld Info, MONITOR,
Feb.,. 1, 2011, 7:08 PM, http://www.themonitor.com/news/environmental46750group-ibwc.html.
525. See, e.g., TIMOTHY M. O'LEARY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, USING PFMA WITH
IRRM PLANS: POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS WORKSHOP, at Q-5 (2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/Risk/pfma/TabQ
UsingPFMAwithIRRMPlans.pdf.
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multipurpose international dam and reservoir on the Rio Grande."52 6
The United States Army Corp of Engineers rated the Falcon Storage
For a
Dam as Class III, "High Priority-(Conditionally Unsafe)." 2
Class III dam, such as Falcon, the "probability of failure is moderate to
high." Corrective action calls for the agency to "[i] mplement interim
risk reduction measures, including operational restrictions ...
[c]onduct heightened monitoring and evaluation ...
[and]
for
for investigations to support justification
[p]rioritize
remediation.""'
Yet, in the 2010 hurricane and monsoon season, the IBWC
maintained historically high dam levels and made unprecedented dam
releases, nonchalantly proclaiming that the IBWC was operating the
dams normally. 2' According to the Corps, only for dams in Class V,
the "Safe" dams, should the operator "[c]ontinue routine dam safety
"Heightened
activities, normal operation, and maintenance."so
monitoring and evaluation" and "very high priority for investigations",
as translated by the IBWC, meant that a "risk analysis study on Amistad
IBWC's
Dam" was supposed to be completed sometime in 2010!'
website notes that it planned to "initiate preliminary investigations and
evaluation of Falcon Dam in FY2009."1 2 The agency acknowledges
that it prepared a November 2009 updated report on the condition of
Amistad," but refused to make that public.3
G. SECRECY AND COVER-UP

More shocking, however, was the agency's decision to hide from
the public the inundation maps that would show the extent of the
catastrophe that would ensue should one of the IBWC dams fail. The
IBWC website does not even acknowledge the existence of
"Emergency Action Plans" (EAPs) and inundation maps, although
they are considered essential to reduce potential property damage and
loss of lives in areas that dam failure would affect. A complete EAP
includes a map of the potential inundation area, procedures and

526. Falcon Dam & Power Plant, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(last
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/FieldOffices/Falcon.html
visited Apr. 18, 2011); IBWC STRATEGIC PLAN, supranote 521, at 7.
527. INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, supra note 5266; INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N JoINT REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL ADvISORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
AND WATER COMMISSION REGARDING THE GEOTECHNICAL, ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND
STRUCTURAL SAFEIY OF FALCON DAM 5, availableat

http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/SODReportFalcon.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
528. O'LEARY, supra note 525, at Q-5.
529. See, e.g., Perez-Trevino, Inspections Indicate Weakness in Some Dams, supra note
517; Perez-Trevino State keeping Eye on Dams and Levees, supra note 517; Perez-Trevino,
FormerIBWC Counsel Alleges Abuses Affecting Safety, supra note 517.
530. O'LEARY, supra note 525, at Q-5.
531. Id.; Perez-Trevino, supra note 59.
532. Falcon Dam, supranote 520.
533. Amistad Dam, supranote 520; Perez-Trevino, supranote 59.
534. Taylor, supra note 524.
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information for warning downstream emergency management
authorities, and other crucial information."
Although the IBWC denied a FOIA request for its EAP and maps,
claiming they do not exist,536 the agency apparently has told another
story to FEMA. FEMA has reported that "the USIBWC has an EAP for
each of its large storage dams (Amistad and Falcon), as well as for
Anzalduas and Retamal International Diversion Dams."53 1
The IBWC has been aware of the sinkholes that threaten the
integrity of Amistad Dam since 1990, and they have gotten worse, now
numbering approximately thirty and varying in 'size and severity. 3
Besides the sinkholes, a "depression" area has also been noticed on
the upstream embankment and water seepage has been noticed
downstream from the dam.539 If the Amistad Dam were to fail, nearly 5
million acre-feet of water would be released. 4 o Falcon Dam also has a
history of foundation seepage and there are serious questions about
the stability of the entire Falcon Dam, which inspectors noted is in
need of further evaluation."' "Both Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam
were built before 1972 when the National Dam Inspection Act was
passed and before . . . guidelines for dam safety were developed." 4 2

On appeal of the FOIA denial, the USIBWC belatedly
acknowledged the existence of various documents related to the ultrahazardous condition of the Amistad and Falcon Dams, but once again
the U.S. Section refused to produce the requested information.
This time, instead of denying the existence of the documents,
including an admitted seventy-seven inundation maps, the USIBWC
claimed the documents are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA
because they are mere drafts subject to the deliberative process
exemption under the FOIA.544 Additionally, IBWC withheld the
documents pursuant to a claim that "disclosure of such information
could facilitate illegal acts against critical infrastructure."54 5
The claim that the documents are drafts subject to the deliberative
process exemption is troubling, both since "maps are simply factual
535. About
EAPs,
DAMSAFETYACrION.ORG,
http://www.damsafetyaction.org/TX/about-eaps/what-eap.php (last visited Mar. 22,
2011).
536. Taylor, supra note 524.
537. FEMA, Dam Safety in the United States, supranote 518, at 32.
538. Perez-Trevino, Deficiencies, supra note 59.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. See Letter from Steve Fitten, Chief FOIA Officer, USIBWC, to Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility (Nov. 29, 2010) (on file with author); Complaint at
1, 2, Pub. Emp. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, No.
1:11CV00261 (Jan. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 466053,
at
available
http://peer.org/docs/tx/1_31 11_USIBWC-damsafetyFOIAComplaint.pdf.
544. Complaint, supra note 543, at 2.
545. Letter from Steve Fitten, supra note 543; Complaint, supra note 543, at 8.
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representations and not subject to policy deliberation, [and] also
because the documents have been in perpetual draft form decades
after they were first required, precisely to avoid public disclosure."54
Moreover, the claim of deliberative process suggests the EAPs have not
been shared with state and local officials, which is either a
preposterous claim or an admission of a truly counterproductive
obsession with secrecy.54 7
Even more troubling is the USIBWC claim that emergency action
plans and inundation maps may be withheld from the public on the
basis that "disclosure of such information could facilitate illegal acts
against critical infrastructure."8 . By this logic, communities
throughout the nation may be denied the very information mandated
for their safety planning."' In reality, it is plain that the USIBWC is
546. Complaint, supra note 543, at 2. The Amistad EAP "itself suggests this, at p. 27
('Emergency Action Plans should be considered 'Living Documents,' This means that:
(1) They will never be complete, (2) They should be reviewed not less than
annually.')." Id. at 2 n.I. See also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973) (discussing the
Freedom of Information Act and the scope of the deliberative process privilege).
547. The exemption protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (2011).
548. Complaint, supra note 543, at 20. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines "critical
infrastructure" as "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters." 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2011). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 includes a provision that operate as a new "Exemption
3 statute" under the FOIA for "critical infrastructure" information that is obtained by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 6 U.S.C. § 133(a) (1) (A) (2011). The
Exemption 3 statute provides new protection under the FOIA for information
pertaining to the nation's critical infrastructure that is voluntarily submitted to DHS.
The Act contains an extensive definition of the term "critical infrastructure
information." This exemption would not apply to USIBWC, and USIBWC has not
claimed Exemption 3. Courts have been asked to protect different types of
information related to homeland security under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2011), but the
information must relate solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. Not only that, but even when the exemption is sought, the agency must
sufficiently articulate the potential harm from disclosure. Agencies' "conclusory ...
boilerplate" assertions are insufficient to support non-disclosure of even intra-agency
practices. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep't Homeland Security, 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 312
(D. Conn. 2008).
549. There is some precedent for withholding inundation maps under FOIA due to
claimed threat of terrorist attack. In Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. -, 131
S. Ct. 1259 (2011), the Supreme Court of United States held that FOIA exemption 2, 5
U. S. C. §552(b) (2), could not be used by the Department of the Navy to deny a FOIA
request for data and maps used to help store explosives at a naval base in Washington
State. Thus, when assessing records whose disclosure would risk circumvention of the
law, as by terrorists, the government must assert interference with a law enforcement
function, under exemption 7, §552(b) (7), as in the only reported case to uphold an
agency's refusal to release inundation maps. A Federal District Court in Utah declined
to order the Bureau of Reclamation to release inundation maps for the areas below
Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam, when the Bureau claimed that it was acting in a
statutory law enforcement capacity. Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320, 1322 (D. Utah 2003); see also Cara Muroff, Terrorists and
Tennis Courts: How Legal Interpretations of the Freedom of Information Act and New Laws
Enacted to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Will Shape the Public's Ability to Access Critical
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cowering behind bogus claims of privilege to hide its own gross
incompetence, thereby putting millions of border residents at even
greater peril by virtue of denying them information deemed essential
to their safety.
The annual USIBWC budget requests in recent years indicate the
agency has considered dam safety anything but a "high priority" in the
twenty years it has known about the poor condition of the dams.
There appears to be a dawning awareness of the need to address
urgent safety issues at the two major international storage dams on the
Rio Grande, but those tentative efforts appear to be mainly still in the
investigatory stages.55 0 The agency's response to the
FOIA appeal also revealed that it did- not even have an EAP of any
kind for Falcon Dam prior to
February 17, 2009." Similarly, the agency suggests the EAP still
has no inundations maps. 5
VIII.EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE USIBWC
A.

DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES

The Supremacy Clause states that, like the Constitution and
federal statutes, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
"
In the leading case of Foster v. Nielson, 554 decided in
Land;

InfrastructureInformation, 16 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 166-68(2005). The IBWC has
made no law enforcement claim, which in any event would not explain its initial
deception regarding the existence of the maps. Significantly, the Army Corps of
Engineers, like most of the 100,000 dam operators in the U.S., make their EAPs and
inundation maps widely available, often on the internet. The Corps maintains the
National Inventory of Dams at http://nid.usace.army.mil. The Corps has posted
online all of the inundation maps for Wolf Creek Dam in Kentucky, for example,
which impounds Lake Cumberland, the largest reservoir east of the Mississippi River
and ninth largest in the U.S. See Wolf Creek Inundation Maps, ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS
http://www.1m.usace.army.mil/WolfCreek/mapsonline.htm (Apr. 19, 2011); see also,
Austin Peay State University GIS Center, Wolf Creek Dam, AP GIS CENTER,
http://gisweb.apsu.edu/WolfCreek.html (last visited May 24, 2010). FEMA is similarly
unequivocal about the need for communities to have access to EAPs and inundation
maps for their own emergency preparedness planning. See, e.g., FEMA, CREDIT FOR
DAM SAFETY, at 2 (2006),
available

at

http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?fromSearch=fromsearch&id=4612.
State laws often require public access to dam safety information as well. See, e.g., CAL.
GOv'T CODE § 8589.5(b) (West 2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-175-520 (West 2009).
550. See, e.g., STATE DEP'T BUDGET 2011, supra note, at 692-96.
551. See Redacted FOLA copy of the Falcon EAP, C-10, Revisions and Updates made
to EAP, describing February 17, 2009 version as the "original" EAP (on file with
author).
552. See Redacted FOIA copy of the Falcon EAP, G-1, Desirable Additions to this
Manual includes "inundation maps" (on file with author).
553. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
554. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), rev'd on other giounds, United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
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1829, the Supreme Court explained that notwithstanding the language
of the Supremacy Clause, not all treaties are immediately the law of the
land upon their ratification:
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the distinction in the case of
Medellin v. Texas,"" wherein the Court noted the longstanding
distinction between a self-executing treaty, which upon entry into force
"automatically constitute [s] binding federal law enforceable in United
States courts," and a non-self-executing treaty, which does not.557 In
determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, the Court has
focused on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers as evidenced by the
treaty's text.558 The Court has also considered the negotiation and
drafting history, as well as the post-ratification understanding of
signatory nations, including the views of the Executive Branch.5
Nothing in the Court's Medellin decision suggests that the
president is not still constitutionally bound to comply with a non-selfexecuting treaty. The lack of implementing legislation (and thus
justiciability) would seem to have no effect on the president's
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Indeed, Medellin makes clear that the president may take non56
judicial actions to enforce a non-self-executing treaty, even if the
president is precluded from "unilaterally making the treaty binding on
domestic courts."561 For example, the Court suggests, the president
might set aside state law to implement a non-self-executing treaty.6 2
Obviously, then, the President may and must require compliance with
a non- self-executing treaty within the executive branch, and to that
end should employ any available constitutional or statutory
authorities.5 63
Under Medellin, the 1944 Water Treaty is shown to be non-self555. Id. at 314.
556. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
557. Id. at 504. Due to the unique facts of the case, and the court's somewhat
inscrutable opinion, scholars disagree as to how far the Court may have tilted away
from a presumption of self-execution of international agreements entered into by the
United States, and the power of the president to implement such agreements without
an act of Congress. See generally, David J. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigmfor Treaty
Interpretation,102 AMI.J. INT'L L. 529 (2008).
558. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3, 518-19.
559. Id. at 507, 513.
560. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
561. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
562. Id. at 523 n.13.
563. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties,
102 AM.J. INT'L L. 540, 549-50 (2008).
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executing. Applying the first part of the analysis, examination of the
text, the Protocol to the Treaty specifies that it is "an integral part of
the Treaty," and:
(a) [t]hat no commitment for works to be built by the United States
in whole or in part at its expense, or for expenditures by the United
States, other than those specifically provided for in the treaty, shall be
made by the Secretary of State of the United States, the
Commissioner of the United States Section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission, the United States Section of said
Commission, or any other officer or employee of the United States,
without prior approval of the Congress of the United States ....

(b) Insofar as they affect persons and property in the territorial limits
of the United States, the powers and functions of the Secretary of
State of the United States, the Commissioner of the United States
Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the
United States Section of said Commission, and any other officer or
employee of the United States, shall be subject to the statutory and
constitutional controls and processes. Nothing contained in the treaty
or protocol shall be construed as impairing the power of the
Congress of the United States to define the terms of office of
members of the United States Section of the International Boundary
and Water Commission or to provide for their appointment by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate or
otherwise. 5
Indeed, Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme
to implement the 1944 Water Treaty and the other boundary and
water treaties.5 " The Senate Report that accompanies the AmericanMexican Treaty Act of 1950 states that the legislation was needed to
authorize the USIBWC to engage in activities including construction
of storage dams on the Rio Grande, and other activities consistent with
and required by 1944 Water Treaty, which heretofore had been
authorized only on a yearly basis by appropriation acts.5" Moreover,
the Report makes clear that "[t]he treaty of 1944 and enabling
legislation (principally the Act of August 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 660)
authorize the United States Section of the Boundary Commission to
carry on most of the activities necessary in connection with its
The Report is accompanied by letters from the State
operations.

564.

1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, at Protocol (a), (b).

565. See 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011).
566. S. Rep. No. 81-2095 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3734, 3735, 1950 WL
1829.
567. Id. As described above, the exact same 1935 law cited in the legislative history
as giving the USIBWC most of its powers explicitly authorizes the President to
designate the USIBWC, or any other federal agency, to perform those functions, and it
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Department, which drafted the bill."* The detailed provisions of these
statutes also evidence the post-ratification understanding of the United
States that such legislation was essential to implementation of the
treaties.
Again, it is important to stress that the non-self-executing nature of
the Treaty merely precludes judicial enforcement, except for those
provisions that have been implemented through legislation. The
executive branch is nevertheless bound by all of the Treaty's
provisions, including for example those concerning allocation of
boundary waters between the United States and Mexico.
B. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The State Department has fabricated a variety of excuses for
abandoning its responsibilities for oversight of the USIBWC. Chief
among these is the implication that the agency is subject not to control
by the executive branch, but solely by Congress. The fuzzy claim is
promoted by the Department's oft-repeated insistence that the
USIBWC cannot be reined in by the executive branch absent
congressional approval. Even academic scholars have propagated the
myth of congressional control that the State Department instigated. A
recent article claims that "the U.S. IBWC was structured, in effect, as a
congressional agency, an agency that under normal circumstances was
meant to operate with a considerable degree of congressional
oversight."56 9 Yet, when it ratified the 1944 Treaty, the Senate did not
make the position of Commissioner subject to its advice and
consent.7 o The abdication of this right-indeed this constitutional
obligation-hardly suggests a heightened congressional interest in
overseeing the agency.5 71
In contrast to the "congressional agency" theory, the IBWC
"considers itself an independent federal government agency whose

specifies that the Secretary of State, acting through the USIBWC, is so authorized.
568. Id.
569. Mumme & Little, supranote 5.
570. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at Protocol (b).
571. Under the U. S. Constitution Appointments Clause, the president may appoint
two classes of officers: principal officers and inferior officers. The former are
appointed subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. In Edmond v. United States, the Court explained that, at a minimum, to be an
inferior officer one must be subordinate: "Whether one is an 'inferior' officer
depends on whether he has a superior." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662
(1997). If "directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate," one has a
superior. Id. at 663.
The Congress has no authority to vest the appointment of
"principal" officers in the President alone. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of 'etiquette or
protocol'; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional
scheme."
Id. at 659 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976)).
The
requirement for "Advice and Consent of the Senate" serves both to curb Executive
abuses of the appointment power, and "to promote ajudicious choice of [persons] for
filling the offices of the union." Id. (citations omitted).

BOUNDARY WATER COMMISSION, US-MEXICO

Issue 2

287

leader is answerable only to the President." 7 ' This view presumably is
shared by the State Department,5 7" yet there is no statutory or other
support for the claim. Independent agencies are distinguished from
other executive agencies by their structural and functional
characteristics, or by statutory designation; whereas most executive
agencies have a single head, independent agencies are normally led by
a multi-member commission or board, and there are usually statutory
limitations on presidential influence. 7
The - State Department likens the USIBWC to genuinely
independent agencies that have since been statutorily reassigned to
the State Department,575 but the comparisons are inapt.5 76 In, 1961,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act established the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent
In 1999, "ACDA was abolished and two new Department
agency.
bureaus, Arms Control (BAC) and Nonproliferation (BN), were
Subsequently in 2000, due to congressional concerns
created.
regarding effective verification of and compliance with arms
agreements, part of the [BAC] became a separate Bureau of
Verification and Compliance [BVC]."57

The United States Information Agency (USIA) "was created in
1953 as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive
branch

of

the

U.S.

government .

. .

."'"

In

1977,

the

State

Department's educational exchange programs and USIA were
combined as the United States International Communication Agency
(USICA).s In 1982, President Reagan restored the agency's name to
"Pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and
the USIA.5 11
Restructuring Act of 1998, USIA was abolished on October 1, 1999,
and its functions were merged into the State Department. "582
In contrast to these agencies, the USIBWC has always been under
the sole jurisdiction of the State Department, notwithstanding the

572. OIG 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 10.
573. See id. at 5, 6, 12; see also OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 36, at 5.
574. See, e.g., RICHARD PIERCE Jr., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 4.4.1b at
95-96 (4th ed. 2004).
575. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 36, at 5 (comparing the USIBWC to the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ("ACDA") and the United States Information
Agency (USIA)).
576. See generally Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §
6501 (2011); KENNON H. NAKAMURA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40989, U.S. PUBuC DIPLOMACY: BACKGROUND AND CuRRENT ISSUES 15-16 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40989.pdf.
577. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961).
578. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT No. ISP-I-05-51: REPORT OF
INSPECTION, THE BuREAu OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 4 (2004).
579. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF STATE, OIG REPORT NO. ISP-I-05-54:
SUMMARY REPORT; PUB. DIPLOMACY AT THE DEP'T OF STATE 22 (2005).
580. Id.
581. Id. at 23
582. Id.; see also Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
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State Department's reticence to exercise that jurisdiction. As such, the
USIBWC was never an independent agency reporting to Congress
rather than to the executive branch, and Congress has, therefore,
never tried to insulate the USIBWC from State Department control.
In addition, a dramatic contrast may be made with the International
Boundary Commission, United States- Canada, which does not even
have a U.S. or Canadian Section, but exists only as an international
body, not a Federal agency, independent or otherwise.
Those who embrace the State Department's hands-off policy also
claim to find support in Treaty language that purportedly delegates
unfettered authority to the USIBWC. "The foundation of the [US]
Section's authority is the 1944 Water Treaty," 8 5 according to one
scholarly tribute to the U.S. Section's autonomy, which also describes
the 1944 Water Treaty as "the basic organic act of the modern
Commission."" The authors say the U.S. Section was endowed with
exclusive operational authority over the construction of mandated
international works, independent control over its payroll,
procurement, and retention of consultants, and other discretionary
authority that might be justified in the discharge of its functions.
These authorizations were not made 'through the Secretary of State,'
States Commissioner, who
but were conferred directly on the United587
has the statutory status as 'head of agency.'

Failure to read the statutes that implement the treaty language
results in concluding the exact opposite of what Congress intended,
and in fact legislated. The statutory scheme enacted by Congress is
susceptible to no interpretation other than that Congress intended to
empower the Secretary of State to carry out the various statutory
duties, and to do so presumptively, but not conclusively, through the
USIBWC.'" The statute reinforces this intent with commonly used
phrases such as "the construction of any project or works undertaken

583. See The Official White House List of Independent Agencies and Government
CorporationsCreated by Congress, USA.GOV,
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2011)
(showing that IBWC is not listed as an "Independent establishment").
584. See David C. Weiss, The International Boundary Commission, Treaty Interpretation,
and the President'sRemoval Power, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 48 (2010).
585. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 669.
586. Id. (whereas the treaty might be viewed as the organic act of the IBWC, only in
the broadest sense of the term, it certainly is not the organic act for the U.S. Section,
an essential distinction); See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and
the Hallmarks of Modern OrganicLegislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002).
587. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 673. To be fair to the authors, they
presumably were misled by a 1954 State Department Memo that they cite as authority
for this mistaken claim. Id. at n.47.
588. See generally YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. "A

cardinal rule of construction is that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole,

with its various parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a
manner that furthers statutory purposes." Id. at CRS-2.
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or administered by the Secretary of State through the International
Boundary and Water Commission;""' and "in connection with
projects, in whole or in part, constructed or administered by the
Secretary of State through the said American Commissioner." 590
More specifically, the statutes frequently reference the fact that all
USIBWC appropriations are made through the State Department.59 1
Of course many of the statutes reflect the non-remarkable fact that the
State Department is charged with negotiating agreements with Mexico,
sometimes "acting through" the USIBWC,"" but often acting directly,
even.where the agreements implement projects previously designated
and agreed to by treaty.9 Moreover, some statutory language goes so
far as to direct the Secretary of State, again without reference to the
USIBWC, to negotiate a new Minute.
Ultimately, however, most of the statutes direct the Secretary of
State, "acting through" the USIBWC, to take a variety of actions, not
merely to negotiate or approve agreements, but to conduct
investigations and construct water systems and other works along the
border.s Some of these statutes impose such implementation duties
directly on the Secretary of State, not acting through the USIBWC."'
Others explicitly give the Secretary the discretion to act "through such
officers as he may designate.""' Obviously, to the extent that the
Secretary delegates such statutory duties to the USIBWC, the Secretary
cannot escape responsibility to see that they are properly performed.
Notably, Congress also recognized the jurisdiction of the State
Department OIG to investigate the USIBWC, specifically calling on the
OIG to monitor and report on the SBIWTP."
The State Department's own Basic Authorities Act makes clear that
the State Department may not simply treat one of its agencies as
"independent."9" The law provides that "the Secretary shall have and
exercise any authority vested by law in any office or official of the
Department of State.""o Additionally, "a reference in any other
provision of law to an official or office of the Department of State ...
589. 22 U.S.C. § 277e (2011).
590. Id. "Statutes should be construed 'so as to avoid rendering superfluous' any
statutory language." KIM, supranote 588, at CRS-12.
591. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 277d-3, d-5, d-7, d-9 (2011).

592. See, e.g., §§ 277d-13, d-14, d-26, d-30, d-32.
593. See, §§ 277d-6, d-8, d-26, d-41, 277g(a).
594. § 277d-45(a). This resulted in Minute No. 311. See IBWC Minute 311, supra
note 157.
595. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 277a, 277d-1, d-17, d-34, 277e (2011).
596. Id. §§ 277e, 277f, 27 7 g- 2 .
597. Id. §§ 277, 277e. This explicit authority to act "through such officers as he may
designate" reflects similar statutory authority given to the President, to construct,
operate; and maintain treaty projects through "any Federal agency" the President may
designate. Id. §§ 277b(a), 277c.
598. Id. § 277d44.
599. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-885, 70 Stat. 890
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2651a, 2669 et seq).
600. 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a) (3) (A) (2011).
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shall be deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of State or the
In 1991, Congress
Department of State, as may be appropriate."6'
designated the US. State Department as the lead agency for
coordination of international water resource policies."o2 Ironically, the
Department's annual reports to Congress under the Senator Paul
Simon: Water for the Poor Act, listing U.S. Federal Agencies Working
on International Water-Related Activities, include no mention of the
IBWC." 3
The, refusal of the State Department to fulfill its own statutory
authority over the IBWC flies in the face of not only the expectations
of Congress, the public, and the White House (as acknowledged by
State OIG),604 but also contradicts settled constitutional doctrines
concerning executive authority over both treaty matters and
administrative agencies. Recent scholarship and a broad spectrum of
political consensus strongly supports the constitutional right and duty
of the executive branch to assert control over federal agencies,
especially where there is a clear statutory delegation, and most of all,
over a non-independent agency such as USIBWC."0
One need not embrace the "unitary executive" theory espoused by
those who contend the president has exclusive control of executive
agencies to agree that the executive branch has not just the right but
an obligation to reign in and direct a renegade agency-particularly
one whose head he alone appoints and removes-and subject it to
Indeed, President Obama's second
administrative discipline.
appointee to the Supreme Court, former Harvard Dean and Solicitor
General Elena Kagan, persuasively articulated the constitutional basis
for presidential control of such administrative agencies in a landmark
law review article published ten years ago, in which she distinguished
the more radical doctrine the Regan and Bush administrations
espoused. 6
Kagan does not embrace the "unitarian" view that "the

601. Id. at§ 2651a(d).
602. Id. at § 2686a(a) (providing that the "Secretary of State shall designate a
Special Coordinator" for water policy Negotiations and water resource policy).
603. The Water for the Poor Act makes access to safe water and sanitation for
developing countries a specific policy objective of U.S. foreign assistance programs. 22
U.S.C. § 2152h (2011); see Water for the Poor Act of 2005, U.S. DEP'T STATE., at T.4.1
(June 1, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/67447.htm; see also, e.g., Senator
Paul Simon, U.S. DEP'T STATE., WATER FOR THE POOR AcT: REPORT TO CONGRESS JUNE
at
(2010)
available
2010
72
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146141.pdf (describing efforts of EPA
"to reduce water contamination along the US-Mexico border").
604. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 35, at 4.
605. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 29, at 358-59 (noting how the unitary executive "has
attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents across the political
spectrum"); Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251; Strauss, supranote 29, at 713-15.
606. See generally Kagan, supranote 29. For an objective analysis of Kagan's views, see
generally TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41272, SUPREME COURT NOMINEE
ELENA KAGAN: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2010),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41272.pdf.
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Constitution provides the President with plenary authority over
administration, so that Congress can no more interfere with the
President's directive authority than with his removal power.""
Rather, Kagan argues that "statutory delegation to an executive agency
official - although not to an independent agency head - usually should
be read as allowing the President to assert directive authority."6 08 By
"independent" agencies, Kagan means those agencies created by
Congress, "whose heads the President may not remove at will.""'
The traditional understanding has been that when an agency
possesses delegated authority under a statute, agency heads-not the
president-must be the ultimate deciders of policy made under
authority of that statute."o Yet under this theory, a president, as the
head of the executive branch, may lawfully try to influence agencies'
actions, and can even remove the head of an agency who does not
follow the president's wishes. 1 Proponents of the fully unitary
executive doctrine, on the other hand, take the extreme view that the
Constitution gives presidents the power to control their subordinates including the so-called independent agencies, whose heads the
president may not remove at will.612
Kagan describes the need for executive leadership to revitalize
especially moribund agencies, stating that "bureaucracy also has
inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia

607. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251; see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 599.
608. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251.
609. Id. at 2247.
610. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 29, at 698, 703.
611. See Id. at 715-16, 735-36, 751 (finding a presidential role uncontroversial where
"presidential authority readily fit the 'oversight' mold and/or may have been explicitly
conferred by Congress."). Even where Congress has designated an agency "an
independent agency of the executive branch", the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel has concluded "[a] 11 that should be inferred from the status of an
'independent agency' is that the entity is not located within another department or
agency." Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. Richard L. Shiffrin on
Removal of Holdover Officials Serving on the Fed. Hous. Bd. and the R.R. Ret. Bd. to
1997)
available at
1,
5
(Aug.
President
to
the
Counsel
the
http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/removalthtm.
612. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008) [hereinafter Calabresi &
Yoo]. This position has been the subject of much criticism that it seeks to encroach on
the constitutional powers of the congress. See e.g., Mark Tushnet, A PoliticalPerspective
on the Theory of the UnitaryExecutive, 12 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 313, 313, 318-19, 323 (2010).
Whereas the debate is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the
Unitary Executive theory draws its name from a passage in The Federalist No. 70, in
which Alexander Hamilton defended the need for a vigorous, energetic, and therefore
unified executive; that the theory has long been debated among scholars whose
references are exclusively to the Constitution's textual grant of executive powers to the
president; but that this traditional theory has little in common with the truly radical
proposition promoted during the Administration of George W. Bush that the
president has vast "inherent" powers that do not appear in the Constitution or federal
law and that are not subject to any power of Congress to limit their exercise. Robert
D. Sloane, The Scope of the Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, 88
B.U. L. REV. 341, 343-45 (2008).
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and torpor."'
She notes that even traditional proponents of agency
independence have long acknowledged that "governmental agencies
inevitably develop 'arteriosclerosis,"' a "rigidity cycle" or "ossification
syndrome" where "Bureaus 'become [] ... gigantic machine [s] that
slowly and inflexibly grind[] along in the direction in which...
initially aimed,' incapable of acting speedily or making necessary
innovations;" all seemingly apt descriptions of the USIBWC."' The
President has the constitutional responsibility to ensure that the "Laws
be faithfully executed."'
The State Department and the USIBWC
must not be permitted to continue their flagrant defiance of the laws.
C. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER TREATY AFFAIRS
It is well established that the President, by virtue of various
constitutional powers, controls the "vast share of responsibility for the
conduct of our foreign relations." 66 It has even been argued that the
president has "unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret
At a
notwithstanding their domestic law effect."
treaties,""'
minimum, scholars agree that the president has authority to interpret
treaties that are not "self-executing," and thus do not have the force of
federal law absent statutory implementation.1
Those who celebrate the purported autonomy of the USIBWC,
eschewing any consideration of the governing statutes, rely on the
1944 Water Treaty to support their thesis. Ironically, the Treaty itself
does no such thing, but rather explicitly recognizes the right of each
country to construct treaty works through any public or private agency
in accordance with domestic laws."o Indeed, the State Department
and the U.S. Section went to elaborate lengths at the Senate heaings
on the Treaty to assure apprehensive Senators that the USIBWC could
never become the renegade agency it is today. The "American
Commissioner" testified, in regard to such concerns, that the role of
the

U.S.

Section

was

merely

as

a

coordinator

of

communications

with

Mexico, not a border jurisdictional goliath:
The discharge of various functions imposed by provisions of the

613. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2263.
614. Id. at 2264 (citations omitted).
615. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
616. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (giving the president
"Commander in Chief" authority); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the
President power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
3 (providing for the presidential authority to receive ambassadors).
617. Yoo, supranote 28, at 868.
618. See id. at 853, 862-63, 867.
619. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1888, 1900-01, 1942-43 (2005)
(distinguishing presidential power concerning treaties that are not "self-executing"
from the authority that the federal courts have to interpret "self-executing" treaties).
620. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, art. 20.
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treaty can in fact be handled by other Federal agencies, but all
dealings between the two countries concerning boundary and
international water matters are funneled through the Commission,
subject always to the control, on matters of policy, of the respective
foreign relations departments.

The purpose of article 2, and other articles of the treaty hereafter to
be noted bearing on the functions and jurisdiction of the
International Boundary and Water Commission, is to provide a
central agency through which all such matters can be cleared and
which would also serve to coordinate the activities of other agencies
aged in the discharge of functions relating to
which might be en
boundary matters.62
The Commissioner's testimony was echoed repeatedly by
Government witnesses eager to assure the lawmakers of the limited
jurisdiction of the USIBWC.6 22
The effect of this provision [Article 20] is to vest in the respective
sections of the Commission the responsibility for the construction of
The actual
the works required by the terms of the treaty.
construction may be carried on by any competent public or private
agency. The sole purpose of the provision is to vest the responsibility
for carrying out the provisions of the treaty in one central agency, to
which either country may look for compliance with the treaty terms.
Here, again, internal arrangements are not sought to be
controlled.623

The jurisdiction of the United States section, as distinguished from
that of the Commission, over the administration of treaty functions, is
very limited. The American section is the representative of the
United States in performing the treaty obligations of the United
States to Mexico and also in seeing that Mexico's obligations to the
United States are carried out. The underlying idea is that all treaty
functions should be centralized in an international agency, and that
the functions to be performed by interior agencies, to the extent that
they bear upon the performance of international functions, should
be correlated and carried out in cooperation with the respective
national section.624

621. Hearings on the 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 98, pt. 1, at 162-63 (statement of
L.M. Lawson, American Comm'r, IBWC).
622. See id., pt. 5, at 1801, 1809-11 (Digest of Testimony of Witnesses for the Dep't of
State and United States Section, IBWC).
623. Id. at 1811.
624. Id. at 1814.
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[The United States section] acts .... as a clearing house through
which matters involving treaty rights, obligations and functions are
cleared, without in any way encroaching upon the jurisdiction of an
or
local.6
Federal,
State,
interior
agency
Thus, the president is empowered not only by the Constitution and
by statute, but also by the 1944 Water Treaty itself to assert executive
authority, and specifically to reassign technical duties away from the
USIBWC and State Department. Freed from technical engineering
responsibilities, the USIBWC should also be unchained from the
debilitating treaty requirement that engineers dominate its leadership.
The 1944 Water Treaty designates five officials for each section: an
"Engineer-Commissioner," two principal engineers, a legal adviser,
and a secretary. 2 An earlier treaty had required the appointment of a
"practical astronomer," an anachronistic requirement that, unlike that
of the "principal engineers" and "Engineer-Commissioner," has been
Indeed, Mexico unilaterally departed from this
dropped.
requirement in 2009 when it appointed a new commissioner who is
not an engineer. 62' The United States had earlier departed from at
least the spirit of the requirement in 2004, when President George W.
Bush appointed Arturo Duran, a chemical engineer rather than a civil
engineer, but with similarly nonexistent management abilities. 2' The
IBWC should, by Minute, eliminate this designation of leadership, so
that each section may be free to employ a variety of appropriate
professionals. Perhaps USIBWC employees will finally be freed from
incompetent and abusive management, and the agency may begin to
focus on active diplomacy and adaptive treaty interpretation, to pursue
new policy initiatives, with maximum public participation, in areas
such as water conservation, water quality, groundwater protection, and
environmental restoration.
D.

SEPARATING DIPLOMATIC DUTIES FROM TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR TREATY WORKS

It has been established that the President has the constitutional,
statutory, and treaty-endowed power to assign technical responsibility
for treaty works to an agency other than USIBWC or the State
Department. The USIBWC has proven that it cannot capably perform
625. Id. at 1816.
626. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2. In recent years, the normal in-house
permanent personnel of the USIBWC number nearly 300. STATE DEP'T BUDGET 2011,
supranote, at 683.
627. Convention of 1882, supra note 82, art. II.
628. See Press Release, Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n, U.S. Section, The
Boundary Marker, Mex. Names a New Comm'r (2009), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/BM-Spring-2009.pdf.
629. See OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.
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both diplomatic and technical duties, and the State Department is
admittedly unwilling and unable to oversee the latter. It is yet to be
seen whether the USIBWC, under the close supervision of the State
Department, as proposed herein, can effectively perform the former.
Meanwhile, technical duties should immediately be transferred
elsewhere.
Undoubtedly, there is a continuing important role for the Border
2012 Program, Border Environment Cooperation Commission
Good
(BECC), North American Development Bank (NADB),
Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), and similar binational
institutions."'o Since its inception in 1995, BECC has certified a total of
175 environmental infrastructure projects-eighty-two in the United
States and ninety-three in Mexico-related to water, sewage, and
municipal waste.63 ' The projects are estimated to cost a total of $3.92
billion to construct and will benefit an estimated 13.8 million border
BECC works in cooperation with the North American
residents.3
which administers the Border
Development Bank (NADB),
Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF), consisting of grant
resources provided by EPA for water and wastewater infrastructure
projects.63 3 Since its inception in April 1997, a total of $560 million in
BEIF grants were approved and contracted to support ninety-two water
NADB
and wastewater projects in the United States and Mexico.'
also provides direct financing in the form of loans for the construction
of BECC-certified environmental projects. 3 5 To date, NADB has
loaned an estimated $569.8 million for fifty-six environmental
infrastructure projects, and another $438.6 million for forty-four loans
in Mexico through the multipurpose financial institution COFIDAN.
616 Such groups might play a larger diplomatic role in addition to their
existing duties, however, they are not the type of organizations that
could be expected to assume the USIBWC's technical duties.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers are
two agencies that are possible successors to the USIBWC, at least with
regard to responsibility for treaty-based construction, operation,
maintenance, and environmental restoration projects. Unfortunately,
neither would be a panacea for what ails the USIBWC. The Bureau of
Reclamation's organic act, the Reclamation Act of 1902, gave it broad
authority to build and operate large-scale projects to irrigate the arid

630. For an interesting discussion of the unique new participatory opportunities
opened for Mexican farmers by BECC and similar groups, see generally Margaret
Wilder, Border Farmers, Water Contamination, and the NAAEC Environmental Side Accord to
NAFTA, 40 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 873 (2000).
631. BORDER ENvTL. COOPERATION COMM'N, N. AM. DEv. B.ANK, QUARTERLY STATUS
REPORT 17 (2010), available at http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/status-eng.pdf.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 1, 4.
634. Id. at 20.
.635. Id. at 1.
636. Id. at 20.
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Additional legislation includes statutes of general
West.637
applicability 38 and project-specific laws. 639 The Department of the
Interior, within which the Bureau of Reclamation is located, has a
horrible record of supervising its sub-agencies, as demonstrated by
mismanagement debacles of the Bureau of Indian Affairsro and the
Moreover, the Bureau of
Minerals Management Service."'
Reclamation itself has a very poor reputation with environmentalists,
historic
and
expertise
its
engineering
notwithstanding
accomplishments."
The Army Corps of Engineers has a similarly mixed reputation,
lauded for its engineering expertise and condemned for its reckless
The Corps lacks an organic statute to
environmental destruction."
limit its discretion," but was given broad authority to prevent
obstructions to navigation under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899;
" wide discretion for flood control projects under a series of Flood
Control Acts adopted between 1928 and 1965;" and project-specific

637. See generally The Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2011)).
638. See, e.g., The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1 (2011)).
639. See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (a)-(v) (2011) (ratified
the Colorado River Compact and authorized construction of Hoover Dam).
640. See Robert J. McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust
Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYUJ. PUB. L. 1, 5-6 (2004) (recounting long history
of gross mismanagement of Indian affairs); see also News Release, U.S. Dep't of
Interior, Secretary Salazar, Attorney General Holder Announce Settlement of Cobell
Lawsuit on Indian Trust Management (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.doi.gov/ost/cobell/FINAL 12-08-09_Cobell-releaseasrevised_127PMFINAL.pdf (discussing United State's mismanagement of Indian trust accounts).
641. Following years of congressional investigations and scathing reviews by the DOI
Inspector General, the last straw for the Minerals Management Service was its
culpability in the British Petroleum Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. See, e.g.,
Minerals Management Service Oversight Hearing: House Committee on Natural Resources,
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary L. Kendall,
available at
Interior)
Department of the
General,
Acting Inspector
http://www.doioig.gov/reports/congressional-testimony; Secretarial Order No. 3302
(June 18, 2010), availableat
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&Pagel
D=35872 9 (renaming the Minerals Management Service as the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)).
642. See generally, MARc REISNER, CADillAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 222-99 (1986) (detailing the relationship between Floyd Dominy
and David Brower during the era large dam construction).
643. See Tarlock, supra note 65, at 1285-86; Klein, supra note 65, at 679-82 (discussing
both the Corps technical ability to build dams and their propensity for inefficient
expenditures of public monies).
644. Zellmer, supra note 43, at 602.
645. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2011).
646. See e.g., Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, ch. 569, § 1, 45 Stat. 534
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 702a (2011)); Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738,
ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2011)); Flood Control Act of
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, § 1, 58 Stat. 887 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1
(2011)); Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1962d-5 (2011) & 33 U.S.C. § 2220 (2011)).
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appropriations for specified navigational enhancements, dams, levees,
and other engineering structures in various Water Resources
Development Acts. .
Notwithstanding its own record of environmental destruction and
wasteful spending, the Corps may offer a better prospect for reform
than the Bureau of Reclamation. According to one leading scholar:
" [T]he Corps is often portrayed by environmentalists as a lawless
agency, but in fact, it is a model 'rule of law' agency compared to sister
management agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation."64
Moreover, the Corps has admitted its errors," and seems ready to
"reinvent itself as a restoration agency.",6o
Nevertheless, recent developments would suggest that the Bureau
of Reclamation is the front-runner to succeed the USIBWC. The
agency's close relationship with the seven Basin states, its dominant
role in management of the Colorado River, its designation as lead
agency in legislation such as the Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Act, and its guiding hand in promised negotiations of a new
comprehensive water agreement with Mexico all signal, not so much
that it might serve as an appendage to the USIBWC, but that the
USIBWC might become the diplomatic arm of the Bureau. Given the
Bureau's notorious lack of diplomacy, it would be wise to separate
responsibility for technical matters from diplomatic ones, as proposed
herein, before it is too late.
E.

ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION

The most urgent policy imperative is that the U.S. Section and
State Department aggressively pursue new initiatives, with maximum
public participation, in areas such as water conservation, water quality,
The
groundwater protection, and environmental restoration.
and
review
participation,
USIBWC should immediately, with full public
categorical
justify
and
revise its defective NEPA procedures, to narrow
exclusions, and to specify the criteria for extraordinary circumstances
to override those exclusions. Similarly, the agency should either
eliminate its advisory committees or else comply with procedural and
substantive requirements, including those for legislative authorization

647. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100
Stat. 4082 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (2011)); Water Resources Development
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-640, 104 Stat. 4604 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2011));
Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2011).
648. Tarlock, supra note 65, at 1291.
649. See U.S. ARmY CORPS OF ENG'Rs, USACE 2012: ALIGNING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
available at
ENGINEERS FOR SUCCESS IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY i, ii (2003),
http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/USACE 2012Final-ExSum.pdf.
650. Tarlock, supranote 65, at 1325. Additionally, unlike the Bureau, the Corps also
has general authority to modify water project facilities and operations for
environmental benefits. Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau:Modern-Day
Reclamation Statutes and Congress's Unfinished Environmental Business, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 137, 176 (2011).
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and for "balance."
As for transboundary environmental impacts, such as those caused
by operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant, they are generally
unregulated by U.S. law. 6' Nevertheless, the United States is a party
to many international agreements that recognize the responsibility of
each nation to consider the transboundary environmental effects of
These include, e.g., the United Nations
governmental actions."'
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context;... the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation;... the United Nations Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes," and
the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
Transboundary environmental impacts
International Watercourses.'
on the US- Mexico border have generally been viewed as subject to
Article 25 of the 1944 Water Treaty
regulation by the IBWC."'
contemplates or at least permits application of these new international
It may well be too late to
understandings to evolving conditions.'
ward off the worst ecological effects of a century of neglectful
development of the boundary rivers, especially in light of potentially
apocalyptic climate change," but a continuing failure to try to reverse

651. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extraterritoriality
of U.S. Environmental Laws, 50 VA.J. INT'L L. 997, 1012 (2010) ("[T]o the extent that
U.S. courts have recognized extraterritorial applications of NEPA, such applications
have occurred exclusively in settings governed as a global commons where no other
single sovereign asserts exclusive jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
652. See generally Thomas E. Digan, Comment, NEPA and the Presumption Against
ExtraterritorialApplication: The Foreign Policy Exclusion, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
165 (1994); Erika L. Preiss, Student Article, The International Obligation to Conduct an
EnvironmentalImpact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerningthe Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject, 7
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307 (1999); Angela Z. Cassar & Carl E. Bruch, Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment in International Watercourse Management, 12 N.Y.U.
ENvrL. L.J. 169, 171 (2003).
653. United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800.
654. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
655. United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
656. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
657. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: YUMA DESALTING PLANT PILOT RUN 7-8 (2009), available at

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmentaldocs/ydp/finalea.pdf.
658. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, art. 24-25.
JANE A. LEGGETF, RL
659. "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal ......
34266, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANCE: SCIENCE HIGHLIGHTS 19 (2009) (citing
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS

REPORT 2 (2007)), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34266.pdf. The
IBWC has at least acknowledged the problem of climate change, although has not
begun to address it outside the context of drought. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Climate
AdaptationPolicy at the ContinentalLevel: NaturalResources in North America and Europe, 27
PACE ENVEL. L. REV. 473, 479 (2010).
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this trend is not an option.660
IX. CONCLUSION
There has never been a greater opportunity for radical reform of
the USIBWC due to a confluence of unhappy events that include a
crescendo of criticism; disappearing water supplies and related
ecological crises; an unprecedented level of expenditures by the
USIBWC; continuing rapid turnover in its ineffective leadership, the
lowest employee morale of any federal agency; and a still rising tide of
scandal, including recent revelations about failing dams and other vital
infrastructure that now pose catastrophic threats to millions of border
residents, the region's ecosystem and its economy.
The executive branch urgently needs to exercise its constitutional,
statutory, and treaty authorities in order to salvage a dedicated forum

for transboundary diplomacy. The State Department's shameful
incompetence and neglect necessitate narrowing its mandate to
diplomatic duties only, along with those of the USIBWC. As other
institutions take over responsibility for carrying out treaty projects, the
need is greater than ever for the State Department and the USIBWC to
rise above decades of disrepute and dishonor, to finally focus on
adaptive treaty interpretation and sustainable management of
boundary waters.

660. Imprisoned by Mussolini in Fascist Italy in 1926, the Italian philosopher
Antonio Gramsci famously wrote, "pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the
will."
ANTONIO GRAMsci, The Modern Prince, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 175 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971); see also Michael
Ekers & Alex Loftus, The Power of Water: Developing Dialogues Between Foucault and
Gramsci, 26 ENV'T & PLANNING D: Soc'Y & SPACE 698 (2007), availableat
http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/loftus/Ekers%20and%20Loftus%202008.pdf.

